
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HINDU PHILOSOPHY IN BUDDHIST PERSPECTIVE

The Vedāntatattvaviniścaya Chapter of Bhavya's Madhyamakahṛdayakārikā

Olle Qvarnström



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ABSTRACT

Hindu Philosophy in Buddhist Perspective
The Vedāntatattvaviniścaya Chapter of Bhavya's Madhyamakahṛdayakārikā
Olle Qvarnström
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This thesis contains a critical edition, annotated English translation, and historical analysis of the Vedāntatattvaviniścaya chapter of the Madhyamakahṛdayakārikā (MHK) based upon a unique Sanskrit palmleaf manuscript preserved in the China Library of Nationalities (Zhongguo Minzu Tushuguan), Beijing, China. MHK together with its auto-commentary, the Tarkajvālā, was composed by the Buddhist Madhyamaka philosopher Bhavya (c. 500-570 A.D.).

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ADDENDA ET CORRIGENDA

page/line	for	read
7/12	Gurhyādhipati	Guhyādhipati
9/11	XVIII	VIII
17/7 (n. 15)	Buddhist	Buddhists
24/1, 3, 14 (n. 16)	ājatisamatā	ajātisamatā
27, 132/7	(No. 3246)	(No. 3247)
27, 132/11	(No. 5255)	(No. 5256)
27, 132/15	(No. 3855)	(No. 3856)
29/5	paśyataḥ /	paśyataḥ / 19a4
29/8	dehādyuda yavyaye	dehādyudayavyaye
31/3	°apekṣinaḥ	°apekṣiṇaḥ
32/14	pareṣthātma° ex con T. mchog tu 'dzin pa bdag gi yul: pareṣṭātma ° *Ms*	pareṣṭhātma°, cf. 23d, mchog na gnas pa grol pa'i bdag: pareṣṭātma *Ms*, T. mchog tu 'dzin pa bdag corroborates *Ms* (para+īṣṭa+ātman)
32/18	characters	syllables
32/19	17b2...17b3	19b2...19b3
33/11	28a	27a
33/17	gcod byed	gcod byed (*chettā)
35/19	*ex con T.* yod la	delete
36/6	pūrnakaś	pūrṇakaś
37/7	yat pīḍānugrahe	yatpīḍānugrahe
37/10	syān amṛtaḥ	syād amṛtaḥ
38/9, 11	hemistitch	hemistich
38/13	gi: gis *P*	delete
38/15	54a	55a
41/15	68	68ab
45/9	bhumy agni°	bhumyagni°
47/5	naiḥsvabhāvyaṃ	naiḥsvābhāvyaṃ
47/7	yuktā	yuktaḥ
47/8	°eha	°eva
49/4 (n. 4)	8.14	8.18
49/5 (n. 4)	No. 5255	No. 5256
49/6 (n. 4)	No. 3855	No. 3856
61/15	(*paraniḥpanna*)	(*apariniṣpanna*)
62/1 (n. 11)	nīti	nītiṃ
63/4 (n. 13)	(*sarvtraga*)	(*sarvatraga*)
63/6 (n. 14)	Dāśa°	Daśa°
68/18	[Various words,...	[Various] words, [...
77/1-2 (n. 56)	[self-originating]	self-originating
80/16	(*bandhyatanaya*)	(*vandhyatanaya*)
88/11	(*gira*)	(*gir*)
88/4 (n. 91)	mahātmānaḥ	mahātmanaḥ
88/11 (n. 91)	bhagavany	bhagavan
90/3 (n. 96)	(*ājati*)	(*ajāti*)
90/7 (n. 97)	varttika	vārttika
92/25	contingent	not contingent
94/10	(*lokabandhuna*)	(*lokabandhu*)
95/1-4	How is it possible...	How can such [an agent and enjoyer] logically lack intrinsic nature? It is not without reason



Bhavya

(*Tibetan Thanka*)

| slob dpon klu sgrub źabs la legs gtugs nas |

| lho phyogs yul du mu stegs tshar bcad daṅ |

| gsaṅ bdag mṅon sum źal gzigs bya rog mtshan |

| bran 'khol slob dpon chen po legs ldan źabs |

The great master Bhavya (central) who, having bowed down to the feet of the master Nāgārjuna (upper left),

And who, having conquered [in debate] the heretics in southern India (central right and central below),

And who is endowed with an immediate perception of the Secret Master (Gurhyādhipati, Śaṃvara) (upper right),

Subjugates [the protective deity] whose emblem is a crow (Bya-rog-mtshan) (lower right).

Courtesy
Musée Guimet
Collection J. Bacot
(M.G.) 16505

aiśvaryamadamatto 'si mām avajñāya vartase /
upasthiteṣu bauddheṣu madadhīnā tava sthitiḥ //

"You are intoxicated by the pride of your lordship in that you [now] remain treating me with disdain. [But remember that] when the Buddhists approach to attack, your existence is in my hands." (*Nyāyakusumāñjali*)*

*Quoted from Chemparaty, G., *An Indian Rational Theology. Introduction to Udayana's Nyāyakusumāñjali* (Vienna 1972), p. 28 and n. 34

CONTENTS

Preface

It is not an easy task even to venture to do full justice to all those individuals who in various ways have smoothed the often toilsome path of mine during my travels through the enigmatic, brushy and intellectually thorny landscape of Buddhist and Brahmanical philosophy.

My initial interest for conducting research into the field of Indian philosophy grew out of my contact with the late Prof. Sven S. Hartman, Department of the History of Religions, University of Lund, Sweden. My studies were then to continue under the guidance of Hartman's successor, Prof. Tord Olsson, to whom I here take the opportunity to express my sincere gratitude for constant support and scholarly assistance. I am also thankful to his colleagues and postgraduate students, especially Dr. Jan Ergardt and Theol. lic. Åke Boqvist, for their constant encouragement and constructive criticism.

During my stay at the University of Washington, Seattle, I had the pleasant privilege of studying with Prof. Karl H. Potter and Prof. Collette Cox. Accordingly, I want to acknowledge here my debt to these two American scholars.

At the close of the present study, I have benefitted from the critical remarks provided me by the following scholars: Prof. Jan W. de Jong, the Australian National University, Canberra, Australia; Prof. Tilmann Vetter, Institut Kern, Indologisch Institut der Rijksuniversitiet, Leiden, the Netherlands; Prof. K. Kunjunni Raja, University of Madras, India. To all of them I bow in respect. I should also record my special thanks to Prof. J. Takasaki, University of Tokyo, who sent me, through Dr. Christian Lindtner, Tucci's photographs of the manuscript of the *Vedāntatattvaviniścaya* chapter of the *Madhyamakahṛdayakārikā* discovered by Rāhula Sāṅkṛtyāyana and Gokhale's copy of the decipherings of Sāṅkṛtyāyana.

However, there exists a core of Indo-Tibetan specialists without whose expertise this thesis would not have assumed the present form and to whom I therefore naturally want to acknowledge my very sincerest thanks. These specialists include, first of all, Lecturer Per K. Sørensen, University of Copenhagen, whose proficiency and extraordinary skill in philosophical Tibetan helped me successfully to carry through my critical edition of the *Vedāntatattvaviniścaya* of the *Madhyamakahṛdayakārikā,* and with whom I have indulged in many valuable discussions on various topics within Buddhist philosophy. In particular, I would like to express my gratitude to Sørensen for providing this book with a critical edition of the Tibetan versions of the *Vedāntatattvaviniścaya.* They also include Professor Malcolm D. Eckel, who during my stay at Harvard University shared with

me his profound historical and philosophical knowledge of Madhyamaka and Vedānta philosophy, as well as his novel approach in editing and translating the delicate Sanskrit and Tibetan *śāstra* texts; Dr. William Ames, formerly University of Washington, Seattle, who provided me with a rough translation of the *uttarapakṣa* of the eighth chapter of the *Tarkajvālā;* and Professor Jiang Zhongxin, Institute of South and South-East Asian Studies, Chinese Academy of Social Sciences, Beijing, who during his stay in Copenhagen put at my disposal an excellent photograph of the Sanskrit manuscript of the *Vedāntatattvaviniścaya* chapter of the *Madhyamakahṛdayakārikā* kept in the Sanskrit manuscript collection of the China Library of Nationalities (Zhongguo Minzu Tushuguan), Beijing, administered by the Cultural Palace of Nationalities (Minzu Wenhua Gong), Beijing, and who gave me an introduction into the script of the manuscript during his stay in Copenhagen in 1987.

To Dr. David Jackson, presently at the University of Hamburg, I pay my Tibetan *phyag 'tshal* for carefully proof-reading my thesis and for numerous critical and editorial remarks.

From the very outset of this acknowledgement, I have deliberately postponed mentioning the scholar who, through his stamina and brilliant knowledge of Sanskrit, Tibetan and the Indian philosophical tradition is well-nigh *primus inter pares*. It is therefore with the greatest pleasure that I acknowledge my sincere gratitude and thanks to my friend and teacher Dr. Christian Lindtner, University of Copenhagen, Denmark. His outstanding knowledge and unflagging support have been almost the *conditio sine qua non* for this doctoral thesis. Should any notable success accrue from this work, it is solely due to my Danish colleagues.

Here I should also express my heartfelt gratitude to Lindtner's parents, Jörgen Lindtner (Royal Commissioner for Expropriation in Denmark) and his wife Lisa, whose generous hospitality, kindness and personal concern will always be dearly treasured in my memory.

I also want to express my great obligation to the Swedish Institute, which afforded me the opportunity to conduct research at the University of Washington and Harvard University, and to Einar Hansen's Forsknings-fond, which supported my studies at the University of Copenhagen.

Finally, I thank my beloved parents, Lars and Inga, to whom this book is dedicated, and whose importance to me could never be conveyed by mere verbal expression.

Lund, March 1989 Olle Qvarnström

I. Introduction

Buddhist and Brahmanical philosophy underwent a significant development in the centuries following Nāgārjuna and Āryadeva.[1] Within the Buddhist tradition, this advancement is indicated by the achievements attained by the Yogācāra school, and by the progress taking place in the field of logic and epistemology, which eventually led to the establishment of the logico-epistemologic school headed by Dignāga. Extraneous to the Buddhist tradition, improvements and innovations were achieved by the major schools of Brahmanical philosophy, whose basic tenets were textually settled and then provided with commentaries.[2]

1 On the dates of Āryadeva (third century A.D.), see Lang 1986, pp. 7-8. The purpose of this Introduction (**I**) is to add information of historical and philosophical importance not specifically dealt with in parts **II**, **III** and **IV** of this thesis. As far as the outline of Bhavya's reformative work of Madhyamaka philosophy is concerned and its historical presuppositions, I am indebted to the works of Ames (1986, pp. 28-58); Eckel (1987, pp. 3-51; 1980, pp. 1-6); Lindtner (1984c, pp. 181-182) and Ruegg (1981a, p. 61). The reader may find it convenient to consult (**IV**), pp. 96-108, before reading parts **II** and **III** of this thesis.

Part **II** of this thesis is a revised version of an article accepted for publication in *Wiener Zeitschrift für die Kunde Süd-Asiens* (WZKS) XXXIII, 1989. Part **IV** is a revised version of an article published in *Studies in Central and East Asian Religions,* vol. I. Copenhagen 1988, pp. 3-34. In order to avoid unnecessary repetition and to make the page and note references conform with the overall pagination of the present work, the references, etc., given in the articles corresponding to parts **II** and **IV** have occasionally been changed or omitted.

Nakamura's doctoral thesis, *Shoki no Vedānta Tetsugaku,* University of Tokyo 1942, vols. 1-4, was published respectively in 1950, 1951, 1955 and 1956. A new edition of the first volume was presented in 1981. Some of the sections contained in Nakamura 1950 were translated from Japanese into English and published in various journals (see Nakamura 1983, pp. viii-xi). The entire vol. 1 was translated into English and published in 1983. When the subject of discussion does not require the year of the first publication of Nakamura's article(s), I refer in this thesis to the publication of 1983.

2 As far as the development of Jaina philosophical writing is concerned, Nakamura's investigations (1983, pp. 266-295) show that in the period between Nāgārjuna (2nd century A.D.) and Bhavya, the Jainas were engaged in composing commentaries on their fundamental texts, as well as in writing manuals on the Jaina doctrine. We do not, however, possess any text from this period of probably considerable ideological interchange between Jainism and Brahmanism an account or criticism of a Vedānta "school". To the best of our knowledge, Jaina philosophical writings had, therefore, not direct impact upon Bhavya's scholarship.

On the relationship between Jaina philosophy and Vedānta, see Nakamura 1983, pp. 266-293; Bollée 1977, pp. 51, 78.

These historical circumstances resulted in a century of great intellectual activity and debate, which, as far as Buddhist thought is concerned, is practically unmatched. In this sixth century, Buddhist philosophy witnessed one of its more distinguished contributions in the scholarship of Bhavya (c. 500-570 A.D.). His innovations within Madhyamaka philosophy and his profound encyclopedic knowledge formed in response to the challenges of his time were to give him an important position in the history of Buddhist philosophy.

The conclusive reason for Bhavya to revise the position and methodology of Madhyamaka philosophy first established by Nāgārjuna was primarily the immediate danger of being absorbed or overshadowed by the Yogācāra school and, secondly, the challenges which various Brahmanical systems posed to the Madhyamaka school. In order to avert these threats and to bring Madhyamaka philosophy into conformity with the prevalent philosophical requirements of the intellectual milieu in the sixth century, Bhavya used logical devices originally formulated by Dignāga and others.[3]

According to Bhavya, the refutation of a system by depicting its inherent contradictions without stating a positive thesis of one's own was not sufficient to settle a debate. This "*reductio ad absurdum*" (*prāsaṅgika*) argumentation had to be supplemented by independent propositions (*svatantra*), sometimes incorporated in formal syllogisms (*prayoga-vākya*). By means of independent inferences (*svatantrānumāna*) and proper syllogisms, Bhavya considered himself capable of both proving the validity of his own propositions and of refuting any upcoming counter-position, Buddhist or Hindu. To cope with such objections from Buddhist and non-Buddhist schools presupposed, naturally, a thorough knowledge of these heterodox systems. This is accomplished in the *Madhyamakahṛdaya-kārikā* (MHK) and its auto-commentary, the *Tarkajvālā* (TJ).[4] Here the Śrāvakayāna or Hīnayāna, Yogācāra, Vaiśeṣika, Sāṃkhya, Vedānta and Mīṃāṃsā schools, as known to him, are described in a *pūrvapakṣa* and then subjected to a critical examination in a collateral *uttarapakṣa*. With regard to the Buddhist systems criticized, Bhavya's refutation of the Yogācāra marks the definite split between the Mādhyamikas and the Yogācāras, who prior to Bhavya tried to assimilate rather than oppose the Madhyamaka. In order to prevent such a split with respect to Buddhist Abhidharma, etc., Bhavya elaborated in his *Madhyamakaratnapradīpa* and *Madhyamakārthasaṃgraha* upon the theory of two truths (*satya-dvaya*) systematically established by Nāgārjuna.[5] This epistemological

3 On Bhavya's relationship to Dignāga, see (**IV**), pp. 96, 99-100.

4 On the transmission of MHK/TJ and the titles *Madhyamakahṛdayakārikā, Tarkajvālā,* etc., see (**II**), pp. 25-26.

5 MRP and MAS are, therefore, more "synthetic" than the other earlier works of

device of Bhavya enabled him not only to establish firmly the Madhyamaka affinity with Buddhist tradition (*āgama*), but also to arrange the Buddhist and non-Buddhist systems into a hierarchial order representing different levels of understanding as far as reality is concerned.[6]

Among Bhavya's works, the MHK/TJ is particularly important. Its early date and ample information, not only for the pivotal doctrine but also for the telling details of the various Buddhist and non-Buddhist systems, makes it not only the earliest doxographical work which we possess,[7] but also one of the most valuable sources for the study of the history of Indian philosophy.[8] Of its chapters dealing with Brahmanical systems, the *Vedāntatattvaviniścaya* (VTV) appears to the historian of religion as probably the most interesting. The main reason for this is that the MHK/TJ is the first still extant text within the Buddhist tradition to describe a Vedānta philosophical system stemming from this early period, of which our historical knowledge is extremely scarce.[9] Almost all the relevant circumstances concerning the formation and development of systematic Vedānta philosophy from the time of the compilation of the *Upaniṣads* (c.

Bhavya (i.e. MHK, TJ, PP and KTR).

6 See (**IV**), pp. 100-101 and n. 27.

7 See p. 13, n. 2 and p. 16, n. 11 above; (**II**), p. 22, n. 7.

8 The MHK/TJ consists of the following eleven chapters according to the Sanskrit Ms:

1. *Bodhicittāparityāga* (Maintenance of the *bodhicitta*).
2. *Munivratasamāśraya* (Following the Muni's Vow).
3. *Tattvajñānaiṣaṇā* (Quest for Knowledge of Reality).
4. *Śrāvakatattvaniścayāvatāra* (Presentation of the Determination of Reality according to the Śrāvaka).
5. *Yogācāratattvaviniścaya* (The Determination of Reality according to the Yogācāra).
6. *Sāṃkhyatattvāvatāra* (Presentation of Reality according to Sāṃkhya).
7. *Vaiśeṣikatattvaviniścaya* (The Determination of Reality according to Vaiśeṣika).
8. *Vedāntatattvaviniścaya* (The Determination of Reality according to Vedānta).
9. *Mīmāṃsātattvanirṇayāvatāra* (Presentation of the Determination of Reality according to the Mīmāṃsā).
10. *Sarvajñatāsiddhinirdeśa* (Exposition of the Realization of Omniscience).
11. *Stutilakṣaṇanirdeśa* (Exposition concerning Praise and Specific Characteristics).

See Ruegg 1981a, pp. 62-63; Gokhale/Bahulkar 1985, p. 76. On the title of ch. 8, see (**II**), p. 22, n. 6.

9 The MHK/TJ is the earliest known text in the Buddhist tradition to list the terms *vedāntavādin* and *vedāntadarśana,* and to describe a Vedānta philosophical system. On the definition of *vedānta* and *vedāntavādin,* see (**IV**), p. 101, n. 28.

300 A.D.) to the appearance of Śaṅkara in the 7th or 8th century[10] are unknown. In effect, apart from fragmentary accounts of early Vedānta philosophers, we only have access to some of the results of this formative process,[11] i.e., the *Brahmasūtra*,[12] the *Vākyapadīya* (VP) and the *Gauḍapādīyakārikā* (GK).[13]

These texts are from a historical perspective the result of an assimilation of the two main currents within Indian thought: the Brahmanical tradition and the Buddhist tradition. As far as the *Gauḍapādīyakārikā* is concerned, the Buddhist influence is of Mahāyāna origin. From studies conducted by Bhattacharya, it is clear that the GK is greatly indebted to Madhyamaka-

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10 On the dates of Śaṅkara, see Vetter 1979, pp. 11-12.

11 References to early Vedānta philosophers and fragmentary accounts of their doctrines are primarily found in the works of Śaṅkara, Bhāskara, Rāmānuja, Yāmunācārya, Sureśvara and Ānandagiri. From studies conducted by Bhattacharya (1943, pp. ciii-cxiii); Hiriyanna (1924a, b, 1928); Ingalls (1952, pp. 9-11, 1954, pp. 291-294); Kane (1930); Sastri (1924); Nakamura (1983, pp. 369-390), and others, it is not possible to evaluate the impact which these philosophers and their thought may have had on early systematic Vedānta philosophy expounded in BS, VP and GK. We do know, however, that they wrote commentaries on for example the *Upaniṣads* and BS. The majority of these pre-Śaṅkara Vedānta philosophers appear, therefore, not as authors of independent systems but as interpreters of the *Upaniṣads*.

From Nakamura's investigations (1983, pp. 129-182, 266-295), we may conclude that neither the scriptures of early Buddhism or the Madhyamaka and Yogācāra texts, nor the writings of Jaina philosophers, contain any accounts of Vedānta systematical philosophy prior to the compilation of Bhavya's MHK/TJ.

Accounts of Vedānta philosophy are incidentally also found in Bhavya's *Prajñāpradīpa* and **Karatalaratna*.

12 The *Brahmasūtra* differs from VP and GK in that it is more of a systematic commentary of the *Upaniṣads* than an independent philosophical treatise.

13 On the dates of BS, VP and GK, see (**IV**), p. 109, n. 63.

Bhattacharya (1943, p. lvii) concludes that the books (*prakaraṇa*) of GK are four independent treatises put together in one volume. GK does not, therefore, represent a unitary text. Vetter (1978, pp. 97-104) agrees with Bhattacharya that the four *prakaraṇas* of GK were not originally intended as one unit. They are, however, connected to each other in that they reflect a development of the author of GK, known from the post-Śaṅkara *advaita* tradition as Gauḍapāda (p. 96). The books of GK were, according to Vetter, composed in the reverse order to that in which the text has been transmitted (p. 108). On the title of this text (*Gauḍapādīyakārikā, Gauḍapādakārikā, Āgamaśāstra* and *Māṇḍūkyakārikā*), see Vetter *ibid.*, p. 112; Bhattacharya *ibid.*, pp. lxi-lxiii.

In the *Paramārthasāra* (PaS) of Ādiśeṣa and the *Yogavāsiṣṭha* (YV), there are many resemblances to GK (see Bhattacharya 1943, pp. lxxx-lxxxi, n. 15, lxxxvi-lxxxviii). These texts, however, are most likely post-Śaṅkara Vedānta texts. On PaS, see (**IV**), p. 109, n. 63; on YV, see Glasenapp 1951, pp. 432-438.

Yogācāra philosophy.[14] With respect to the *Brahmasūtra* and the *Vākyapadīya,* the present stage of research does not allow for any definite conclusions as to the scope and details of their indebtedness to Mahāyāna philosophy. Nevertheless, some traces of such an influence can be established. Of these two texts, BS is the most problematic. The elliptical style of the *sūtra* genre requires in most cases a commentary, and since the first available commentary on BS is that of Śaṅkara,[15] we have by then not only departed from BS in time, but also as to its original intention. What we can establish, however, is that the structure of some of the argumentation found in BS resembles the *prasaṅga* of the Madhyamaka school. It is therefore most likely that BS was influenced by Madhyamaka philosophy in this respect.[16] As far as the Mahāyāna influence on the *Vākyapadīya* is concerned, Nakamura's investigations show that the Madhyamaka-Yogācāra influence on VP is not restricted only to terminology and formal structure, but penetrates to the very core of its doctrinal content.[17]

The indebtedness of BS, VP and GK to Mahāyāna philosophy was probably not limited only to logic and epistemology. Even in an ontological sense the Madhyamaka/Yogācāra influence may be discernable. Despite the doctrinal differences between BS, VP and GK, all postulate in one way or another the relative or illusory nature of the phenomenal world. The fundamental reason for such an ontological reflection is, however, completely different in Mahāyāna and in Vedānta. Whereas the former postulates the illusory nature of the phenomenal world on the basis of its dependent origination, the latter tradition takes such a stand on the basis of the assumption that the world is produced by a single, all-pervading and self-

14 See Bhattacharya 1943. GK quotes either fully, or partially or substantially, from Nāgārjuna's *Mūlamadhyamakakārikā,* Āryadeva's *Catuḥśataka,* Asaṅga's or Maitreyanātha's *Mahāyānasūtrālaṅkāra* (see Bhattacharya *ibid.* lxxvi-lxxix) and from several other works.

15 Despite the efforts of Śaṅkara to reform the Vedānta tradition from Buddhist elements, he and his successors of the school of non-dualism (*advaita*) were accused by Bhāskara, Vijñānabhikṣu and others for being "crypto Buddhists" — their teachings being actually nothing but Buddhist Vijñānavāda. (See Hacker 1953, p. 201, n. 1; La Vallée Poussin 1910, pp. 131-133; Ingalls 1954, pp. 293-294.) It was, however, not only the Vedāntins who were charged with the crime of heterodoxy; the Buddhist were also accused of this. In the *Majjhima-* (I.329) and *Dīgha Nikāya* (I.213), they had to apologize for their Brahmanical speculations as to an unmanifested consciousness (*viññāṇaṃ anidassanam*) (see La Vallée Poussin 1910, p. 132 with n. 3; Madanayake 1985, pp. 21-22; (**IV**), pp. 120-121, n. 132.

16 See Nakamura 1983, pp. 435-436.

17 See Nakamura 1973 and Hacker 1953 (pp. 199, 200-201). The studies of Nakamura (1960), Iyer (1969), Aklujkar (1970) and Biardeau (1964a, b) do not bring any substantial informations as to the Mahāyāna philosophical influence on VP.

containing reality.

The doctrinal assimilation in Vedānta systematic philosophy therefore did not result in the eradication of the fundamental difference between Buddhism and Brahmanism which had existed from the time of the early scriptures of the respective traditions and of which these traditions had been well aware.[18] The affirmation and negation of a "Self" (*ātman*) or an "intrinsic nature" (*svabhāva*) still constituted the line of demarcation between the two traditions. In this context, the Vedāntatattvaviniścaya of the *Madhyamakahṛdayakārikā* and *Tarkajvālā* is interesting because it is the first Buddhist text to distinguish Madhyamaka philosophy from purely Vedānta notions. In VTV, Bhavya maintains that the notion of a "Self" — or in his terminology, an "intrinsic nature" — actually was borrowed from the Madhyamaka school. Bhavya consequently considers it his duty not only to refute the Vedānta interpretation of this notion, but also to outline his own view on this matter at great length. The question of "intrinsic nature" or "Self" constitutes, therefore, the main object of the polemics between the Vedāntavādins and the Mādhyamikas in VTV. Bhavya may thus be said to have initiated on a systematical basis the main issue of the prolonged controversies between Buddhist and Brahmanical philosophy which were to continue well beyond his time.[19]

The dominant trend of Vedānta research during the 19th century (and even to some extent during the 20th century, at least among Indian scholars), i.e. to focuse mainly on Śaṅkara and his successors, was interrupted in the early 1900s by the pioneer work of Walleser.[20] This study dealt in particular with GK, but it also drew attention to the relationship between VTV and GK. Since the time of Walleser, scholars have become more interested in early Vedānta philosophy, and this interest has, accordingly, given rise to a number of studies.[21] As far as the VTV is

18 See *Majjhima Nikāya* 22 (I:137) and *Kaṭha Upaniṣad* 4.14 (II.4.14-15), quoted by Glasenapp 1950, p. 1014.

19 A systematical account of these *ātman*-controversies is presented by Claus Oetke (1988).

20 Walleser 1910.

21 To mention a few studies in Western languages: Hiriyanna 1924a, b, 1925, 1928; Bhattacharya 1943; Nakamura 1950 (see n. 1 above); Vetter 1979; Danielson 1980; and Lindtner 1985a. For the bibliography of scholarly works on Bhavya's authentic works, i.e. the *Madhyamakahṛdayakārikā* (MHK), the *Tarkajvālā* (TJ), the *Prajñāpradīpa* (PP), the **Karatalaratna* (KTR), the *Madhyamaka-ratnapradīpa* (MRP) and the *Madhyamakārthasaṃgraha* (MAS), see (**II**), p. 21, n. 1, the following recent studies (chronologically ordered) in Western languages should be *added* to those listed by S. Iida (1980, pp. 12-19) and D.S. Ruegg (1981a, pp. 62-64, 66, 127-128):

M. D. Eckel 1980 (Eng. tr. of PP, chs. 18, 24, 25); Y. Ejima 1980 (Skt.-Tib.

concerned, Nakamura was the first scholar to continue the initial investigations conducted by Walleser.[22] He was then followed by Gokhale.[23] Whereas Walleser only had access to the Tibetan translations of VTV, Nakamura and Gokhale, in their partial studies of VTV, could benefit from a copy of a handcopy of the Sanskrit manuscript of VTV-MHK discovered in 1936 by Rāhula Sāṅkṛtyāyana in the Źa lu monastery, Tibet.[24] Considering the condition of the textual material which they had at their disposal, Gokhale and Nakamura's works constituted a real step forward in early Vedānta philosophical research.

The recently established cooperation between the Department of Oriental Philology, University of Copenhagen, and the Institute of South and South-East Asian Studies, the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences and the University of Beijing has, however, changed the textual situation radically. Instead of having to rely upon such an inadequate source-material, we now have at our disposal an excellent photograph of the original manuscript of MHK discovered by Rāhula Sāṃkṛtyāyana. In this connection, the present

ed. of MHK ch.3); S. Iida 1980 (Skt.-Tib. ed. and Eng. tr. of MHK/TJ, ch. 3, vv. 1-136); D.S. Ruegg 1981a (a brief summary of Bhavya's works); Chr. Lindtner 1981a (p. 200, n. 14, Eng. tr. of MAS); 1982a, (pp. 172-184, on the authenticity of MRP); 1984a (Tib. ed. of the appendix to PP ch. 25); 1984c (a brief summary of MHK, TJ, PP, KTR and MAS, and a detailed analytical survey of MRP); M. D. Eckel 1985 (Eng. tr. of the appendix to PP, ch. 25); V.V. Gokhale and S.S. Bahulkar 1985 (Eng. tr. of MHK/TJ, ch. 1); W. Ames 1986 (Tib. ed. and Eng. tr. of PP, chs. 3-5, 23, 26); Chr. Lindtner 1986a (analysis and Eng. tr. of the appendix to PP ch. 27); 1986b (Eng. tr. of MRP ch. 4); 1986c (Eng. tr. of Bhavya's critique of Śrāvakayāna as found in MRP ch. 3, Tib. ed. of Bhavya's critique of Yogācāra as found in MRP, ch. 4); S. Kawasaki (Skr. and Tib. ed. of MHK chs. 9, 10, forthcoming). A complete edition and Engl. tr. of PP is being prepared by M. D. Eckel and W. Ames. Dr. Eckel is also preparing an Eng. tr. of MHK ch. 3, vv. 136-360.

For a bibliography of Japanese studies on Bhavya's works, see H. Nakamura 1980, pp. 284-287.

22 Walleser 1910 (pp. 17-18) gives a German translation of MHK 8.1-3, 5, 10-13 (= 8.1-3, 5, 11-14 in my tr.). Nakamura 1942/1950 (see n. 1 above) contains the following studies: "The Vedānta philosophy known to Bhavya and Dharmapāla" (1983, pp. 182-184), "The Vedānta Chapter of Bhavya's *Madhyamakahṛdaya*" (1983, pp. 184-206=1975, Skt. and Tib. ed. of the *uttarapakṣa* of VTV-MHK), "The Vedānta as Presented by Bhavya in his *Madhyamakahṛdaya* and *Tarkajvālā*" (1983, pp. 206-217=1965), and "The Vedānta Thought as Referred to in Other Texts of Bhavya" (1983, pp. 217-219= 1972). Nakamura 1958 (Tib. ed. of the *pūrvapakṣa* of VTV-TJ). Nakamura 1981 (see n. 1 above) contains in addition a Japanese translation of the entire VTV of MHK/TJ.

23 Gokhale (1958) edited MHK 8.1-16 (=8.1-17 in my ed.) and presented an English translation of MHK/TJ 8.1-16 (=8.1-17 in my tr.). Gokhale's tr. of TJ 8.1-16 was based upon Nakamura's (1958) Tib. ed.

24 See (**II**), p. 23 with n. 10, 12-13.

author was very fortunate to be the first scholar to gain access to the *Vedāntatattvaviniścaya* chapter of this unique manuscript now preserved in the Sanskrit Manuscript Collection of the China Nationalities Library (Zhongguo Minzu Tushuguan) administered by the Cultural Palace of Nationalities (Minzu Wenhua Gong), Beijing, China. This favorable circumstance made it possible to edit critically the entire VTV of MHK (**II**) and to present an annotated translation of it (**III**) on a much sounder footing than had been possible hitherto.

The relationship between VTV and GK that was established by Walleser is, according to the present author, the only historical relationship between VTV and the still extant texts or fragments of early systematic Vedānta philosophy which can be settled beyond any doubt.[25] Due to this fact, the present thesis restricts its historical investigations of VTV to a study of the "pot-space" simile (*ghaṭākāśadṛṣṭānta*) (**IV**), which not only ties VTV and GK together, but also is instrumental in capturing the very core of Madhyamaka and Vedānta philosophy as presented by Bhavya.[26] References and discussions of other Buddhist and Brahmanical texts will, however, be given throughout this work in order to describe the intellectual circumstances in which the various tenets of Vedānta and Madhyamaka philosophy as stated in VTV possibly first acquired their meaning, and to assemble references as which a contemporary of Bhavya might have used to understand the text. It is hoped that this will also make the different propositions of VTV more accessible to the modern reader.

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25 Walleser established the relationship between VTV-MHK and GK on the basis of those verses stating the pot-space simile. See (**IV**), p. 109, n. 65. The present investigation shows that in addition to this, VTV-MHK and GK are also connected to each other in that VTV-MHK (78-84) constitutes a criticism of the *ajāti-samatāvāda* of GK. See (**II**), p. 24 with n. 16, pp. 43-44; (**III**), pp. 88-90 with n. 94, p. 89. As to the question whether Bhavya borrowed from Gauḍapāda, or vice versa, it is most likely that the former is the case, even if Bhavya himself states the opposite. There are, however, some facts which point in favour of Bhavya's assertion. These have been discussed by Lindtner (1985a).

26 Since we are not fully aware of the sources from which Bhavya derived his knowledge of Vedānta philosophy, it is not possible to penetrate the VTV with the aim of critically discerning the philosophical kernel of Vedānta philosophy presented in VTV by removing Bhavya's interpretation of it.

II. The Vedāntatattvaviniścaya Chapter of Bhavya's Madhyamakahṛdayakārikā

Introduction

Among the various works[1] ascribed to the Mādhyamika philosopher Bhavya[2] (c. 500-570 A.D. [3]), later classified as a *svātantrika,*[4] the *Madhyamakahṛdayakārikā* along with its autocommentary, the *Tarka-jvālā,*[5] provide an indispensable source of information for the study of

1 The following texts are considered genuine: *Madhyamakahṛdayakārikā* (MHK), *Tarkajvālā* (TJ), *Prajñāpradīpa* (PP), **Karatalaratna* (KTR), *Madhyamakārthasaṃgraha* (MAS) and *Madhyamakaratnapradīpa* (MRP). *Vide* Lindtner 1982a, pp. 172-182. For a brief summary of the first five texts and a detailed study of MRP, *vide* Lindtner 1984c, pp. 163-184. There are, to be sure, also two Tantric texts, ascribed to a certain Bhavyakīrti, but these are unlikely to have been written by Bhavya. *Vide* Ruegg 1981a, p. 106, n. 339.

The *Nikāyabhedavibhaṅgavyākhyāna,* treated as a separate work of Bhavya in the *bsTan-'gyur,* is identical with parts of TJ, ch. 4. *Vide* Iida 1980, pp. 13-14; Ruegg 1981a, p. 63. The *Madhyamakabhramaghāta* ascribed to Āryadeva is in fact nothing but an extract from TJ. This has been pointed out by Per K. Sørensen. *Vide* Lindtner 1982a, p. 173, n. 21.

Walleser, Gokhale and Ejima call in question the genuineness of the TJ or parts of it. The only substantial argument against it, however, is the phrase occuring at intervals: *ācārya āha,* or the like, which would prove the existence of a different author of the TJ from the one who wrote MHK, *vide* Walleser 1910, p. 17, n. 1; Gokhale 1985, p. 76; and Ejima as cited in Lindtner 1982a, pp. 182-184, where Ejima also questions the MRP and MAS. Texts like the *Abhidharmakośa* (AK) show, however, that it is quite acceptable and normal for an author to refer to himself in such a way, as for example in AKbh. 1.2 where Vasubandhu calls himself *ācārya* (glossed *śāstrakāra* by Yaśomitra). *Vide* also Lindtner 1982a, p. 184.

2 There are various names allotted to this *ācārya,* though we are most likely dealing with one person only. In a paper delivered in Stockholm, Vancouver and San Francisco in 1986, Lindtner has argued that Bhāvaviveka is a spurious form of the author's name only found in late Sanskrit Mss. of the *Prasannapadā.* Most probably his full name was Bhavyaviveka. *Bhāvin, Bhāviviveka, Bhāviveka, Bhavya, Bhagavadviveka,* etc., are all but current alternative or abbreviated forms of his original name. For the details, *vide* Lindtner's paper which will be published in a forthcoming vol. of "Indiske Studier", Copenhagen. Cf. Ames 1986, p. 37; Gokhale 1958, pp. 165-166, n. 1; Iida 1980, pp. 5-6; La Vallée Poussin 1933, pp. 60-61; Ruegg 1981a, p. 60, n. 183.

3 Kajiyama 1963, pp. 37-38, and 1968/1969, pp. 193-203.

4 *Vide* Ruegg 1980, 1981b, 1982; Mimaki 1982, pp. 27 sqq.; (**IV**), pp. 96-98.

5 Strictly speaking, the titles *Madhyamakahṛdaya* and *Tarkajvālā* both refer to the verses and the prose as a whole. Gokhale followed by Ruegg holds that chapters 1-3 originally made up an independent work which was later enlarged by

Indian philosophical polemics in the sixth century A.D. This partially doxographical treatise comprises accounts of Buddhist and Brahmanical scholastic systems.[6] The eighth chapter entitled *Vedāntatattvaviniścaya* (VTV) is to our knowledge the earliest Buddhist systematical presentation (*pūrvapakṣa*) and criticism (*uttarapakṣa*) of a Vedānta philosophical system that is extant.[7] The following work confines itself to a critical edition of the Sanskrit text of VTV.

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chapters 4-11. The title of this work was *Tattvāmṛtāvatāra,* derived from the colophon to ch. 3 and from ref. in KTR. *Vide* Gokhale 1958, pp. 165-166, n. 1, 1972, pp. 41-42; Gokhale/Bahulkar 1985, p. 78.

6 Chs. 4-9 acc. to the Skt. Ms. : *Śrāvakatattvaniścayāvatāra, Yogācāratattvaviniścaya, Sāṃkhyatattvāvatāra, Vaiśeṣikatattvaviniścaya, Vedāntatattvaviniścaya, Mīmāṃsātattvanirṇayāvatāra* (*vide* Gokhale/Bahulkar 1985, p. 76, n. 1: *Vedāntatattvanirṇayāvatāra* which is a misreading).

On Bhavya's attitude towards the Vedāntadarśana and his various motives for writing a doxography, *vide* (**IV**), pp. 98-104.

7 Walleser 1910, p. 15; Nakamura 1983, p. 117. In the other genuine works of Bhavya, references to Vedānta philosophy are found in the *Prajñāpradīpa* and the **Karatalaratna. Vide,* e.g., Ames 1986, ch. 1, pt. 2, p. 27; Kajiyama 1963, p. 58.

Texts or parts of texts belonging to the doxographical traditions of Jainism and Buddhism prior to MHK/TJ give only brief statements or allusions to ideas which may be classified as "Vedāntic". Historical and methodological considerations preclude, however, any attempt of settling their philosophical affiliation and historical setting in relation to MHK/TJ at present. The still extant texts of systematical Vedānta philosophy, exposing different traditions, are: *Brahmasūtra, Vākyapadīya, Gauḍapādīyakārikā.* On the *Paramārthasāra* (PaS), *vide* Danielson 1980, pp. 1-2; Rüping 1977, p. 2; (**IV**), p. 109, n. 63. On the fragments of early Vedānta philosophy, *vide* e.g. Hiriyanna 1924a, 1924b, 1925, 1928; Nakamura 1983, pp. 369-390; p. 16, n. 11 above.

Bhavya's presentation and criticism of Vedānta is based upon unsystematical and systematical Vedānta philosophical texts, e.g., the *Śvetāśvatara Upaniṣad* and the *Gauḍapādīyakārikā. Vide* TJ 8.2 and MHK 8.78-84, etc. The different arguments set forth by Bhavya in the *uttarapakṣa* may therefore either be part of a general Madhyamaka polemical approach, or it may reflect different Vedānta traditions along with Bhavya's own understanding of certain *śruti* and *smṛti* texts. Despite an apologetical interest, Bhavya seems to be a well-read historian of philosophy who did not depend on verbally transmitted knowledge or quotations in various "handbooks", but instead derived his knowledge directly from the sources. Bhavya distinguishes between *vedāntavādin* (MHK/TJ 8.1), *vedāntadarśana* (MHK 4.7, TJ 8.1) and *vedānta* (MHK 4.56, TJ 8.1). *Vide* (**IV**), p. 101, n. 28.

For a discussion of the term *darśana, vide* Halbfass 1979, 1981.

Source materials

For the study of MHK the following source materials are at our disposal (**1-3**) :

1. A unique, but incomplete, Sanskrit manuscript (Ms) dating from the eleventh century[8] in the so-called *proto-Bengali-cum-Maithili* script of Northern India,[9] consisting of 24 palm leaves each measuring 22 1/2 x 2 inches, with 5 or 6 lines on *recto* (a) and *verso* (b).[10] The c. 928 *anuṣṭubh* verses are divided into 11 chapters of uneven length.[11]

The Ms was discovered in August 1936 by Rāhula Sāṅkṛtyāyana in the collection of the Źa lu monastery, Tibet. Being unable to photograph the Ms, he made a rapid handcopy which later was passed on to Prof. V.V. Gokhale, who transcribed it on the basis of the transcription of Sāṅkṛtyāyana. On a visit to Rome, Gokhale found that G. Tucci had photographs of the very same manuscript. These largely illegible photographs, along with the manuscript-copy (Msc) of Gokhale, have been until recently the only existing source material in Sanskrit.[12]

However, in connection with the recently inaugurated cooperation between the departments of Indian Studies in Copenhagen and Beijing, an excellent photograph of Ms kept in the Sanskrit Manuscript Collection of the China Library of Nationalities, Beijing, was put at the disposal of the present author.[13] Thanks to this fortunate circumstance, it is now possible with the help of the existing Tibetan versions to establish a critical edition of

8 Ejima 1980, p. 263. Cf. Gokhale 1958, p. 165, n. 1 (10th century).

9 Ejima 1980, p. 263. Cf. Gokhale 1958, p. 165, n. 1 (*rañjanā*).

10 The Ms is described in JBORS XXIII, pt. I, 1937, p. 48, and registered as: VII Ṣha lu Monastery, XXXVII, 1.311: *Tarkajvālā* (*Madhyamakahṛdaya*), or as: 11. *Tarkajvālā* (p. 55). See Sāṅkṛtyāyana 1937.

11 *Vide* Gokhale/Bahulkar 1985, p. 76, n. 1.

12 There also exists an incomplete, partly burnt Ms in the Potala Library, which is said to contain chs. 3-5. More information about this Ms is not available at present. (Information received from Dr. Jiang Zhongxin).

Due to the courtesy of Dr. V.V. Gokhale and Prof. J. Takasaki, Univ. of Tokyo, the Msc and Tucci's photographs of ch. 8 was sent to me through Dr. Chr. Lindtner. Efforts to gain access to the Leningrad material (see Chattopadhyaya 1969, p. 131) have so far proved fruitless.

13 During May-August 1987, in Copenhagen, I had the great opportunity of reading the eighth chapter with Associate Prof. Jiang Zhongxin, Institute of South and South-East Asian Studies, Chinese Academy of Social Sciences, Beijing, who placed at my disposal the Ms photographs kept in the Sanskrit manuscript collection of the China Library of Nationalities (Zhongguo Minzu Tushuguan), Beijing, administered by the Cultural Palace of Nationalities (Minzu Wenhua Gong), Beijing, China.

the Sanskrit on a much sounder basis than has been possible hitherto. The following edition therefore presents a considerably improved text in comparison with the Msc readings and the editions by Gokhale and Nakamura based upon it,[14] although their editorial suggestions have occasionally proved valuable in the course of my own critical work.

The *Vedāntatattvaviniścaya*-chapter consists of 3 palm-leaves, extending from *fol.* 19a1-21b1,[15] 6 lines on *recto* (a) and *verso* (b). Some verses of VTV found in the Ms are not to be found in the Tibetan translations (i.e. 78-84). These verses, forming a criticism of the **ajātisamatāvāda* of the *Gauḍapādīyakārikā*,[16] are probably *antaraślokas*[17]

14 Dr. V.V. Gokhale edited MHK 8.1-16 (=8.1-17 in my ed.) on the basis of the Msc (*vide* Gokhale 1958, pp. 165-180), and Prof. H. Nakamura edited the Tibetan translations of MHK/TJ 8.1-16 (*vide* Nakamura 1958, pp. 181-190). H. Nakamura presented also a rather incomplete edition of MHK 8.17-104 (my numbering) based upon the Msc. This was first published in the *Adyar Library Bulletin* (vol. XXXIX, pp. 300-329) and then reprinted in the English tr. of his doctoral thesis *Shoki no Vedānta Tetsugaku*, University of Tokyo 1942 (*vide* Nakamura 1983). The entire VTV was edited in the new edition of *Shoki...*, (Tokyo 1981, pp. 557-626).

15 The 18th folio of Ms is missing. The numbering of the folios is according to the China Library of Nationalities (Zhongguo Minzu Tushuguan), Beijing: 17b-17a-19a-19b-20a-20b.

16 The concept of *ājatisamatā* is not to be found prior or posterior to GK (*vide* GK 3.2, 38; 4.80, 93, 95, 100) in the Vedānta tradition. This strengthens our assumption that the criticism of *ājatisamatā* in MHK 8.78-84 must be directed towards GK (e.g. MHK 8.81 seems to be a critique of GK 3.2, 38). Furthermore, since Gauḍapāda, according to our present knowledge, was the one to introduce the *ghaṭākāśa* simile in the Vedānta tradition (GK 3.3, 4, 5), Bhavya's description (MHK 8.10, 11, 13) and criticism of this *dṛṣṭānta* (MHK 8.63-67) may also prove the relationship between MHK and GK. *Vide* p. 20, n. 25 above; (**IV**), pp. 108-127. This leads us to assume that even MHK 8.78-84 are by the same author who was criticizing GK, and that these verses have once been a part of the original work of Bhavya. In the Buddhist tradition, the *Prasannapadā ad* XVIII.9 quotes an early Mahāyānasūtra, the *Āryasatyadvāyāvatāra*, also known to Bhavya, which apparently already knows this simile as well as the concept of *ājatisamatā* (*vide* B 374.14 sqq., Vaidya 1960, p. 31, pp. 105-106. For a translation, *vide* de Jong 1949, p. 31). Gauḍapāda's knowledge of this *sūtra* cannot, however, be historically established. On the possibility of Gauḍapāda borrowing from Bhavya, *vide* Lindtner 1985a. Walleser (1910, p. 18), followed by Bhattacharya (1943, pp. 50-53), was the first to establish the relationship between VTV and GK: MHK 8.10 resembled GK 3.3; MHK 8.11, 12, GK 3.6cd. Walleser (*ibid.* p. 18) and Bhattacharya (*ibid.* p. 52), however, maintained incorrectly that MHK 8.13 was a verbatim quotation of GK 3.5 (cf. PaS 36). This inaccuracy was due to the fact that these scholars did not have direct access to the Sanskrit Ms.

17 On *antaraśloka*, *vide* Gnoli 1960, *passim*; Mimaki 1980. Bhavya does not

inserted simultaneously, or later, by Bhavya himself. A few verses found in the Tibetan translations, but absent in the Ms (i.e vv. 8, 12cd, 23, 52cd, 53cd), are also considered genuine.

Orthographical peculiarities are annotated in the *apparatus criticus* only if a different grammatical structure is possible; otherwise they are tacitly normalized. The same goes for the irregular and awkward punctuation (single and double *daṇḍa*) of the Ms. No numbering of the verses is given in the Ms.

2. A Tibetan translation of TJ incorporating MHK (3) entitled: *dBu ma'i sñiṅ po'i 'grel pa rtog ge 'bar ba* (*Madhyamakahṛdayavṛtti Tarkajvālā*). The original copy of this translation, the joint work of Atiśa (981/982-1054 A.D) and Lotsawa Jayaśīla (Tshul khrims rgyal ba) is only indirectly available in later editions printed in Narthang (N), Peking (P), Derge (D) and Cone (C). Gokhale has pointed out that a previous Tibetan translation of MHK and TJ existed in the early 9th century.[18] Lindtner provided new evidence for the existence of fragments of a "para-canonical" version of the verses as well as the prose. This may, according to Lindtner, be assumed to be identical to the "pre-canonical" version referred to by Gokhale.[19]

3. A Tibetan translation of MHK entitled: *dBu ma'i sñiṅ po'i tshig le'ur byas pa* (*Madhyamakahṛdayakārikā*). Translators and available editions are the same as for the above.

Transmission of the text

Ms is a copy of an unknown number of antecedent exemplars with an uncertain relationship to the author's original manuscript, the original being no longer extant (or, at least, not known to us). On the whole, Ms is a very accurate piece of work. Lindtner has attempted to reconstruct the line of transmission and has come to the following result:[20] At some point in the line of transmission, the verses were extracted from a prose-verse unit and subsequently entitled *Madhyamakahṛdayakārikā* or *Tarkajvālāsūtra*, being the *sūtra* upon which the prose-commentary entitled *Tarkajvālā then* (i.e. after the verses had been extracted) was based. The original work was written in a mixed style of verse and prose, *miśrakavyākhyāna,* to use the Sanskrit term.[21] Bhavya himself uses no less than four different titles

use this device elsewhere. Dignāga, by contrast, does.

18 *Vide* Gokhale/Bahulkar 1985, pp. 76-77, esp. p. 77, n. 3; Ruegg 1981a, p. 111.

19 *Vide* p. 21, n. 2 above (Lindtner, forthcoming).

20 *Vide* p. 21, n. 2 above (Lindtner, forthcoming).

21 As was the case with many other Buddhist philosophical works in those days,

to refer to his own work as a whole: *Madhyamakahṛdaya, Tarkajvālā, Tattvāmṛtāvatāra* and *Madhyamakahṛdayatattvāvatāra.* He does not refer to verse and prose under separate titles as if they were independent works. For purely practical purposes, however, I will refer to the *verses* as MHK, the *prose* as TJ.

e.g., *Abhidharmakośa, Pramāṇasamuccaya, Pramāṇavārttika, Pramāṇaviniścaya,* etc.

Sigla

Ms	The photocopies of VTV preserved in the Sanskrit Manuscript Collection of the China Library of Nationalities (Zhongguo Minzu Tushuguan), Beijing, China.
NK	The Tibetan version of MHK in the *sNar-thaṅ bsTan-'gyur* (No. 3246) (*fol. : Dza* 27b5-31a4)
N	The Tibetan version of TJ in the *sNar-thaṅ bsTan-'gyur* (No. 3246) (*fol. : Dza* 270b4-293a3)
PK	The Tibetan version of MHK in the *Peking bsTan-'gyur* [Vol. 96]. (No. 5255) (*fol. : Dza* 30b7-34a8)
P	The Tibetan version of TJ in the *Peking bsTan-'gyur* [Vol. 96]. (No. 5255) (*fol. : Dza* 282b6-306a2)
DK	The Tibetan version of MHK in the *sDe-dge bsTan-'gyur* (No. 3855) (*fol. : Dza* 27b5-31a7)
D	The Tibetan version of TJ in the *sDe-dge bsTan-'gyur* (No. 3855) (*fol. : Dza* 251a1-271a2)
CK	The Tibetan version of MHK in the *Co-ne bsTan-'gyur* (*fol. : Dza* 27b5-31a7)
C	The Tibetan version of TJ in the *Co-ne bsTan-'gyur* (*fol. : Dza* 251a1-271a2)

ex con T.	my conjecture based upon **NK, N, PK, P, DK, D, CK, C**
illeg.	illegible
omit.	omitted
Gok.	Gokhale's Msc edition of the *pūrvapakṣa*
Nak.	Nakamura's Msc edition of the *uttarapakṣa*

1. vedāntavādinaḥ prāhur ātmavid durlabho bahiḥ / 19a[1] 19a[2]
kuta ātmadviṣāṃ mokṣaḥ śūnyasaṃskāravādinām //

2. tamaḥparastāt puruṣaṃ mahāntaṃ sūryavarcasam /
mṛtyum atyeti matimān matvātmānaṃ maheśvaram //

3. rukmavarṇaṃ yadā paśyan paśyet kartāram īśvaram /
vihāya pāpaṃ puṇyaṃ ca paraṃ sāmyaṃ tadāpnuyāt //

4. bhūtaṃ bhavad bhaviṣyac ca sarvaṃ puruṣa iṣyate /
so 'ntar bahiś ca dūre ca so 'ntike sa ca karmakṛt // 19a[3]

5. viśve bhāvās tato jātā ūrṇanābhād ivāṃsavaḥ /
tasmin pralīnā vidvāṃso nāpnuvanti punarbhavam //

6. amṛtatvaṃ na martyasya vahneḥ śaityam iveṣyate /
tasmād amṛtatāyuktāprabodhāt puruṣe 'mṛte //

1c kuta: kutaḥ *Ms*
2a ˚parastāt *ex con T.* las gźan: ˚purastāt *Ms*
2c mṛtyum atyeti *ex con T.* 'chi med 'gyur: mṛtyubhyeti *Ms*
3d sāmyaṃ *ex con T.* źi ba: sātmyaṃ *Ms*
6a na martyasya *ex con T.* 'chi bcas ... med: tamabhyasya *Ms*
6d 'mṛte *ex con T.* bdud rtsi: mṛte *Ms*

7. yataḥ paraṃ paraṃ nāsti yato jyāyān na vidyate /
aṇīyān vāpi tenedaṃ viśvam ekena saṃtatam //

8. | | de ni phra daṅ rags daṅ ldan | | yaṅ ldan gtso bo dbaṅ sgyur ba |
| rab phye 'dod pa'i mthar thug gaṅ | | rnal 'byor ji ltar 'dod par 'gro | |

9. tasmin sarvāṇi bhūtāni bhavanty ātmaiva paśyataḥ /
bālapaṇḍitacaṇḍālaviprādīnāṃ ca tulyatā //

10. ghaṭotpattau vināśe vā nākāśasya tadātmatā /
tadātmatātmano 'pīṣṭā na dehādyuda yavyaye //

11. ghaṭākāśavad ekasya nānātvaṃ ced abhedataḥ /
ghaṭabhedena caikatvaṃ sāmyaṃ sarvasya yan matam //

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8 *omit. Ms*
8b sgyur: bsgyur *DK, CK*
9b bhavanty: bhavaty *Ms*
10d ˚ye *ex con T.* ltar: ˚yaṃ *Ms*
11b ced *ex con T.* źe na: deh˚ *Ms*
11c caikatvaṃ *ex con T.* gcig ñid du: caikasya *Ms*
11d sāmyaṃ *ex con T.* mñam par: sāmye *Ms*; yan: jan *Ms*

12. yathā ghaṭādibhede 'pi mṛdbhedo nāsti kaś cana /

- - - - - - - - -   - - - - - - - - - //

| de bźin lus ni tha dad kyaṅ | | bdag la tha dad 'ga' yaṅ med | |

13. ghaṭākāśe yathaikasmin rajodhūmādibhir vṛte / 19a5

tadvattā na hi sarveṣāṃ sukhāder na tathātmanaḥ //

14. aprabodhād anātmajñaḥ svapne bhogābhimānavat /

cinoti karma bhuṅkte ca tatphalaṃ yac chubhāśubham //

15. dehasaṃstho 'py asaṅgatvād bhuñjāno nopalipyate /

rājavat kāmacārī ca pāpenānaparādhy asau //

16. ekaṃ sarvagataṃ nityaṃ paraṃ brahmācyutaṃ padam /

yogī yuñjān yadā vetti na tadaiti punarbhavam // 19a6

12cd *omit. Ms*

*tathaiva dehabhede 'pi nātmabhedo 'sti kaś cana //

(Gokhale 1958, p. 17)

*tathā deheṣu bhinneṣu na kaścid bheda ātmani //

(Bhattacharya 1943, p. 53)

13d sukhāder: sukhādair *Ms*

16b brahmācyutaṃ: brahmācchutaṃ (?) *Ms*

16c yuñjān yadā vetti *cum* Gokhale: yuñjāna[ ]tti *Ms*

17. nityaṃ tad avikalpaṃ ca yatra vācām agocaraḥ /
giras tatra prayujyante bhedāpahṛtabuddhibhiḥ //

18. atrāpīdaṃ parīkṣante pakṣapātāṇapekṣiṇaḥ /
pakṣarāgāvṛtamatiḥ satyaṃ yathāpi nekṣate // 19b[1]

19. niṣiddham ātmano 'stitvaṃ jagatkāraṇatā tathā /
atas taddarśanān muktir abhūtaiva prakalpitā //

20. satkāyadṛṣṭiḥ sahajā paśūnām apy aśāntaye /
sarvasaṃkleśamūlatvāt saiva tvayā vivardhitā //

21. satkāyadṛṣṭyāviṣṭānāṃ mamāhaṃkārakāriṇām /
yato bhāvitaḥ saṃsāro muktir apy uditā tataḥ // 19b[2]

22. taddṛṣṭau ced bhavec chāntir madād iva madātyaye /
ajīrṇāt saṃnipannasya bhojanāt svasthatā bhavet //

18c ˚vṛta˚ *ex con T.* bsgribs pa: ˚vikala˚ *Ms*

18d satyaṃ yathāpi *ex con T.* ji ltar bden pa'aṅ: saty[ ]pi *Ms*

20d tvayā *ex con T.* khyod kyis: bhūyā *Ms*

21b ˚kāriṇāṃ: ˚kāriṇā[ ] *Ms*

21c yato bhāvitaḥ *ex con T.* gaṅ las ... 'byuṅ bar 'gyur:
[ ]ha (h[i]?)[ ] *Ms*

21d muktir: muktid *Ms*

23. | | rig byed smra bas bdag de ni | | rnam pa gñis su 'dod byed de |
| lus źes bya ba bciṅs bdag daṅ | | mchog na gnas pa grol pa'i bdag |

24. na pareṣṭhātmaviṣayā yathārthātmeti dhīr matā /
ātmany evaṃ parāmarśād dehādāv ātmadhīr yathā //

25. parikalpitasattvo 'pi kim ātmā kurute tava /
rūpaśabdādiviṣayāṃ buddhiṃ cet tan na yujyate //

26. dhiyo rūpādiviṣayā jāyante nātmakartṛkāḥ / **19b3**
pratyayāyattajanmatvāt sūryakāntād ivānalaḥ //

27. dhvanir varṇātmako yaś ca so 'pīṣṭo nātmakartṛkaḥ /
śrāvaṇatvād dhvanitvād vā tadyathā pratiśabdakaḥ //

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23 *omit. Ms*
23c źes: źe *PK*
23d na: ni *CK*
24a pareṣṭhātma˚ *ex con T.* mchog tu 'dzin pa bdag gi yul: pareṣṭātma˚ *Ms*; ˚viṣayā *ex con T.* yul: viṣayād *Ms*
24c ˚ād *ex con T.* phyir: ˚parāmarśā *Ms*
24d cet tan: cetan *Ms*
25 *Between vv. 25 and 26, 12 characters are deleted:* (17b2)rūpādiviṣ[ ] (17b3) cetannayujya *Ms*
26c ˚janmatvāt *ex con T.* skye yin phyir: ˚janmatvā *Ms*

28. etena śeṣāḥ pratyuktā gamanāgamanādikāḥ /
hastapādādivispandalakṣaṇā dehajāḥ kriyāḥ //

29. vyavacchedena saṃjñāyā saṃjñānaṃ smaraṇaṃ smṛteḥ / 19b4
prajñānaṃ ca prakāreṇa prajñāto vedanaṃ vidaḥ //

30. na cānyad ātmanaḥ kāryaṃ svabhāvo nāvadhāryate /
khapuṣpavad atas tasya na sattāpy avadhāryate //

31. jñānādeḥ karaṇokteś cet karaṇatvaṃ prasādhyate /
tadanyakartṛkatvaṃ vā dātṛvat tan na yuktimat //

32. kartari pratyayotpatter naiṣāṃ karaṇatā yataḥ /
ato 'siddhārthatā hetor anekāntikatāpi vā //

28a dhvanir: dhvani *Ms*
28b gamanāgamanādikāḥ: gamānāgamanādikāḥ *Ms*
28d dehajāḥ: dehajā *Ms*; kriyāḥ: kriyā *Ms*
29b saṃjñānaṃ *ex con T.* kun śes: [ ]jñānaṃ *Ms*
30a ātmanaḥ: ātmana *Ms*
31a karaṇokteś: karaṇoktaś *Ms*
31d dātṛvat *ex con T.* gcod byed bźin: dātūvat *Ms*
32c 'siddhārthatā *ex con T.* ma grub pa [ñid] : siddhārthatā *Ms*
32d vā: va *Ms*

33. jñānādīnāṃ hi kartṛtvaṃ kartṛśabdābhidhānataḥ / 19b[5]
devadattaś chinattīti yathā dṛṣṭātra kartṛtā //

34. nirīha eva saṃskārarāśau syāt kartṛvācyatā /
kāraṇatvād yathā dīpe dīpo dyotayatīti te //

35. na mukhyas tattvataḥ kartā naiko hi ghaṭakṛd yataḥ /
naupacārikakartṛtvaṃ dīpāder iṣyate tataḥ //

36. cittaṃ rāgādivaśagaṃ saktaṃ rūpādigocare /
pratibaddhaṃ nirmokṣe ca baddhaṃ saṃsāracārake // 19b[6]

37. pāṇyādisamudāyo 'yaṃ sacittaḥ sattvasaṃjñakaḥ /
tyāgādicetanotpatter dātetyādi nigadyate //

35d dīpa˚ *ex con T.* mar me: dvīpa˚ *Ms*

36a ˚vaśagaṃ: ˚vaśaga *Ms*

36c pratibaddhaṃ: pratibaddhaḥ *Ms*; nirmokṣe *ex con T.* thar pa: [ ]mokṣe *Ms*; ca: *omit. Ms*

36d baddhaṃ: baddhaḥ *Ms*

38. vidyotpattāv avidyādisaṃyojananivṛttitaḥ /
rāgādibandhanān mukto mukta ity abhidhīyate //

39. ātmani vyomakalpe tu sarvam etat sudurvacaḥ /
khapuṣpam astu vāpy ātmā yady ātmātīva vallabhaḥ //

40. svabhāvato hi yady ātmā jñānabhāva itīṣyate / **20a**[1]
na tarhy asyaikatā yuktā karaṇādivyapekṣaṇāt //

41. sati vātmādike jñeye jñānaṃ tan na nivartate /
kṛtārthasyāpi dīpasya dṛṣṭaṃ janma svakāraṇāt //

42. sato jñānodayo yāvat tāvad bījaṃ pracīyate /
ārāvaprabhavo yāvat tāvat pratiravo yathā //

39c vāpy ātmā *ex con T.* vāpy *omit. T.* bdag la: vāryāte *Ms*

39d yady ātmātīva *ex con T.* gal te bdag la lhag chags na: yadyātīva *Ms*

40b ātmā jñānabhāva *ex con T.* bdag ni ... (40a) śes pa'i ṅo bor: ātmā[ ]bhāva *Ms*

40c asyaikatā: asyekatā *Ms*

40d karaṇādi *ex con T.* byed pa la sogs: kāraṇādi *Ms*

41b tan na *ex con T.* tan *omit. T.* mi: tadva *Ms*

42a sato *ex con T.* yod la: ato *Ms*

43. saṃsāraś ca kathaṃ jñasya jñānaṃ ca karaṇaṃ vinā /
sarvadā vāviśiṣṭatvād bandhamokṣau kutaḥ katham // 20a[2]

44. na duḥkhenāpi nirmokṣo mokṣe ’py ekātmavādinaḥ /
ātmanas tadananyatvād yathoṣṇena vibhāvasoḥ //

45. līnānutpannabuddhiś ca kathaṃ jñaḥ karaṇaṃ vinā /
yathā hi pūrnakaś chettā na yuktaḥ paraśuṃ vinā //

46. agninā dahatīty ukte dahaty agnir na rādhakaḥ /
tadvad vetti dhiyety ukte jñānaṃ vetti na vaḥ pumān //

43a jñasya: jñāsya *Ms*
43c °aviśiṣṭatvād *ex con T.* kun tu khyad med yin pa’i phyir: °aviśiṣṭa *Ms*
43d bandhamokṣau *ex con T.* bciṅs daṅ grol: mokṣau Ms
44c °aṅanyatvād: °atanyatvād *Ms*
44d vibhāvasoḥ: vibhāvayoḥ *Ms*
45c pūrṇakaś chettā *ex con T.* gaṅ pos gcod par byed pa: pūrvakaś cittān *Ms*
46b dahaty *ex con T.* bsregs: na dahaty *Ms*

47. kulālavan na tatsiddhis tatsvabhāvo yato na saḥ / **20a[3]**
neṣṭā dahanavat siddhiḥ dāhyābhāve 'gnyasaṃbhavāt //

48. na cājño jñaḥ kathaṃ kartā bhoktā ca sa bhavet tava /
vyomakalpo 'vikalpaś ca kiṃ kalpyaḥ kevalāgamāt //

49. na cājñājñaḥ svabhāvo vā niḥsvabhāvo bhaved asau /
niḥsvabhāvaś ca nātmā syād vandhyātanayavat sa ca //

50. yat pīḍānugrahe yasya na duḥkhānugrahodbhavaḥ /
na tasyātmā hy asau yukto yathākhaṃ devaśarmaṇaḥ // **20a[4]**

51. dhyānajñānādi ced iṣṭaṃ muktaye 'rthāntarātmanaḥ /
anātmārthaḥ prayatnaḥ syān martyaḥ syān amṛtaḥ katham //

47a na tatsiddhis *ex con T.* de mi 'grub: na t[ ]ddhis *Ms*

47c dahanavat siddhiḥ *ex con T.* sreg byed bźin du'aṅ 'grub: dahanavad asmin *Ms*

47d dāhyābhāve *ex con T.* bsreg bya med pas: bāhyābhāve *Ms*; 'gnyasaṃbhavāt *ex con T.* me med phyir: agnisambhavāt *Ms*

48a cājño jñaḥ *ex con T.* mi śes...daṅ...śes (48b): cājñājñaḥ *Ms*

48c 'vikalpaś *ex con T.* rtog pa med pa: vikalpaś *Ms*

48d kalpyaḥ *ex con T.* brtags...bya: kupta *Ms*

50a pīḍānugrahe: pītānugrahe *Ms*

50b na duḥkha˚ *ex con T.* gnod...mi: tad duḥkha˚ *Ms*

50d amṛtaḥ *ex con T.* mi 'chir: na mṛtaḥ *Ms*

52. antarātmātmano 'nyaś cet pratijñā te ca hīyate /
- - - - - - - - -   - - - - - - - - - //

53. nāntarātmātmano 'nyaś cet pratijñā te ca hīyate /
- - - - - - - - -   - - - - - - - - - //

54. yadi sūkṣmo mahān nāyaṃ mahāṃs cen nāsya sūkṣmatā /
na caiko rūpidharmaś ca katham ātmany arūpiṇi //

55. na yuktā hastidṛṣṭāntād ekasyānekarūpatā / **20a[5]**
karaḥ karī yato neṣṭaḥ karādīnāṃ na caikatā //

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52 *one hemistitch (cd or ab) is lacking in Ms*
52b hīyate *ex con T.* ñams pa: dīyate *Ms*
53 *one hemistitch (cd or ab) is lacking in Ms*
53b hīyate *ex con T.* ñams pa: dīyate *Ms*
53c gi: gis *P*
54a yadi *ex con T.* gal te: ati *Ms*
54a 'hasti *ex con T.* glaṅ po: 'h[ ]sti *Ms*

56. sūryādivarṇo yady ātmā syād avarṇaḥ kathaṃ ca saḥ /
neṣṭā palāśadṛṣṭāntād ātmano 'nekarūpatā //

57. yataḥ palāśo naiko 'sti sarvadā vikṛtātmakaḥ /
mūlādayo yato naike pratyayaiś cāpi bhedinaḥ //

58. jyāyastā ca paratvaṃ ca tadanyāpekṣam iṣyate /
saṃbhavo 'muṣya ca vidher ekatve katham iṣyate // **20a6**

59. dravyaṃ yadi bhaved ātmā dravyatvāt sarvago na saḥ /
ghaṭavan nāpi nityaḥ syāt tena pūrṇaṃ kuto jagat //

60. dravyasyādhāratā yuktā dravyaṃ cātmā na yujyate /
khapuṣpavad ajātatvān nādhāratvaṃ yatas tataḥ //

61. kasmiṃ sarvāṇi bhūtāni bhavanty ātmaiva paśyataḥ /
ātmatānātmano neṣṭā yathābhāvasya bhāvatā //

56d 'neka° *ex con T.* du ma: neka° *Ms*
57c naike: naikai *Ms*
58c saṃbhavo 'muṣya *ex con T.* 'di ñid yod par: [ ]mbhavo muṣya *Ms*
61a kasmiṃ: kesmiṃ *Ms*
61c ātmatānātmano *ex con T.* bdag med bdag tu: ātmatādyātmano *Ms*

62. na bālādyaviśeṣo 'to nirādhāro 'nidarśanaḥ / 20b[1]
ekatve nātmano naikadoṣopaplavasaṃbhavaḥ //

63. maitrātmā caitrakaraṇaiś caitrātmavad apīkṣatām /
caitrād abhinnamūrtitvād deśābhedād athāpi vā //

64. sukhaduḥkhopabhoktā ca tanmuktau cāpi mucyatām /
tadbandhe cāpi bandho 'sya tadduḥkhe vāstu duḥkhitaḥ //

65. na ghaṭākāśadṛṣṭāntāt sarveṣāṃ tadasaṃbhavaḥ /
ākāśasya yato 'siddham ekatvaṃ bhāvatāpi ca // 20b[2]

66. mukto dravyasya yo bhāvas tad ākāśaṃ hi sāṃvṛtam /
gatir gatimatāṃ tatra so 'vakāśo 'vakāśinām //

62a na bālādyaviśeṣo 'to *ex con T.* byis sogs khyad par med ma yin...phyir: n[ ]viśeṣā to *Ms*

62b nirādhāro *ex con T.* rten med pa: nidhādhāro *Ms*; 'nidarśanaḥ *ex con T.* dpe med: nidarśanaḥ *Ms*

63a caitra° *ex con T.* tsai tra'i: caikatra *Ms*

64b °muktau: °mukto *Ms*

64d tadduḥkhe: taduḥkhe *Ms*

65a °dṛṣṭāntāt: dṛṣṭāntā *Ms*

65c ākāśasya: ākāśa[ ] *Ms* 'siddham *ex con T.* ma grub: siddham *Ms*

66a mukto: mukta *Ms*

66d 'vakāśināṃ: vakāśitāṃ *Ms*

67. nāto 'nāvṛtir ākāśaṃ nāvakāśasya dātṛ ca /
taddhetūktau tadastitve hetos tu syād asiddhatā //

68. nāpi hetvanupādānād ākāśaṃ bhāva iṣyate /
vandhyātanayavan nāpi tad ekam ata eva hi //

69. mṛdo ghaṭādirūpāyā mṛjjātīyatayaikatā / 20b[3]
anyā cānyā ca kuṇḍādāv ato naikatvam ātmanaḥ //

70. jñatve saty aviparyāsān neṣṭā jñasyābhimānitā /
ajñatve cāviparyāsān neṣṭā 'jñasyābhimānitā //

71. vyomavac cāvikāritvād asaṅgatvād athāpi vā /
nātmanaḥ kartṛtā yuktā yuktā nāpi ca bhoktṛtā //

72. kartā cel lipyate nātmā kartur iṣṭaṃ phalaṃ katham /
na yukto rājadṛṣṭāntaḥ pāpabhag nṛpatir yataḥ // 20b[4]

67a 'nāvṛtir *ex con T.* sgrib med: nāvṛ[ ]r *Ms*
67b nāvakāśa° *ex con T.* skabs...ma yin: tāvakāśa° *Ms*
68 °upādānād ākāśaṃ: °upādānnākāśaṃ *Ms*
69d ātmanaḥ *ex con T.* bdag ni: ānataḥ *Ms*
70d 'jña° *ex con T.* mi śes: jña° *Ms*
72c °dṛṣṭāntaḥ: °dṛṣṭānta *Ms*

73. na caikatādvitīyasya yuktā bāhyānapekṣaṇāt /
ekatvayogād ekaś ced yogas tasyaiva netaraḥ //

74. anekaṃ kalpayitvā ced ekatā tadapohataḥ /
ekatvaṃ tattvato na syāt kalpanā sāṃvṛtī yataḥ //

75. nityaikatvādirūpeṇa tattvataś cet sa vidyate /
ekādiśabdadhīvṛttir arthe sati niratyayā //

76. ekatvādivikalpāc ca katham asyāvikalpatā / 20b[5]
vikalpaviṣaye cārthe vācāṃ vṛttir avāritā //

77. dhiyām aviṣayo hy evaṃ kathaṃ vāgocaro girām /
avācyo nirvikalpo 'pi vitathaḥ pūrvanītivat //

73b bāhyānapekṣaṇāt *ex con T.* phyi rol la ni ma bltos par: pohyānapekṣaṇāḥ *Ms*

73d netaraḥ *ex con T.* de...ma yin: tenannaḥ *Ms*

74b ced: caid *Ms*

76b asyāvikalpatā ex con T. 'di ni...mi rtog ñid: as[ ]vikalpatā *Ms*

77a aviṣayo (cāviṣayo, vāviṣayo?) *ex con T.* yul min: ca viṣayo *Ms*

78. buddhyā ced darśanān muktis tadbhedāt katham ekatā /
nānātvadhīvat sā ca syād vitathā pūrvavad grahāt //

79. ajātisamatāṃ yāte jñāne 'bhedāt kva darśanam /
adarśanād vimuktiḥ syān muktir vā nāsti kasyacit // 20b[6]

80. bodhe sati tadutpādād ajātisamatā kutaḥ /
satyabhāvād anutpāde tadvikalpasamo 'pi saḥ //

81. ajātir jātivad dharmas tadabhāve ca sā satī /
naivātmasamatā tasya yuktā nāpi na tatsthatā //

82. ajasya ko na bhedo 'sti mato yena samarthanam /
na jātājātayor iṣṭam ajatvaṃ tattvato yataḥ //

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78 *vv. 78-84 of Ms omit. in NK, N, PK, P, DK, D, CK, C*
78a buddhyā: budhyā *Ms*
79a ajātisamatāṃ *cum Lindtner* 1985a
79b 'bhedāt: bhedāt *Ms*
79c vimuktiḥ: vimukti *Ms*
79d nāsti: nā[ ]i *Ms*
80a bodhe: bodhye *Ms*
80d °samo: °kṣayo (?) *Ms*
82a ajasya *cum Nakamura:* ajaś ca *Ms*; bhedo 'sti *cum Nakamura*: ced asti *Ms*
82b mato: matā *Ms*

83. khapuṣpāt tadabhedaś ced asatpakṣaparigrahaḥ /
parinispatte bhedaś ced advaitaṃ na prasidhyati // 21a[1]

84. nāto bhāvo na cābhāvo na pṛthag nāpṛthak pumān /
na nityo nāpy anityaś ca na buddhidhvanigocaraḥ //

85. jñeyasya sarvathāsiddher nyāyyo buddher agocaraḥ /
dhīgocaranivṛttau ca syād girām apy agocaraḥ //

86. tāthāgatīm avitathāṃ matvā nītim imāṃ śubhām /
tasmāj jātaspṛhais tīrthyaiḥ kṛtaṃ tatra mamāpi tat //

87. kaḥ śraddhāsyati tāṃ tatra pūrvāparavirodhinīm / 21a[2]
atyantātulyajātīyaṃ maṇiratnam ivāyasaḥ //

83b parigrahaḥ: parigraha[ ] *Ms*
83c pariniṣpatte: [ ]ṣpātta *Ms*
84d ca na: cāto *Ms*
85a jñeyasya: jñeya *Ms*
85b nyāyyo *ex con T.* rigs: nyāyo *Ms*
85c °nivṛttau *ex con T.* las log pas na: °nirvṛttau *Ms*
85d agocaraḥ: agocara *Ms*
86a avitathāṃ: avitathā *Ms*
86c tīrthyaiḥ: tīrthaiḥ *Ms*
86d tat: taṃ *Ms*
87a kaḥ ex con T. su źig:[ ] *Ms*

88. deśanāyās tu vaicitryād ihaivaṃ syād ayaṃ nayaḥ /
ākarṣaṇārtham ekeṣāṃ śeṣagrāhanivṛttaye //

89. ajātatā hi bhāvānāṃ svabhāvo 'kṛtrimatvataḥ /
anapāyitvataś cāsāv ātmety api nigadyate //

90. eko 'sāv ekarūpatvād bhāvabhede 'py abhedataḥ /
sarvagaḥ sarvadharmatvān nityaś cāpy avināśataḥ // **21a[3]**

91. ajātatvād ajāto 'yam ata evājarāmaraḥ /
acyutaś cyutyabhāvāc ca prakarṣatvāt paraṃ matam //

92. na rūpaśabdagandhādir na bhūmy agnijalānilāḥ /
nākāśaśaśisūryādir na manojñānalakṣaṇaḥ //

88b ivaṃ: iva *Ms*
89b 'kṛtrimatvataḥ *ex con T.* bcos ma med pa'i phyir: kartṛmatvataḥ *Ms*
89c anapāyitvataś *ex con T.* ñams pa med pas na: anayāyitvataś *Ms*
90c sarvagaḥ *ex con T.* kun khyab: sarva[ ] *Ms*; ˚tvān *ex con T.* : phyir: ˚tvā *Ms*
91a ajāto 'yam *ex con T.* skye med ñid de ñid: ajātaś cāyam *Ms*
91b ˚ajarāmaraḥ *ex con T.* rga śi med: ˚jarāmaraḥ *Ms*
92b bhūmy *ex con T.* sa: bhūpy *Ms*; ˚anilāḥ: ˚anilaḥ *Ms*

93. sarvaś cāsau svabhāvatvān na sarvaṃ cāvināśataḥ /
tatra kleśādyanutpatteḥ śuddho 'sau śānta eva ca //

94. sa kalpanāsamāropād vācyo 'vācyas tu tattvataḥ / 21a[4]
sarvathā cāpy avācyatvād ukta eṣa nirañjanaḥ //

95. īdṛśo yady abhipreta ātmā hi bhavatām api /
nāmādibahusādharmyān nirdoṣaḥ sopapattikaḥ //

96. nairātmyād eva bhītānāṃ bhītyā tatraiva ca sthitiḥ /
ākāśād iva bhītasya kva cānyatra sthitir bhavet //

97. svāgataṃ kriyatāṃ tṛptir nātra kaścin nivāryate /
buddhānāṃ lokabandhūnāṃ tattvāmṛtam idaṃ param // 21a[5]

93a sarvaś cāsau *ex con T.* thams cad 'di: sarvasyāsau *Ms*
94a °samāropād *ex con T.* sgro btags nas: °samāropa[ ] *Ms*
94b vācyo *ex con T.* brjod bya: [ ]cyo *Ms*;
'vācyas *ex con T.* brjod bya min: vācyas *Ms*
95b bhavatām *ex con T.* khyod kyis: tavatām *Ms*
96b bhītyā *ex con T.* 'jigs: dṛṣṭyā *Ms*; ca: va *Ms*
97b nivāryate *ex con T.* bkag pa: na vāryate *Ms*
97d tattvāmṛtam *ex con T.* de ñid bdud rtsi: ta[ ]m *Ms*;
paraṃ *ex con T.* mchog: padaṃ *Ms*

98. api tv ātmatvakartṛtvabhoktṛtvādir nirāspadaḥ /
saṃtyajyatām asadgrāho bhūtadṛkpratibandhakaḥ //

99. svabhāvājātito 'jātir bhāvānāṃ tattvato matā /
svabhāvato hy ajātatvād uktaiṣā niḥsvabhāvatā //

100. naiḥsvabhāvyaṃ ca nairātmyaṃ na tadātmā virodhataḥ /
anātmā ced bhaved ātmā gor abhāvo 'pi gaur bhavet //

101. yuktā svabhāvābhāvo 'sau kathaṃ kartṛtābhoktṛte / **21a**[6]
dṛṣṭe vandhyāsutasyeha nākasmāt kartṛbhoktṛte //

102. itthaṃbhūtāt kathaṃ janma pralayas tatra vā katham /
na vyomakusume yuktā pralayotpādakalpanā //

98b ˚vādir: vādi *Ms*
98c ˚grāho: ˚graho *Ms*
98d bhūtadṛk: bhūtadrik *Ms*
99a 'jātir *ex con T.* skye med: jāti *Ms*
99d niḥsvabhāvatā: nisvabhāvatā *Ms*
100a naiḥ: nai *Ms*; ˚svabhāvyaṃ: ˚svābhāvyaṃ *Ms*
101a yuktā *ex con T.* rigs: yataḥ *Ms*
101b kartṛtābhoktṛte *ex con T.* byed po za por: kartṛ...(*illeg.*) [ ]ktṛte *Ms*

103. svabhāvābhāvaviṣayā yāvad buddhiḥ pravartate /
dhīkalpanāsamāropās tāvad ekādikā matāḥ //

104. savikalpāvikalpā ca yadā buddhir nivartate /
dhiyām aviṣaye tasmin prapañcopaśamaḥ śivaḥ // **21b[1]**

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vedāntatattvaviniścayo 'ṣṭamaḥ paricchedaḥ //

103c dhī˚: dhīḥ˚ *Ms;* ˚samāropās: ˚samāropā Ms

103d ekādikā *ex con T.* gcig la sogs par: ekāntikā *Ms;* matāḥ: matā *Ms*

104a ˚vikalpā: ˚vikalpāś *Ms*

104c dhiyām *ex con T.* blo ni: viyām *Ms*

104d ˚śamaḥ: ˚śama[ ] *Ms;* śivaḥ *ex con T.* źi ba ñid (*śivatā): [ ]... (*illeg.*) *Ms*

III. Bhavya's Determination of Vedānta Philosophy in Chapter VIII of the Madhyamakahṛdayakārikā

Introduction

The following annotated English translation of the *Vedāntatattvaviniś-caya* (VTV) chapter of Bhavya's *Madhyamakahṛdayakārikā* (MHK),[1] is based upon a critical edition of the Sanskrit text by the present author.[2] For translating Sanskrit philosophical prose into English, I have adopted the following three principles of translation outlined by Prof. Malcolm D. Eckel.[3]

1) Due to the elliptical quality of Sanskrit prose, a vigorous and clear English translation has to identify parts of the sentence which are omitted in the Sanskrit. These parts are to be inserted in brackets. Concerning specifically the present translation of VTV of MHK, it is necessary not only to include brackets containing words or sentences carried down from a preceding verse (as a result of the distinctive feature of Sanskrit philosophical prose), but also to insert brackets comprising passages from the auto-commentary, the *Tarkajvālā*.[4] The reason for the latter is that the original work of Bhavya (the *Madhyamakahṛdaya,* also called the

1 Translations of the VTV: Gokhale 1958 (Eng. tr. of MHK/TJ 8.1-16=8.1-17 in my tr.); Walleser 1910, pp. 17-18 (German tr. of MHK 8.1-3, 5, 10-13=8.1-3, 5, 11-14 in my tr.); and Nakamura 1981, pp. 557-626 (Jap. tr. of the entire ch. 8 of MHK/TJ).

2 See (**II**), pp. 28-48.

3 Eckel 1987, pp. 6-11.

4 The passages from TJ 8.1-17, inserted in brackets, follows Gokhale's translation (1958) except for some deviations of which the major ones are stated in the *apparatus*. Since no translation into a Western language or critical edition of TJ 8.14-108 is available, the inserted passages from the *uttarapakṣa* of TJ are based upon the *Peking bsTan-'gyur* (Vol. 96, No. 5255, *fol.: Dza* 282b6-306a2) and the *sDe-dge bsTan-'gyur* (No. 3855, *fol.: Dza* 251a1-271a2). These passages are not to be conceived of as literal translations, even though they occasionally closely renders the Tibetan, but instead should be viewed as paraphrases of the doctrinal content of TJ which are crucial for understanding the verse.

As far as MHK 8.78-84 is concerned, these verses are only given in the Sanskrit Ms. of VTV-MHK, not in PK, P, DK, D, CK, C, NK, or N. Consequently, we do not possess a commentary on these verses which criticize the *ajātisamatāvāda* of the *Gauḍapādīyakārikā.* See (**II**), p. 20, n. 25.

As an attempt to show the narrative structure of the text, subheadings are inserted in brackets. It should be noted, however, that some of the verses occuring under a specific subheading occasionally depart doctrinally from the overall topic indicated by the subheading.

Tarkajvālā, *Tattvāmṛtāvatāra* or *Madhyamakahṛdayatattvāvatāra*) contains both the verses (later in the transmission entitled *Madhyamaka-hṛdayakārikā* or *Tarkajvālāsūtra*) and the prose commentary (later in the transmission entitled *Tarkajvālā*).[5] The verses cannot and *should* not, therefore, be understood without the commentary, and vice versa.

2) Unless the context requires a more literal rendering of the Sanskrit, constructions with an abstract suffix are best rendered in English without treating the abstract noun as a property of another noun. For example MHK 8.11: */.../ ekasya nānātvaṃ /.../* "Of the one [Self there is] manifoldness" or "Of the one [Self there is] the property [or nature of] 'many'" is therefore best translated: "The one [Self] is many".

3) In order to give a clear and concise translation of Sanskrit verses with passive constructions, one may sometimes change the passive into active and thereby identify the subject of the sentence.

Finally, in the course of preparing the *apparatus* to the translation of VTV, I have attached importance to what Dr. Eckel regards as the main purpose of the notes to his translation of Jñānagarbha's *Satyadvaya-vibhaṅga* (*°vibhāga*)[6]: "The notes to the translation are meant to give a detailed view of the relationship between Jñānagarbha and his intellectual background, and to assemble a cross section of the references, allusions, arguments, and terms that a contemporary of Jñānagarbha would have used to understand the meaning of the text".[7]

5 See (**II**), pp. 25-26.

6 On *vibhāga/vibhaṅga*, see Lindtner's forthcoming review of Eckel's book (1987) in the *Journal of Indian Philosophy*.

7 Eckel 1987, p. 6.

Analytical Survey [8]

[The Position of the Proponent (*pūrvapakṣa*): Vedānta Philosophy (*vedāntadarśana*) According to Bhavya]

[Introduction]

Liberation (*mokṣa*) arises out of the knowledge of the Self (*ātman*) or the "Person" (*puruṣa*). The Buddhists, who deny the notion of a "Self" and maintain that all entities (*saṃskāra*) are empty (*śūnya*), without an "intrinsic nature" (*svabhāva*) or a "Self", therefore cannot obtain liberation (**1**).

[The Characteristics of the Self]

The liberating knowledge results from the perception of the Self (*ātman*), the "Person" (*puruṣa*) or the great Lord (*maheśvara*), located beyond the three-realm universe (*traidhātuka*), which results from cause and effect (**2**). When one perceives the "Person" and is consequently in union (*sāmya*) with Him, one realizes that He is the agent (*kartṛ*) and the Lord (*īśvara*) of the three-realm universe (**3**). This three-realm universe is completely pervaded by this "Person" in time and in space (**4**). The "Person" remains unchanged and unspent while creating the three-realm universe, just like a spider (*ūrṇanābha*), which remains unchanged and unspent while producing threads (*aṃśu*). The one who, through the practice of meditation (*dhyāna*), perceives the "Person" and therefore is dissolved (*pralīna*) into Him, is not reborn into another existence (*punarbhava*) (**5**). The one who does not perceive the immortal "Person" and accordingly is not awakened (*aprabodha*) to become absorbed into Him, does not attain immortality (*amṛtatva*), since the entire world (*sarvaloka*) — of which he is a part — is mortal (*martya*) by nature (**6**). There does not exist anything superior (*param*), more excellent (*jyāyas*) or subtler (*aṇīyas*) than this "Person" who is the upholder of the entire empirical reality (**7**). The one who perceives the "Person" is endowed with perfections or super-natural powers (*siddhi*). Since the "Person" has the nature of epitomizing all the aggre-

8 The purpose of the following analytical survey is to render clearly the fundamental arguments stated in the VTV of MHK/TJ. In order to accomplish such an analysis and rephrasing of the text in the order it unfolds itself, it has occasionally proved indispensable to incorporate arguments from a different verse and/or commentary into the analysis and paraphrase of a specific verse and its commentary.

Concerning the fundamental principles of Bhavya's philosophy, and their philosophical presuppositions, these are outlined in an excellent article by Malcolm D. Eckel (1985, pp. 29-44).

gates of the three-realm universe (**8**), the experiencer of Him realizes that all entities as well as the very "Self" of the three-realm universe are comprehended within that "Person". All beings, such as the ignorant (*bāla*) and the learned (*paṇḍita*), the outcast (*caṇḍāla*) and the brahmin (*vipra*), are therefore intrinsically identical from the perspective of the experiencer of the Self or the "Person" (**9**). The Self does not have the same nature as bodies, etc., just as space (*ākāśa*) does not have the same nature as pots (*ghaṭa*), etc. (**10**). The Self is one (*eka*) and not many (*nānātva*), although it exists in different embodied beings, just as space is one and not differentiated, though occupying different pots (**11**). The Self is one, even though bodies created out of that Self are different, just as clay (*mṛd*) is one, even though pots, etc., created out of that clay are different (**12**). Just as when dust, smoke, etc. (*rajodhūmādi*) cover the space in a single pot, all other pots are not similarly covered, so when one person is happy or suffers, all other persons are not similarly happy or suffering (**13**). Happiness and suffering arise only within the person who does not know the Self (*anātmajñaḥ*) and who is not awakened to become absorbed into the Self. Happiness (*sukha*) and suffering (*duḥkha*) therefore do not belong to the Self, just as dust, smoke, etc., do not belong to space. That person who is ignorant of the Self and not awakened to become absorbed into it, thinks of his experiences as real, just as the person who dreams imagines himself to have real experiences. In effect, impressions are accumulated from activity, and depending on their good (*śubha*) and bad (*aśubha*) results (*phala*), happiness or suffering is experienced (**14**). The very Self however is not defiled as the agent (*kartṛ*) and the enjoyer (*bhoktṛ*) of the three-realm universe, since it is non-attached (**15**). The Self (*brahman*) is one, due to its supremacy over the whole body; all-pervasive (*sarvatraga*), due to the fact that it pervades the whole world; eternal (*nitya*), due to its indestructability; and it is the immortal state (*acyutaṃ padam*), due to the fact that it is without beginning or end. When through meditation (*dhyāna*) one knows the Self, one is free from rebirth (**16**). The Self is also eternal, because it is capable of being objectified by the Yogin at all times. It is non-conceptual (*avikalpa*), because it is different from the senses and consciousness, and it is beyond the realm of speech (*vācām agocara*), because it is not within the reach of the mind. Words like *ātman, puruṣa, īśvara, sarvatraga, nitya,* etc. are, however, applied to it by those whose minds are led astray by difference because they have not experienced the Self (**17**).

[The Position of the Respondent (*uttarapakṣa*): Bhavya's Refutation of Vedānta Philosophy]

[Introduction]

The critical examination (*parīkṣā*) of Vedānta philosophy is to be conducted by a non-dogmatic person (*pakṣapātānapekṣin*) who is not attached to any position (*pakṣa*) including his own (**18**).

[Refutation of Liberation (*mokṣa*) as a Result of the Perception of the Self]

Since the existence (*astitva*) of the Self already has been negated (*niṣiddha*), the Self cannot be the cause of the world (*jagatkāraṇatā*). Accordingly, a liberation which consists in the perception of the Self is false (*abhūta*), since it is mentally constructed (*prakalpita*) (**19**). The Self is like the five aggregates of grasping (*upādānaskandha*), and the view of a Self is like the attachment (*abhiniveśa*) to the five aggregates of grasping (*upādānaskandha*) or the belief in a "personal identity" (*satkāyadṛṣṭi*). This belief, holding that the five aggregates of grasping are the Self (*ātman*) and what belongs to the Self (*ātmīya*), is greatly increased by you. And since such a belief in an "I" (*aham*) and a "mine" (*māma*) is the root of all defilements (*kleśa*), it actually increases *saṃsāra* instead of liberating oneself from it. Liberation is therefore to be obtained through the destruction, not through the cultivation, of the belief in a "personal identity" or the attachment to the five aggregates of grasping (**20-22**). Even though you maintain that the Self appears in two forms: the Self which is bound to the so-called body, and the Self which rests in the supreme (*pareṣṭhātman*) (**23**), that cognition which has as its object or "content" (*viṣaya*) the Self which rests in the supreme is not true, because this would imply attachment (*saṅga*) and movement (*pracāra*) in relation to its object. Liberation is therefore not obtained through the cognition of the supreme Self. Objection: The supreme Self is imagined (*parikalpita*) to be a "Self" by the power of residues (*vāsanā*) of attachment (*abhiniveśa*) to the Self. Answer: Nothing at all is established by imagination (**24**).

[Refutation of the Self as the Agent (*kartṛ*)]

The supreme Self could be neither an agent (*kartṛ*) which makes a cognition that has form (*rūpa*), speech (*śabda*) (**25-26**), sound (*dhvani*) (**27**) as object, nor an agent of physical (*dehaja*) (**28**) or mental activities, such as discernment (*saṃjñā*), recollection (*smarana*), insight (*prajñā*) and

feeling (*vedanā*), because origination (*janmatva*) depends on causal conditions (*pratyaya*) (**29**). Objection: The Self does indeed see, hear, smell, taste, think, remember, etc., because it is the agent, and the eye, etc., are its instruments (*karaṇa*) (**30**). Answer: To assert the Self as the agent and the eye, etc., as its instruments is not logical: Sense-organs, etc., cannot have instrumental status (*karaṇatva*) since the agent presupposes the arising of causal conditions (**31-32**). Agent-status (*kartṛtva*) is therefore only possible to conceive of on the basis of a verbal expression like "Devadatta cuts". Objection: Devadatta does not cut, but the sword does. Answer: This is not correct, because the action will here be accomplished by means of the assemblage of the agent and the object of action. Regarding this, one sometimes emphasizes the agent as the chief thing, for example when saying: "Devadatta cuts". Sometimes one emphasizes the instrument as the chief thing, for example when saying: "The sword cuts". The act of cutting depends on both. The instrument does not act without an agent, and the agent too cannot act without an instrument. Without both of these, it is not possible to conceive of an agent and an instrument acting independently of each other. Things are brought about due to the assembled causal conditions, not due to a principal (*pradhāna*) condition. Otherwise it is just a metaphor (*upacāra*) (**33**). One may assume an agent, but only on the basis of a heap (*rāśi*) of completely motionless conditioned entities (*saṃskāra*), which then is designated "agent". Objection: The Self is supreme, because all actions proceed through dependance on that chief agent (**34**). Answer: Conventionally the eye, etc. may be said to be not just metaphorical agents, but chief agents, because it is not possible to establish an agent different from the eye, etc. In reality (*tattvataḥ*), however, there does not exist a fundamental agent of all actions because they are dependent on many collected causes (**35**).

[Refutation of the Self as Bound and Liberated]

Objection: Since Reality (*tattva*) is under consideration, by the power of past acts the stream of momentary *dharmas* cannot be bound and liberated since what ceases at each instant is without activity. Therefore, one should understand that only the Self is the basis of bondage, liberation and continuance. Answer: Even though the mind (*citta*) is a stream (*saṃtāna*) of momentary *dharmas* and therefore without intrinsic nature (*niḥ-svabhāva*), it is still conventionally said to be "bound" when it is under the power of defilements such as desire (*rāga*) and attachment, a "sentient being" (*sattva*) when it possesses a body (*deha*), and a "giver" (*dātṛ*) when the volition of giving things arises within it. When this "sentient being" consisting of the five aggregates of grasping is free from defilements such as desire, etc., it is said to be "liberated" (*mukta*) (**35-38**). It is,

however, incorrect to maintain that the Self, which always remains the same whether defilements arise or are pacified, is bound or liberated (**39**).

[Refutation of Cognition (*jñāna*) as the Intrinsic Nature (*svabhāva*) of the Self]

If the Self has cognition (*jñāna*) as its intrinsic nature (*svabhāva*), it could not be one (*eka*) since cognition is dependent on an intermediary instrument of knowledge (**40**). To cognize the Self is to view the Self as an object of knowledge (*jñeya*). Liberation will therefore not be produced since the cognition of an object implies activity (*pravṛtti*). And as long as cognition arises in the mind, so long will impressions (*bīja*) be accumulated too. (**41-42**). Moreover, if the Self has the intrinsic nature of cognition which does not depend on an intermediary instrument of knowledge, *saṃsāra* could not exist for the knower of the Self. Such a non-distinguished (*aviśiṣṭatva*) Self cannot be said to be bound or liberated (**43**). And since only the Self exists according to you, it could not be without suffering, even in the state of liberation (**44**). A cognition which is by nature latent (*līna*) and unoriginated cannot produce knowledge without an intermediary instrument of knowledge. Objection: Even when fire burns, it is indicated that the person burns by means of fire, likewise even when cognition knows, it is said that the person knows, but not the cognition (**45**). Answer: When it is said: "He burns by means of fire", it is the fire that burns, not the one who achieves it, just as when it is said: "One knows by means of the mind", it is the cognition that knows, not that Self of yours (**46**). The Self consequently could not have cognition as its intrinsic nature, since cognition is dependent on an intermediary instrument of knowledge. Otherwise cognition as the intrinsic nature of the Self will just be a designation in relation to non-cognition and therefore, not established (**47**). A non-knowing Self could, however, not be an agent (*kartṛ*) and an enjoyer (*bhoktṛ*) — one should not just accept a notion on the basis of scriptural tradition (*āgama*), which is not a means of valid cognition (*pramāṇa*). Objection: Even though the Self has the intrinsic nature of non-cognition, it has the intrinsic nature of cognition when the instrument is present. Answer: This is not correct, since prior to the first existence of cognition the Self had the intrinsic nature of non-cognition because the instrument had not arisen. For something to be intrinsic, it cannot deviate from a certain nature. The Self accordingly must be intrinsically non-knowing and therefore, not an agent or enjoyer (**48**). If you alternatively say that the Self has the intrinsic nature of neither cognition nor non-cognition, it would be non-existent without intrinsic nature (*niḥsvabhāva*) or "Self" (**49**).

[Refutation of an Individual (Mortal) Self (*antarātman*) and an (Immortal) Self which Rests in the Supreme (*parameṣṭhātman*)]

The supreme Self cannot be the "Self" of a single person, since it is not affected by suffering or pleasure (**50**). And because there is no deviation or change from a certain intrinsic nature, meditative cognition (*dhyānajñāna*) does not result in the individual mortal (*martya*) Self becoming immortal (*amṛta*) (**51**). If you say that the mortal and immortal Self are different from each other, then the assertion of yours that "All is the 'Person'" is rendered invalid (**52**), and if you alternatively say that the mortal and immortal Self are identical, then your assertion is also rendered invalid because the immortal Self does not experience pleasure and pain (**53**). It is not possible for a singular Self to have a manifold nature since then mental constructions (*vikalpa*) would occur in regard to the Self, which furthermore would be without an intrinsic nature — nothing could exist in or by itself together with its different parts (**54-56**). An unchanging and non-differentiating Self cannot have a manifold nature, since everything is always subjected to change as a result of causal conditions (*pratyaya*) (**57**). Designations like "most excellent" and "most supreme", etc., (7) are only accepted in relation to something other than that which is said to be so. But since only the Self exists, there does not exist anything in relation to which the Self could be said to be "more excellent", etc. (**58**).

[Refutation of the Self as a Substance (*dravya*) and a Support (*ādhāratā*)]

If the Self were a substance (*dravya*), it could not be all-pervasive and eternal, because of its substantiality (*dravyatva*), as in the example of a pot. Consequently, the world cannot be filled with the Self. As to the statement of yours that all that has arisen, is arising and will arise is the "Person" (4), we reply (**59**): The Self is not the support of the three-realm universe, since the status of being a support (*ādhāratā*) is only valid in relation to a substance. But since the Self is unoriginated, it is not a substance, and therefore, neither existent nor the support of the three-realm universe (**60**). Due to this, all entities are not identical to the Self, and therefore the identity between the ignorant and the learned, etc., (9) is not established either (**61-62**).

[Refutation of the Oneness and Existence of Space (*ākāśa*) and the Self]

If the Self alone exists, then the Self of one person may be perceived through the sense-organs of another person, and vice versa. And if the Self

of one person is liberated or bound, the Self of all other persons must also be liberated or bound. Since this is not the case, the Self is not one (**63-64**). Objection: Although I have determined the support of the elements, etc., and the oneness without distinction of fools, etc., my position is not disproved because I use as an example the "pot-space" simile (*ghaṭākāśa-dṛṣṭānta*) (10-11, 13) which is accepted by both sides (**64**). Answer: The oneness (*ekatva*) and existence of the Self are not established on the basis of the "pot-space" simile, since the oneness and existence of space are not established (**65**). Space is, conventionally, merely the absence of a resistant substance (*sapratighadravyābhāvamātra*) (**66**), and therefore it is blocked (*āvṛta*), not an active provider (*dātṛ*) of room (*avakāśa*), and not a substance possessing existence (*dravyasat*) (**67**). The Self, likened to space, is therefore not an existing, all-pervasive, singular and permanent (*nitya*) entity which is the support of the three-realm universe, since it does not stand in relation to a cause (**68**). The oneness of the Self can furthermore not be established on the basis of the example of clay (12), since even though clay is one by virtue of the character of clay (*mṛjjātīya*), it is differentiated in that there always is a different and new clay in each pot (**69**). As to your statement that because of not being awakened to becoming absorbed into the Self and because of not knowing the Self, one's experience of reality is like the conceit of enjoyment in a dream (14): Will one be conceited because one knows or because one does not know? (**69**). When one knows, as in the case of someone who gets his knowledge of reality through his visual organ, and when one does not know, as in the case of someone who from birth is suffering from blindness, in both cases there is no error. Therefore the knower as well as the non-knower could not be said to be in a state of imagination. As to your statement that although the "Person" exists in the body, He is not attached, and though He enjoys objects, He is not stained by them (15), we answer (**70**):

[Refutation of the Self as the Agent (*kartṛ*) and the Enjoyer (*bhoktṛ*)]

Something which is non-attached and non-changing cannot be an agent and enjoyer, because an agent and an enjoyer is stained by the results of action; otherwise it could not produce the results wished for. As to the statement of yours that the Self is one, all-pervasive and eternal (16), we answer (**71-72**):

[Refutation of a Singular (*eka*), All-pervasive (*sarvatraga*), Eternal (*nitya*), Inexpressible (*avācya*) and Inconceivable (*nirvikalpa*) Self]

Concepts like "one", etc., cannot be attributed to the Self, since if everything external and internal were the Self, then there would be nothing in relation to which it could be said to be "one", etc. Such a Self, which is "without a second" (*advitīya*) and independent of something external, could also not be said to be "one" out of connection to itself, since what is then related to what? An independent or unrelated Self cannot know itself, just as a finger cannot possibly know or touch its own tip (**73**). If the oneness of the Self is established as a result of excluding the conceptualization of it being many, that oneness could not exist in reality, since even the conception of oneness is relative (*sāṃvṛtī*) (**74**). Moreover, if the Self exists in reality with the intrinsic nature of oneness, etc., then words (*śabda*) and cognitions (*dhī*) would be infallible (**75**). This is not correct, however, because if only the Self existed, the referent (*artha*), which is the object of conceptual construction and the basis upon which words function, would not exist. Because one conceptualizes the Self to be "one", the Self cannot be without conceptual construction, since there does not exist any difference between the Self and the cognition of the Self according to you (**76**). Furthermore, because one assumes the existence of a Self, and the Self and the cognition of the Self are not different, it is not correct to say that the Self is neither an object of cognition or speech, nor expressible, nor conceivable through conceptual construction (**77**).

[Refutation of Liberation (*mukti*) or Enlightenment (*bodhi*) as a State of Self-identity of Non-origination (*ajātisamatā*) Resulting from the Cognition of the Self]

If liberation comes from seeing the Self by virtue of cognition, the oneness of the Self cannot exist, because cognition and liberation are different. Liberation which results from the cognition of the Self is therefore false, because the Self will be grasped as an object, like the cognition of multiplicity (*nānātvadhī*) (**78**). If there exists a cognition which knows the self-identity of non-origination, there cannot be seeing, since there does not exist any difference between the cognition of that self-identity of non-origination and the state of self-identity of non-origination itself. Liberation would then result from non-seeing (**79**). If enlightenment (*bodhi*) results from the arising of seeing, then liberation or enlightenment could not be self-identical. If seeing does not arise because it does not possess existence, it is just a conceptual construction of that self-identity of non-origination and therefore not identical to itself (**80**). Non-origination (*ajāti*) exists only as

the absence of origination (*jāti*). Therefore, for this phenomena (*dharma*) of non-origination, it is not logical to be identical to the Self or abiding in it (**81**). Status of being unoriginated is in reality neither accepted to the born nor to the unborn (**82**). If the Self is non-differentiated, it would not be different from a skyflower, which is contrary to your own position, and if there is difference in the absolute, then non-duality (*advaita*) could not be established by you (**83**).

[Conclusion]

Neither existence nor non-existence and neither difference nor non-difference are applicable to the Self, which is neither eternal nor non-eternal, and neither an object of speech nor an object of cognition (**84**). Even if you maintain that our systems are similar since we also maintain that that which is beyond speech and cognition is the ultimate reality, our systems are dissimilar, because the conclusive reason for us to take such a stand is not based upon the notion of an existing Self, but instead is based upon the notion that all entities are empty of "Self" or intrinsic nature. Consequently, since one cannot establish an object of knowledge, the operative domain of cognition and speech do not exist either (**85**).

[Vedānta — A Contradictory and Completely Heterogeneous (*atyantātulyajātīya*) System (*siddhānta*)]

Being very interested in our infallible system, you have actually taken it and made it your own. Your teaching is therefore a mixture of doctrinal systems, and as such, it is contradictory and to be classified as a conceptual construction (**86**) — no one will have faith in such a contradictory and completely mixed system as yours. If you say that our system is also of a contradictory nature because sometimes we teach that there is something which possesses a Self (*sātmatā*), etc. and sometimes we do not (**87**), this does not reflect a contradiction (*virodha*) on the part of our system since these statements of ours are pedagogical devices in accordance with relative (*saṃvṛti*) and absolute (*paramārtha*) truth (*satya*). In order to turn away the grasping of non-existence by nihilists, the existence of a Self is taught, and in order to stop the grasping of a Self by the adherents of a Self (*ātma-vādin*), the non-existence of a Self is taught. In ultimate reality, however, it is taught that neither the Self nor the non-Self exist (**88**).

[Unoriginatedness (*ajātatva*) and Absence of Intrinsic Nature (*niḥsvabhāvatā*) as the "Self" (*ātman*) or "Intrinsic Nature" (*svabhāva*) of all Entities (*bhāva*)]

The intrinsic nature of entities is to be unoriginated (*ajātitva*), since existent and non-existent entities have not originated from themselves (*svataḥ*), from another (*parataḥ*), from both (*dvābhyām*), or from no cause (*ahetutaḥ*). That intrinsic nature is also said to be the "Self" (*ātman*) of all entities because it is contingent (*akṛtrimatva*) and because it does not disappear (*anapāyitva*) (**89**). That intrinsic nature or Self is one (*eka*) by virtue of its single nature (*ekarūpatva*) and because it is undifferentiated (*abheda*) even when there is differentiation of entities. It is allpervasive (*sarvatraga*) because it possesses the property of grasping the own-characteristics of no-characteristic (*alakṣaṇasvalakṣaṇa*) of all *dharmas,* and eternal (*nitya*) because it does not disappear (*avināśa*) (**90**). It is unoriginated (*ajāta*) and not subjected to old age and death (*ajarāmara*), since it is not originated. It is imperishable (*acyuta*) because it is free from extinction, and supreme (*para*) because of excellence (*prakarṣa*) with regard to its nature (**91**). It is neither a sense object such as form (*rūpa*), sound (*śabda*), smell (*gandha*), etc., nor an external element or object such as earth (*bhūmi*), fire (*agni*), water (*jala*), air (*anila*), space (*ākāśa*), the moon (*śaśi*), the sun (*sūrya*), etc. It possesses neither the characteristic (*lakṣaṇa*) of mind (*manas*), which is to cogitate, nor that of cognition (*jñāna*), which is to know entities (**92**). It is everything because it is the intrinsic nature of all entities, but it is not every particular entity, since it is without destruction (*avināśa*). It is pure (*śuddha*) because defilements (*kleśa*) do not arise in it, and completely equanimate (*śānta*) because it has completely transcended all actions (*kriyā*) (**93**). It is expressible by virtue of the imposition of conceptual construction (*kalpanā-samāropa*), but inexpressible (*avācya*) in reality (*tattvataḥ*). It is unmanifest (*nirañjana*) because it is in every respect inexpressible (**94**). If you accept such an "intrinsic nature" or "Self" which is the general characteristic of non-origination, then your notion of a supreme Self and ours of non-origination are identical (**95**) — even if you are afraid of the absence of a "Self" (*anātman*), you will remain exactly there in that very absence anyway (**96**). Therefore, feel welcome to quench your thirst for truth by drinking this supreme nectar of reality offered by the friends of the world, the Buddhas (**97**). But remember to abandon the notion of the Self as the agent and the enjoyer, etc.; it is baseless, non-true and obstructive (*prati-bandhaka*) to the one who seeks reality (**98**). Objection: If our Self and your non-Self are similar, then our systems are equal. Answer: In reality entities are unoriginated not because they ultimately have the Self as their

nature, but because they are empty of a "Self", since they do not arise in their own right or by virtue of their own nature (**99**). Our systems are thus dissimilar, since lack of intrinsic nature and lack of Self is not the same as a Self. That would be a contradiction (**100**). A really existing agent and enjoyer cannot be without intrinsic nature, and consequently the Self has the same unreal agent and enjoyer status as the son of a barren woman (**101**). There cannot be origination from or dissolution into a Self of such a nature, which is unreal like a skyflower (**102**). That cognition which has as its object the absence of intrinsic nature thinks of it as having the intrinsic nature of "one", etc., by the imposition of conceptual construction of the mind. In reality, however, the intrinsic nature of oneness, etc., does not exist (**103**). When the conceptual cognition and the non-conceptual cognition, which does not conceive of the object as having or not having an intrinsic nature, cease, then the peaceful cessation of diversity occurs. That nature in which all entities are completely non-established (*paraniḥpanna*) and which is beyond speech and cognition — that is Reality. However, the view of a Self conceptually constructed by you is not Reality (**104**).

Translation

[The Determination of Reality According to Vedānta (*vedāntatattvaviniścaya*)][9]

[The Position of the Proponent (*pūrvapakṣa*): Vedānta Philosophy (*vedāntadarśana*) According to Bhavya]

[Introduction]

1. The adherents of Vedānta[10] state (*prāhur*)[11]: Outside [our own school] it is extremely difficult (*durlabha*) to find one who [really] knows the Self (*ātman*). How could those who dismiss [the notion of] a Self, maintaining that all conditioned entities (*saṃskāra*) are empty (*śūnya*), [bereft of intrinsic nature (*svabhāvarahita*) and momentary (*kṣaṇavinaṣṭa*) possibly obtain] liberation (*mokṣa*)?[12]

[The Characteristics of the Self]

2. An intelligent man (*matimat*) conquers death (*mṛtyu*) when he [through his divine eye (*divyacakṣus*)] perceives the transcendent "Person" (*puruṣa*)[13] which is on the other side of darkness (*tamaḥ*-

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9 Cf. the *Gauḍapādīyakārikā* (GK) 2.12: /.../*vedāntaniścayaḥ*
An early Jaina scripture, the *Bhagavatī Sūtra* (18, 6, 631, quoted by Iida 1980, p. 244), distinguishes between *vyavahāra-naya* and *niścaya-naya,* which seems to correspond to the Madhyamaka notion of a relative (*saṃvṛti*) and an absolute truth (*paramārthasatya*). See also Lindtner 1982b, p. 279.

10 On Bhavya's definition of *Vedānta* and *Vedāntavādin,* see (**IV**), p. 101, n. 28.

11 Cf. MHK ch. 4 (*Śrāvakatattvaniścayāvatāra*), v. 1: *durvigāhām imāṃ nīti boddhuṃ durbalaśaktayaḥ / asthānatrāsasaṃrabdhāḥ prāhur hīnādhi-muktayaḥ //* "Those attached to the lesser [vehicle], weak in ability to understand this [Madhyamaka] system [presented in the *Tattvajñānaiṣaṇā* chapter of MHK/TJ] which is difficult to fathom, speak out in agitation for fear of losing their foothold."

12 Cf. the discussion on *nirvāṇa* in Bhavya's *Prajñāpradīpa* (PP) 25.1-21. Here a statement with a similar impact to that of TJ 8.1 is set forth by an opponent: "For those who hold the doctrine of no intrinsic nature (*niḥsvabhāvavādin*), the *nirvāṇa* of something with no intrinsic nature cannot be attained, because [something with no intrinsic nature] is neither produced nor destroyed, like the son of a barren woman." (See Eckel 1980, p. 302.)

13 In the *pūrvapakṣa* (1-17), the Self is variously termed *puruṣa, ātman, īśvara, maheśvara, brahman,* etc. Since the Self is the all-pervading nature of the three-realm universe (*traidhātuka*), it is, e.g., in TJ 8.3 viewed as a "Person"

parastāt), radiant like the sun (*sūryavarcasa*),[14] [and which is] the Self (*ātman*) [and] the great Lord (*maheśvara*).[15]

3. When he perceives the gold-coloured one (*rukmavarṇa*) [through the eye of meditation (*dhyānacakṣus*)], he will see that the Lord (*īśvara*) is the agent (*kartṛ*). Then, having abandoned demerit (*pāpa*) and merit (*puṇya*), he will attain the [non-active, non-conceptual (*nirvikalpa*)] supreme unity (*sāmya*) [with that gold-coloured "Person" (*puruṣa*). Question: If He is beyond the three realms of the universe (*traidhātuka*), how could He be the agent (*kartṛ*)? And if He is so distant, whose Lord is He? Answer: In spite of his distant abode, He is all-pervading:]

4. Whatever is past (*bhūta*), present (*bhavat*) and future (*bhaviṣyat*) is all regarded as the "Person" (*puruṣa*). He is within (*antar*) and without (*bahis*), distant (*dūra*) and nearby (*antika*), and He is the agent (*karmakṛt*).[16] [Question: If the "Person" is one

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(*puruṣa*) comprising both the three-realm universe and the Self. This notion is in TJ 8.1 said to be derived from the *Vedas,* i.e. probably from the *Puruṣa-Sūkta* of the *Ṛgveda* (10.90), see n. 16 below. In the *pūrvapakṣa,* the notion of a "Person" is therefore integrated with the notion of an all-pervading (*sarvtraga*), eternal (*nitya*) and singular (*eka*) Self. The *uttarapakṣa* (18-104) consistently uses the concept of *puruṣa* as identical to that of a Self (*ātman*).

14 TJ 8.2 (and TJ 8.17) contains the following quotation from the *Śvetāśvatara Upaniṣad* (Ś.Up) 3.8: "I have known that great Seer, radiant like the sun and living beyond darkness. Having known Him, one surpasses death. There is no other way leading to the place of non-birth" (quoted from Gokhale 1958, p. 168 with n. 9 and pp. 177-78). Cf. TJ 3. 288ab.

In the *Dāśabhūmikavibhāṣa* (vol. 16, *Taisho* vol. 26, p. 74b), we find a passage with a similar doctrinal content: "Before the creation of the world, there was nothing but darkness. In the beginning the Great Man came into existence, like the sun. Those who saw him were saved from death, etc." (Quoted from Nakamura 1981, p., n. 8. Eng. tr. by Cuong Nguyen.)

15 On early Buddhist refutations of Īśvara, see Chemparathy 1968/1969. See also the **Dvādaśadvāraka* (ch. 10, tr. by Hsueh-li Chen 1982, pp. 93-100), incorrectly ascribed to Nāgārjuna (see Lindtner 1982b, p. 11 with n. 13, pp. 11-12), and the **Skhalitapramathanayuktihetusiddhi* of Āryadeva (see Clark/Jamspal 1979, pp. 33-34).

16 Cf. PP ch. 1: "Die Weltseele ist dies alles, was da war und was sein wird, usw. Ferner: Sie regt sich und regt sich nicht; sie ist fern und sie ist nah. Sie ist innerhalb, sie ist beides und sie ist außerhalb aller Dinge, usw." (quoted from Kajiyama 1963, p. 58). PP states furthermore: "Again, those who regard *Puruṣa* as the cause of origination say, 'Because all beings have *Puruṣa* as their cause.'

(*ekatva*), why is He able to undertake a variety of activities and yet remain unimpaired? This is shown by the following example:]

5. All entities (*bhāva*) are born [out of the "Person"], like threads (*aṃśu*) coming out of a spider (*ūrṇanābha*)[17] [which at the same time remains unimpaired]. Wise men (*vidvāṃs*), absorbed (*pralīna*)[18] in Him [through the practice of meditation (*dhyāna*), perceiving Him with the eye of intelligence (*prajñānetra*)], do not come to [be reborn into] another existence (*punarbhava*). [Why does the Yogin[19] not attain immortality (*amṛtatva*) if he has not perceived the "Person"?]

6. [The whole world (*sarvaloka*) which is] mortal (*martya*) [by nature] cannot be immortal (*amṛtatva*), just as fire (*vahni*) [cannot] be cold (*śaitya*). Therefore it is inconsistent that immortality [could be obtained] if one has not awakened [to become absorbed] into the

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What does it mean? Just as threads are woven into a net, just as water comes out of a moon-stone and just as trees sprout their branches and leaves, so do all beings have Him as their cause. What are called past and future, movable and immovable, far and near, inside and outside, are all caused by *Puruṣa*." (Quoted from Nakamura 1983, p. 218.) Cf. also the *Īśa Upaniṣad* 1.5 (quoted by Kajiyama *ibid.*): *tad ejati tan naijati tad dūre tad v antike / tad antar asya sarvasya tad u sarvasyāsya bāhyataḥ //*; the *Ṛgveda* X. 90.2 (*Puruṣasūkta* = Ś.Up., 3.15): *puruṣa evedaṃ sarvaṃ yad bhūtaṃ yac ca bhavyam.* (See n. 13 above.)

In verse 59 of the *Anattālakkhaṇasutta* of the *Saṃyutta Nikāya* (SN XXII) a similar phrasing as that of MHK 8.4 is used in order to deny the notion of a Self related to the five *skandhas*: "Therefore, whatever form [feeling, perception, impulse and consciousness] there is — past, future or present, inner or outer, gross or subtle, low or exalted, near or far away — all that form [etc.] should be seen by right wisdom as it really is, i.e. 'all this form [etc.] is not mine, I am not this, this is not my self'." (Quoted from Conze 1987, p. 37.)

17 Cf. the *Tattvasaṃgrahapañjikā*: *ūrṇanābha ivāṃśūnāṃ candrakānta ivāṃbhasām / prarohāṇām iva plakṣaḥ sa hetuḥ sarvajanminām //* (quoted from Kajiyama *ibid.*).

18 Cf. GK 3.4 (see n. 28 below); TJ 3. 288ab.

19 *rnal 'byor pa* (*yogin*) in TJ 8.5 (cf. MHK 3.28) seems synonymous with *vidvān* (MHK 8.5) and *matimat* in MHK 8.2 (cf. MHK 3.2). The latter term is not found in the Vedic *Upaniṣads* or in the *Bhagavadgītā* (Bh.G). First in the late *Yogaśikhā Upaniṣad* 4, we find *matimant*. It may therefore be a specific Buddhist term (cf. *Lalitavistara* 299.7) used by Bhavya in VTV and by Nāgārjuna, etc. Cf. Lindtner 1985b, p. 121, n. 3.

immortal "Person" (*puruṣa*). [The following serves the purpose of eulogising His great prowess (*mahānubhāva*):]

7. Since nothing more excellent (*jyāyas*) exists than [Him] or superior (*param*) [to Him] or even subtler (*aṇīyas*) than [Him], [He] alone upholds[20] this entire [empirical reality.[21] The character of the one who is in union with Him is:]

8. He is endowed with the power to attenuate himself (*aṇiman*), the power to extend himself (*mahiman*), the power to levitate himself (*laghiman*), supremacy (*īśitā*) [over the elements, etc.], the power to control (*vaśitā*), the power to reach (*prāpti*), the irresistability of will (*prākāmya*) and the power to proceed at will (*yatra-kāmāvasāyitā*).[22] [Although He is one (*ekatva*), He has the nature (*ātmatā*) which epitomizes the manifoldness of the three-realm universe.[23] Therefore:]

9. For the one who experiences [the "Person" (*puruṣa*)], all elements [of the three-realm universe, as well as] the very Self (*ātman*), exist in that [*puruṣa*],[24] and [besides, one who experiences the Self realizes that] there is equality (*tulyatā*) between the ignorant (*bāla*) and the learned (*paṇḍita*), the outcast (*caṇḍāla*) and the brahmin (*vipra*), etc.[25] [If someone were to raise the question: Regarding this

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20 On the Self as a support (*ādhāra*), see MHK 8.60 (p. 83 below).

21 Cf. Ś.Up 3.9.

22 Tr. by Gokhale 1958, pp. 172-173. On *siddhis,* see Lindquist 1935; Tuxen 1982, pp. 183-195.

23 I have here deviated from Gokhale's translation (1958, p. 173): "Hence, although he is alone, he is the Soul of the diverse aggregate of the three spheres of existence".

24 MHK 8.9ab: *tasmin sarvāṇi bhūtāni bhavanty ātmaiva paśyataḥ /*
Cf. Bh.G 6.29: *sarvabhūtastham ātmānaṃ sarvabhūtāni cātmani / īkṣate yogayuktātmā sarvatra samadarśanaḥ //* "He whose Self is established in union sees the Self abiding in all beings and all beings [abiding] in the Self. Everywhere he sees the same."
Cf. the *Aṣṭāvakragītā* 6.4ab: *ahaṃ vā sarvabhūteṣu sarvabhūtāny atho mayi /* "'Wahrlich, ich bin in allen Geschöpfen, und alle Geschöpfen sind in mir'" (ed. and tr. by Hauschild 1967, pp. 60, 79).

25 Cf. Bh.G 5.18: *vidyāvinayasaṃpanne brāhmaṇe gavi hastini / śuni caiva śvapāke ca paṇḍitāḥ samadarśinaḥ //* "The learned ones see the same in a brahmin endowed with knowledge and humility, in a cow, in an elephant and in a

"Person" (*puruṣa*) who is said to be omnipresent (*sarvavyāpin*) and from whom, although He is alone, the bodies of all kinds of living beings (*gati*) such as gods and men are said to be born, how is it that He does not become a nature which is non-eternal (*anitya*) and non-all-pervasive (*asarvatraga*), like all bodied beings? The following is said as a rejoinder:][26]

10. When a pot (*ghaṭa*) is produced or destroyed, the space (*ākāśa*) [in it] does not have the same nature [of being produced or destroyed]. When bodies, etc. (*dehādi*), are born or die, they cannot be considered [to have the same nature] as the Self.[27]

11. If [the objection is raised that] the one (*eka*) [Self (*ātman*)] is many (*nānātva*), like space in pots (*ghaṭākāśa*), [we reply that space] is one (*ekatva*), because it is not differentiated through the breaking of pots [and] because it is considered the same (*sāmya*) for all [pots. The Self therefore does not exist separately in all embodied beings. In spite of the multiplicity of bodies, the Self is the same in all of them].[28] [Now to prove the oneness of the Self by a different approach (*naya*):]

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dog, and even in an outcaste."

26 I have here deviated from Gokhale's translation (1958, p. 173): "/.../ — how is it that he, like any (other) bodied being, is neither evanescent (*anitya*), nor non-pervasive (*asarvatraga*)?".

27 Cf. GK 3.3: *ātmā hy ākāśavaj jīvair ghaṭākāśair ivoditaḥ / ghaṭādivac ca saṅghātair jātāv etan nidarśanam //* "The Self, which can be compared to space, has arisen in the form of individual selves, which can be compared to the space in pots, and in the form of conglomerations, which can be compared to pots, etc." Cf. also Ādiśeṣa's *Paramārthasāra* (PaS) 51.
On the historical background of this passage, see Vetter 1978, pp. 117f.

28 The Vedāntavādin's reply takes the form of an actual syllogism (*prayogavākya*); see MHK 8.68 (p. 85 below) and MHK/TJ 8.68, (**IV**), p. 123.
Cf. GK 3.6cd, and GK 3.4: *ghaṭādiṣu pralīneṣu ghaṭākāśādayo yathā / ākāśe sampralīyante tadvaj jīvā ihātmani //* "Just as space in pots, etc., are merged into Space, when pots, etc. [are broken], so are the individual selves completely merged into the Self [when the conglomerations are broken]."
PP states: "There is the following opinion: What is to be asserted by me is only this one *ātman*, which is comparable to space. Discrimination into pots and the like is all provisional [not really true]. Since they are provisional, the *ātman* cannot be measured. Therefore the *ātman* cannot be compared. It is impossible to refute it by any evidence, for the theory is without defect." (Quoted from Nakamura 1983, p. 218.)

12. Though the clay (*mṛd*) is the same, the pots, etc. (*ghaṭādi*) may be different. In the same way there is difference between bodies, [but] the Self is not differentiated.[29]

13. [Objection: Since your Self is omnipresent, if one person is happy, everybody else should also be happy. Answer:] Just as when space in a pot, which is one, becomes covered by such [things] as dust and smoke (*rajodhūmādi*), it is certainly not the case (*na hi*) [that this takes place] likewise for all [pots], so [when] the Self [of a person, being one], possesses pleasure, etc. (*sukhādi*), it is not the case [that the Self of all other persons also comes to possess pleasure, etc.].[30] [Question: How does happiness and suffering arise at all in each of these individual continua (*saṃtāna*)? The answer is:]

14. It is because one is unawakened (*aprabodha*) [to absorption into the immortal *puruṣa*] that one who does not know the Self collects *karma* and experiences its result which is good or bad (*śubhāśubha*), just as one who dreams imagines himself to have [real] experiences.[31] [Since the "Person" (*puruṣa*) is the agent (*kartṛ*) and the enjoyer (*bhoktṛ*), it may be objected that, inasmuch as He accumulates and enjoys evil deeds as well as merits, He is himself an evil-doer, etc.,[32] but we say:]

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29 Cf. GK 3.6, 13.

30 MHK 8.13: *ghaṭākāśe yathaikasmin rajodhūmādibhir vṛte / tadvattā na hi sarveṣāṃ sukhāder na tathātmanaḥ //*
Cf. GK 3.5: *yathaikasmin ghaṭākāśe rajodhūmādibhir yute / na sarve saṃprayujyante tadvaj jīvāḥ sukhādibhiḥ //*
Walleser and Bhattacharya maintained, therefore, incorrectly that MHK 8.13 was a *verbatim* quotation of GK 3.5. See (**IV**), p. 109, n. 65. On the "pot-space" simile (*ghaṭākāśadṛṣṭānta*) in VTV, see (**IV**), pp. 108-127.

31 On *abhimāna*, cf. MHK 5.1: *anye pracakṣate dhīrāḥ svanītāv abhimāninaḥ /*
The *Ālokamālā* 184-185 states: *svapnanivartitānāṃ tu karmaṇāṃ kiṃ śubhāśubham / na prabuddhaḥ phalaṃ bhuṅkte svapna evākhilo naraḥ // prabodhe 'sad iti jñānāt svapne vṛtter asat phalam / tenaivāsty udite jñāne sarvasyānte vṛthā phalam //* "How can any of the actions performed in a dream [really] have a good or bad [result]? When he wakes up nobody enjoys the fruit [experienced] only in dream. When one is awake and understands that it is unreal the fruit due to activity in a dream [proves to be] unreal. Therefore, the fruit of every [action] is false once understanding has finally arisen." (Ed. and tr. by Lindtner 1985b, pp. 182-183.) This means that Mahāyāna is quite close to Vedānta on this point.

32 See MHK/TJ 8.72.

15. Although He resides in the body, He is not defiled when He enjoys [objects], since He is not attached; just like a king (*rāja*) who behaves according to his pleasure (*kāma*), that [*puruṣa*] remains innocent of evil deeds. [Thus, to follow up the above line of argument:]

16. When a Yogi due to union (*yoga*) [by means of meditation (*dhyāna-yogena*)] understands that [the supreme Self or Brahman] is one (*eka*) [due to its supremacy over the whole body], all-pervasive (*sarvagata*) [since it pervades the entire world], eternal (*nitya*) [since it is indestructable], and the immortal state (*acyutaṃ padam*) [since it is without beginning or end and a place of resort], then [he is] not [born into] another existence. [The characteristic of that Self, which is removed from all enjoyment of wholesome and unwholesome actions, is extolled in the following:]

17. That [Self] is eternal [because it is capable of being objectified by the Yogin at all times]. It is non-conceptual (*avikalpa*) [because it is something different from senses and consciousness], and it is beyond the realm of speech (*vācām agocara*) [because it is not within the reach of the mind]. [Various words, like *brahman, ātman, puruṣa, īśvara, sarvatraga, nitya,* etc.] are, [however], applied to it by those whose minds (*buddhi*) are led astray by difference (*bheda*). [The meaning of other such terms is to be understood just like the meaning of the term Self (*ātman*).][33]

[The Position of the Respondent (*uttarapakṣa*): Bhavya's Critical Examination (*parīkṣā*) of Vedānta Philosophy]

[Introduction]

18. As far as this [teaching in the *pūrvapakṣa* and the meaning which has been stated previously in the work (*prakaraṇa*)] is concerned, it is to be critically investigated by persons who do not take up a dogmatic position (*pakṣa*) [and who are free from attachment (*anurāga*) and anger (*krodha*). Because] a [person whose] mind is concealed by attachment to a position (*pakṣarāgāvṛtamati*)[34] does not even understand the truth.[35]

33 I do not see how Gokhale (1958, p. 177, l. 32) arrives at the translation: "according to the context". I have, therefore, deviated from his translation and rendered *ji ltar bdag gi don* with "just like the meaning of [the term] Self".

34 I.e. he is "biased". Cf. MHK 3.23: *pakṣapātasaṃtaptaḥ*.

[Refutation of Liberation (*mokṣa*) as a Result of the Perception of the Self (*ātman*)]

19. The existence (*astitva*) of the Self has [already] been refuted [by me in the *Tattvajñānaiṣanā,* the *Sāṃkhyatattvāvatāra* and the *Vaiśeṣikatattvaviniścaya* chapters of MHK/TJ][36] and so has (*tathā*) its status as cause of the world (*jagatkāraṇatā*). Therefore, liberation (*mukti*) that results from seeing (*darśana*) that [Self] is entirely false (*abhūtaiva*), [since it is only] mentally fabricated (*prakalpitā*). [There is also the following great fault in the view of a *puruṣa*:]

20. The innate (*sahaja*)[37] belief in a personal identity (*satkāya-dṛṣṭi*),[38] [i.e. the attachment (*abhiniveśa*) to a personal identity (*satkāya*), which is to hold that the five aggregates of grasping (*upādānaskandha*) are the Self (*ātman*) and what belongs to the Self (*ātmīya*)],[39] leads to non-tranquility (*aśānti*) even [for the minds] of

35 Cf. Āryadeva's *Catuḥśataka* (CŚ) 8.10, 12.1. See (**IV**), p. 102, n. 33.
According to Bhavya, not only humans are obstructed from true comprehension of reality due to attachment, but also gods are! TJ 4. 68 states: "/.../ Brahmā, however, who is addicted to the view of his own superiority (*parāmarśadṛṣṭi*), thinks: '*I* am the one who creates the living beings (*jagat*)'. And so he himself does not understand the truth /.../." (quoted from Lindtner 1988, p. 436).

36 TJ 8.18.

37 The *Abhidharmakośa* (AK) V.41 refers to the following Sautrāntika position: "La *satkāyadṛṣṭi* naturelle (*sahaja*), qui se trouve chez les bêtes sauvages et chez les oiseaux, est non-défine. La *satkāyadṛṣṭi* méditée (*vikalpitā*) est mauvaise."
On the concept of *sahaja* in Indian Buddhist tantric literature, see Kværne 1975.

38 *Satkāyadṛṣṭi* is in TJ 8.19 translated with *'jig tshogs la lta ba* "belief in a destruction body" Cf. the following Sautrāntika position, referred to by Vasubhandu in the *Abhidharmakośabhāṣya* (AK.bh) 5.7: "Croire au moi et au mien (*ātmātmīyagrāha*), c'est la *satkāyadṛṣṭi; sat,* parce que périssant; *kāya,* parce que accumulation multiplicité. *Satkāya,* c'est-à-dire les cinq *upādāna skandhas.*" (See AK IV. 15-17 with n. 2, 3.) On *satkāya(dṛṣṭi),* see also AK II. 251, 259; IV. 41, 193; V. 9, 15-17; VII. 70; V. 21, 39-42, 72; and IX. 264. For further references, see May 1959, p. 213, n. 720.
In the Pāli canon, references to *sakkāyadiṭṭhi* are found in for instance the *Majjhima Nikāya* (MN) I.300 (=III.17= *Dhammasaṃgaṇi* 1003); SN III.16 sqq. See also Gethin's article from 1986 (pp. 44-46), which deals with the concepts of *attā, anattā* and *sakkāyadiṭṭhi.*

39 SN III.159 (=MN, I. 299) states: "I will teach you, bhikkus, *sakkāya* (the existing body), its arising, its ceasing, and the way leading to its ceasing. And what, bhikkus, is *sakkāya*? The five *upādānakkhandas* should be said." (Quoted from Gethin 1986, p. 41.)
The *Prajñāpradīpa* XVIII.1.2 states: "/.../ As the Lord said, 'A monk or

animals (*paśu*).[40] [Therefore, this is not the right way to liberation], since it is the root of all afflictions (*saṃkleśa*), [like pride in a Self (*ātmamāna*), delusion regarding a Self (*ātmamoha*), belief in a Self (*ātmadṛṣṭi*), love of a Self (*ātmasneha*), etc.]. This [belief in a personal identity is in even greater degree] promoted by you [in the Vedāntadarśana.]

21. For those people who cherish a belief in "I" and "mine" (*mamāhaṃkāra*), full of belief in a personal identity as they are, liberation also arises out of that from which *saṃsāra* arises[41] [i.e. from the belief in a personal identity, etc. The Omniscient One has said that having destroyed the twenty high mountain peaks of *satkāyadṛṣṭi,* such as thinking that form (*rūpa*) is the Self (*ātman*), there is form in the Self, the Self possesses form, the Self is inside form, etc.,[42] one will see Reality (*tattva*). But you say that the very thing which increases *saṃsāra* is the cause of liberation, but this is like someone who tries to put out fire by heaping fuel on it. Objection: That which is not the cause of peace can, however, become the cause of peace by some method (*upāya*), just as one who is intoxicated becomes free from intoxication due to more liquor. For one who does not know the right method, if he relies on the view of a Self, defilements (*saṃkleśa*) will arise. But for the Yogin meditating on that very same view of a Self, defilements will be pacified. Answer:]

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brahman who correctly sees the Self, also correctly sees the aggregates of attachment (*upādānaskandha*)" (tr. by Eckel 1980, p. 192). On *upādānaskandhas,* see also Skilling 1980.

Regarding the impossibility of the Self to be either identical with, or different from, the *skandhas,* see Nāgārjuna's *Mūlamadhyamakakārikā* (MMK) XVIII.1 and Buddhapālita's *Mūlamadhyamakavṛtti* XVIII.1.

40 Cf. TJ 3. 297-300.

41 NK, N, PK, P, DC, D, CK, C translate Skt. *uditā* in MHK 8.21d with *yin par smra[s],* i.e. as a slightly incorrect perfect passive participle of Skt. √*vad*. TJ 8.24, together with the parallelism in MHK 8.21cd between *bhāvitaḥ* and *uditā,* corroborate our construe Skt. *ud* + √*i* of the perfect passive participle *uditā* (**byuṅ bar gyur*).

42 In TJ 8.21 Bhavya elaborates upon the various forms of *satkāyadṛṣṭi* with regard to the 5 *skandhas*: (1-5) form (*rūpa*), feeling (*vedanā*), discernment (*saṃjñā*), disposition (*saṃskāra*) and consciousness (*vijñāna*) are the Self (*ātman*), (6-10) there is form, feeling, etc. in the Self, (11-15) the Self possesses form, feeling, etc., (16-20) the Self is inside form, feeling, etc. On the twenty "peaks" (*koṭi*) of the mountain of *satkāyadṛṣṭi,* see Yaśomitra's *Spuṭārthavyākhya*: *viṃśatikoṭikā hi satkāyadṛṣṭiḥ paṭhyate rūpam ātmeti samanupaśyati rūpavantam ātmānam ātmīyaṃ rūpam rūpe ātmeti evaṃ yāvad vijñānaṃ vaktavyam.* See also Lamotte 1949-1980, p. 37.

22. If liberation (*śānti*) could exist on the basis of seeing that [Self], then someone suffering from indigestion (*ajīrṇa*) would recover by eating, just as a person recovering from intoxication (*madātyaya*)[43] through [more intoxicating] liquor.

23. The adherents of Vedānta (*vedāntavādin*) postulate that this Self appears in two forms: the Self which is bound up with the so-called body and the liberated (*mukta*) Self which rests in the supreme (*parameṣṭhātman*).

24. (p)[44] The cognition (*dhī*) that has as its object (*viṣaya*) the Self which rests in the supreme (*pareṣṭhātman*)[45] is not considered true (*yathārtha*), (h) because in this way there is attachment (*parāmarśa*) to the Self [as an object, and therefore movement (*pracāra*) in relation to that Self will occur], (d) like the idea of the Self [occuring] in regard to the body, etc.[46] [Objection: This supreme Self is

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43 On *mada* (intoxication), see Jolly 1977, p. 146; *Yogaśataka*, v. 48; *Siddhasāra* ch. 22.

44 p: *pratijñā* (thesis); h: *hetu* (reason); d: *dṛṣṭānta* (example). Bhavya's usage of syllogisms shows, *inter alia*, his dependence on Dignāga. For ref., see (**I**), p. 14, n. 3.

45 Bhavya seems to have coined (*metri causa*?) the term *pareṣṭhātman* (*mchog na gnas pa grol pa'i bdag*, P. *fol. Dza*: 289a4-289a5; D. *fol. Dza*: 256b1), which is short for *parameṣṭhātman* found in, e.g., the *Upaniṣads*.

46 TJ 8.24 states: "Why is the idea that the [individual mortal] Self has as its object the supreme Self not correct? Because movement (*rgyu ba/pracāra*) in relation to that occurs, as in saying, the Self is like this. Like what? Like the idea of the Self occuring in regard to the body and sense-organs and objects. The idea of the body and the objects is correct in conventional reality, because it is apprehended by perception (*pratyakṣa*), but the idea of resting in the supreme is not correct conventionally, because it is not apprehended."

MHK 3.11 refers to a *prajñā* which has a movement which is non-moving (*/.../apracārapracāra/.../*). Cf. TJ 1.2: */.../apracārayogena pracāragocaratvāt /.../* (see Gokhale 1985, p. 83 with n. 14, p. 84), and the *Akṣayamatinirdeśasūtra* : */.../paramārthasatyaṃ katamat ? yatra jñānasyāpy apracāraḥ kaḥ punar vādo 'kṣarāṇām/.../* (quoted from Lindtner 1986a, p. 80, n. 30). The latter passage is alluded to in Candrakīrti's *Prasannapadā* (La Vallée Poussin ed., p. 374.1): *paramārthasatyaṃ katamat? yatra jñānasyāpy apracāraḥ* "What is ultimate truth? That toward which even cognition does not move." In TJ 3. 284, Bhavya states: "If we thought he [i.e. Buddha, defined as a single moment's cognition of the sameness of all *dharmas* (TJ 3.273)] had intrinsic nature, he could be grasped like things that are active /.../ But something that is empty of intrinsic nature has no action". "/.../ Since no

imagined (*parikalpita*) to be a "Self" by the power of the residues (*vāsanā*) of attachment (*abhiniveśa*) to the Self. Answer: Nothing at all is established by imagination (*parikalpa*):]

[Refutation of the Self as the Agent (*kartṛ*)]

25. Even if the Self is by nature imagined (*parikalpitasattva*), what does it make in your [opinion]? If [you say that it makes] a cognition (*buddhi*) that has form (*rūpa*), speech (*śabda*), etc. as its object, that is not logical. [I prove this as follows:]

26. (p) Cognitions (*dhī*), which have form, etc., as an object, do not arise having the Self as agent (*kartṛ*), (h) because [their] origination (*janmatva*) is dependent on conditions (*pratyaya*), [such as the group of sense-object (*jñeya*), sense-organ (*āśraya*), consciousness (*vijñāna*) and attention (*manasikāra*)], (d) just as fire (*anala*) [depends] on a magnifying glass (*sūryakānta*). [So if one performs such actions as seeing and hearing, what is the use of imagining a Self which is different from the object, sense-organ and cognition (*vijñāna*). Moreover:]

27. (p) Nor can sound (*dhvani*), which has the nature of syllables (*varṇa*), be regarded as having the Self as agent, (h) because it is something which is heard (*śravaṇatva*), or because it is a sound (*dhvani*), (d) just like an echo (*pratiśabdaka*).

28. By virtue of these [arguments], the remaining physical (*dehaja*) activities (*kriyā*), such as going and coming (*gamanāgamanādi*), characterized by gestures (*vispanda*) of hands and feet, etc. (*hasta-pādādi*), have [implicitly] been negated (*pratyuktā*) [as having the

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dharmas are established, the moment of cognition that does not arise is called 'Buddha'" (tr. by Eckel). Cf. also TJ 3.276; GK 3.34, and 4.80: *nivṛttasyāpravṛttasya niścalā hi tadā sthitiḥ / viṣayaḥ sa hi buddhānāṃ tat sāmyam ajam advayam //* "Der Stand [des Citta], das nun aufgehört hat [unruhig zu sein] und sich nicht mehr [auf Ähnliches] richtet ist dann nämlich unbewegt. Dies ist nämlich der Bereich der Buddhas. Das ist die Gleichheit, die nichtentstanden und ohne Zweiheit ist" (tr. by Vetter 1978, p. 100). The above quoted passages display the "non-dynamic" character of the Absolute in Mahāyāna Buddhism and in the *Gauḍapādīyakārikā*.

Self as agent. Therefore a Self does not exist apart from the body and sense-organs.][47]

29. The act of discernment (*saṃjñāna*) [arises] when one has understood by discrimination (*vyavaccheda*) [that which originates from the assembled causal conditions (*pratyaya*) of object (*viṣaya*), organ (*āśraya*), consciousness (*vijñāna*) and attention (*manasikāra*)]. The act of recollection (*smaraṇa*) [arises] due to remembrance (*smṛti*) [of the object experienced by the sixfold group of cognitions].[48] The act of insight (*prajñāna*) [arises] by virtue of an insight (*prajñā*)[49] of a specific nature (*prakāra*), [discriminating the individual (*sva°*) and general characteristics (*sāmānyalakṣaṇa*) of *dharmas*]. The act of feeling (*vedanā*) [arises out of] the experience (*vid*) [of the object. Not even the slightest action of a Self is apprehended apart from the mind (*citta*), which has the characteristic of cognizing the nature of an object, and the mental factors (*caitta*), such as feeling (*vedanā*), desire (*chanda*), touch (*sparśa*), absorption (*samādhi*), etc., which have the characteristic of cognizing individually the particularities (*viśeṣa*) of an object.]

30. One cannot precisely determine the intrinsic nature (*svabhāva*) of the Self as a function (*kārya*) different from [perception, memory, insight, feeling, etc.]. Its existence therefore cannot be precisely determined, [since it is without the characteristic of activity (*kriyā*)], like a skyflower (*khapuṣpa*). [Objection: The Self (*puruṣa*) does indeed see, hear, smell, taste, think, remember, etc.,[50] because the Self is the agent, whereas the eye, and so forth, are its instruments. For example, one says that the sickle cuts, although the sickle itself does not cut, but Devadatta cuts by means of the instrument, i.e. the sickle. Likewise one

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47 Cf. MMK ch. 2.

48 According to AK.bh. I.30-31, the *vijñānaskandha* consists of six classes of cognition: visual (*cākṣur*), auditive (*śrotrā*), olfactive (*ghrāṇa*), gustual (*jihvā*), tactile (*kāya*) and mental cognition (*manovijñāna*).

49 In AK I.3, II.24, *prajñā* is defined as "the distinguishing of *dharmas*" (*dharmānāṃ pravicaya*). For references to Madhyamaka definitions of *prajñā*, see Lindtner 1981a, p. 188, p. 205, n. 84. See also MHK/TJ 3.6, 7, 9, 10, 11 (tr. by Iida 1980, pp. 60-67). On *vedanā, saññā,* and *paññā* in the Pāli canon, see Johansson 1979, pp. 87-91, 92-95, 197-216.

50 In MHK/TJ 3.95, Bhavya refutes that the existence of the Self can be established on the basis of the notion that the Self remembers, recollects, produces knowledge, etc. (See Iida 1980, pp. 177-178.)

says that the eye, etc. see, but the eye and the other sense-organs themselves do not see, etc.; rather by means of that instrument the Self sees, etc. Thus, according to this method, action is established as follows: Because one sees by means of this, it is the eye, etc. Answer:]

31. If instrumental status (*karaṇatva*) is attributed [to such sense-organs as the eye] because it is said that knowledge, etc. (*jñānādi*), [presupposes] an [intermediary] instrument, or [if] agent status (*kartṛtva*) different from that [instrumentality is attributed to the Self], like a cutter (*dātṛ*), this [assertion] is not logical:

32. Since these [sense-organs] do not have instrumental status because the agent [presupposes] the arising of causal conditions, the logical reason (*hetu*) therefore has an unestablished meaning (*asiddhārthatā*) or it is inconclusive (*anekāntikatā*).[51] [The eye sees by itself, but it is not the agent of another. Because it hears, it is the ear; because it smells, it is the nose; because it tastes, it is the tongue; because it feels, it is touch (*sparśa*); because it thinks, it is the mind (*manas*); because it remembers, it is memory, and so on. The eye itself sees, but the Self does not see. Therefore:]

33. Knowledge, etc., as an agent, naturally presuppose a word designating the agent, just as agent status is seen here in the expression: "Devadatta cuts". [Objection: Devadatta does not cut, but rather, the sword cuts. Answer: This is not correct, because the action will be accomplished here by means of the assemblage of the agent and the object of action. Regarding this, one sometimes emphasizes the agent as the chief thing, for example when saying: "Devadatta cuts". Sometimes one emphasizes the instrument as the chief thing, for example when saying: "The sword cuts". The act of cutting depends on both. The instrument does not act without an agent, and the agent too cannot act without an instrument. Without both of these, it is not possible to conceive of an agent and an instrument acting independently of each other. Things are brought about due to the assembled conditions, not due to a principal (*pradhāna*) condition. If not so, it is just a metaphor (*upacāra*).]

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51 On Bhavya's usage of *asiddhārthatā* and *anekāntikatā*, see Lindtner 1986a, p. 63.

34. One may [assume the existence of] an agent, but it must be said [that such an agent exists] only [on the basis of] the group (*rāśi*) of completely motionless (*nirīha*)[52] conditioned entities (*saṃskāra*), just as when you say: "The lamp sheds light", although the lamp (*dīpa*) is [only] a means [whereby you shed light, since the light is brought about dependent on the causal conditions of oil, a wick, a vessel and fire.[53] Objection: The Self is supreme, because dependent on that chief agent all actions proceed. But the lamp, etc., are just designations, just as the potter himself is the agent although many conditions such as clay, etc., are present. Answer:]

35. In reality (*tattvataḥ*), there is no fundamental (*mukhya*) agent, since one man alone cannot make a pot [all by himself]. Therefore, it is not accepted that a lamp, etc., [are merely regarded] as the agent in a [transferred or] figurative sense. [The Self alone is not the cause of all actions, because those actions are dependent on many collected causes. The eye, etc., and the lamp, etc., are therefore chief (*pradhāna*) agents, not just metaphorical agents, because a chief agent ruling out those is not established. Conventionally (*saṃvṛtyā*), the collection of causal conditions (*pratyaya*) is shown to be the agent, but in ultimate reality, it is not established that there is any chief agent. Objection: Since Reality (*tattva*) is under consideration, by the power of past

52 On *nirīha*, see Nāgārjuna's *Lokātītastava* 24 (Lindtner 1982b, p. 136 with n. 24, p. 137).

53 From a relative perspective (*saṃvṛtitaḥ*), Bhavya maintains that an "agent" (*kartṛ*), a "giver" (*dātṛ*) (MHK/TJ 8.37), and a "sentient being" (*sattva*) (MHK/TJ 8.37) only designate a collection of causal conditions (*pratyaya*). Cf. AK.bh. IX. 245-246: "Les quatre derniers termes, *vijñāna, vedanā, saṃjñā, cetanā,* sont les éléments (*skandhas*) immatériels (*arūpin*); l'æil et la couleur-figure sont l'élément *rūpa*. Voilà tout ce dont un parle quand on dit «homme». Pour exprimer diverses nuances, on se sert de divers vocables, tels que *sattva,* être, *nara,* homme, *manuja,* né de Manu, *mānava,* jeune homme, *poṣa,* qui se nourrit, *jīva,* principe vital, *jantu,* qui nâit, *pudgala,* personne./.../ Bhikṣus, sachez que ce sont là seulement des manières de dire, des paroles, des expressions conformes à l'usage du monde."

According to the *Mahāvyutpatti* (§ CCVIII, 4668-4683, pp. 309-310) the following terms are used by the heterodox sectarians (*tīrthika*) as synonyms (*paryāya*) of the Self: *ātmā, sattvaḥ, jīvaḥ, jantuḥ, poṣaḥ, puruṣaḥ, pudgalaḥ, manujaḥ, mānavaḥ, kārakaḥ, kārāpakaḥ, vedakaḥ, jānakaḥ, paśyakaḥ, utthāpakaḥ,* and *samutthāpakaḥ*. See also the *Śatasāhasrikā Prajñāpāramitā* 472, 522 (referred to by Dayal 1932, p. 341, n. 186).

In the *Saṃyutta Nikāya* V.10, for instance, it is said that conventionally we speak of a "being" when the *skandhas* are present.

acts, the stream (*saṃtāna*) of momentary *dharmas* cannot be bound or liberated, since what ceases at each instant is without activity. Therefore, one should understand that only the Self is the basis of bondage, liberation and continuance. Answer: Although the mind ceases to exist at each individual instant and is without independent power and intrinsic nature, it continues like the stream of a river:]

[Refutation of the Self as Bound and Liberated]

36. The mind (*citta*) which is subjected to such [things] as desire (*rāgādi*) [and] attached (*sakta*) to the sphere of form, etc. (*rūpādigocara*), [is therefore said to be] obstructed from liberation and bound in the prison of *saṃsāra,* [since it is without independence and lacks the light of insight (*prajñā*).][54]

37. When this aggregate of hands and the like (*pāṇyādisamudāya*) is associated with a mind, it is designated "[sentient] being" (*sattva*). Because the volition of giving, etc. (*tyāgādicetanā*) arises, it is said to be a "giver" (*dātṛ*), etc.

38. The bonds of ignorance (*avidyā*) and the rest are removed the moment knowledge (*vidyā*) arises. [When the continuum (*saṃtāna*) of the aggregates (*skandha*) itself is] free from the bondage of desire, etc.,[55] [having accomplished the path of liberation by the illumination of insight (*prajñā*) consisting of hearing (*śrutamayī*), reflecting (*cintāmayī*) and meditating (*bhāvanāmayī*)], it is designated

54 On *prajñā,* see n. 46 above.

55 In the *Prajñāpradīpa,* ch. 25 ("The Investigation of *Nirvāṇa*"), vv. 1cd, 3, Bhavya distinguishes between two kinds of *nirvāṇa*: One with residual aggregates (*skandha*), and one without residual aggregates. *Nirvāṇa* is thus considered as either the removal (*prahāṇa*) of defilements (*kleśa*) or the cessation (*nirodha*) of aggregates (*skandha*) (see Eckel 1980, pp. 301f, 305). Candrakīrti makes a similar distinction in ch. XIX of his *Prasannapadā.* Here *nirvāṇa* with a residual base (*sopadhiśeṣa*), i.e. with residual aggregates, is said to result from the removal (*prahāṇa*) of the basic afflictions, such as ignorance, desire, etc., and to consist of the mere aggregates (*skandhamātra*). *Nirvāṇa* without a residual base (*nirupadhiśeṣa*) or aggregates results from the cessation (*nirodha*) of the aggregates, and consists not even of the mere aggregates. (See La Vallée Poussin's ed. of the *Prasannapadā,* p. 519.) Bhavya seems in MHK 8.38 to refer to the first kind of *nirvāṇa.*

On *skandhamātra,* cf. the notion of five pure *skandhas: dharmaskandhas, lokottaraskandhas, anāsravaskandhas,* stated in SN, *Vibhāṣā,* AK, etc. (See Lamotte 1980, p. 129.)

"liberated" (*mukta*). [It is therefore acceptable (*yukti*) to say that liberation (*mokṣa*) is the later moment of mind which has arisen and which is superior to the former moment of the group of mind (*citta*) and mental factors (*caitta*) that have the property of ceasing and arising.][56]

39. But since the Self is like the sky (*vyoman*), then all this [about the Self being the basis of bondage and liberation][57] is very difficult to talk about, [since even if the sky is full of snow, hail, wind, etc., defilements (*saṃkleśa*) are not produced for the sky. Likewise, even if desire (*kāma*), anger (*krodha*) and pride (*abhimāna*) have arisen, there is no change in the very Self, and therefore it cannot be said to be bound or liberated even with great exertion]. If you still greatly cherish your Self [due to your attachment to the Self by the power of the residues (**vāsanāsāmarthyāt*) of grasping a Self from beginningless time, [then why not] consider the Self as a skyflower, [which also has the same characteristic and which therefore also would be a "Self".]

[Refutation of Cognition (*jñāna*) as the Intrinsic Nature (*svabhāva*) of the Self]

40. If one maintains that "the intrinsic nature of the Self is cognition (*jñāna*)", then its oneness (*ekatā*) is not logical, since [cognition] is dependent on instruments (*karaṇa*) [such as the eye,] etc., [and besides, if this Self already has the nature of cognition, why does it depend on instruments such as the eye, etc.? If you say that without the eye and the other organs, the fact that this is a cognition is not apprehended, then since something other than the instruments is not

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56 Bhavya describes the state of liberation in TJ 1.3 as "a single moment of [self-originating] knowledge (*ekakṣaṇasvayambhūjñāna*) (see Gokhale 1985, p. 83 with n. 14). TJ 3. 268 (cf. TJ 3.273) states also: "/.../ He understands the similarity of all *dharmas* in a single moment of self-generated knowledge /.../." (tr. by Eckel).

Cf. the following passages from the *Mahāvastu* and the *Lalitavistara,* quoted by Lamotte 1980, p. 124: "Through a wisdom associated with a single moment of thought, I acquired supreme and perfect enlightenment (*ekacitta-kṣaṇasamāyuktayā prajñayā anuttarāṃ samyaksaṃbodhim abhisaṃbuddhe*) /.../." "When the Buddha had reached supreme and perfect enlightenment through a wisdom associated with a single moment of thought (*ekacittakṣaṇa-samāyuktayā prajñayā*), the three knowledges (*traividyā*) were acquired."

57 In TJ 8.1, the Vedāntavādins states that the knowledge of bondage and liberation are dependent upon the Self (see Gokhale 1958, p. 167).

apprehended, its oneness would be lost, which is contrary to your own doctrine.]

41. Furthermore, if the Self, etc., are a really existing object of knowledge (*jñeya*), [then] that cognition [of the Self] will not cease [since, even if you say that having accomplished the object to be accomplished, cognition does not act on the object, as in the case with a lamp which, having illuminated its object, does not act on that object. We answer that] it is [nevertheless] seen that even if a lamp has accomplished its function, it functions [anew] by virtue of its own causes (*svakāraṇa*), [such as a wick, oil, etc. Therefore the Self, like a lamp, will not, even at the time when it has accomplished its object, be without activity (*pravṛtti*). Consequently, even when one has seen the Self (*puruṣa*) with the eye of cognition, liberation will not be produced:]

42. As long as there arises a cognition which has a really existing [object], so long will [a new] seed (*bīja*)[58] be accumulated [in the consciousness], just as, as long as there arises a sound (*ārāva*), so long [will] the echo (*pratirava*) [continue, but when the activity of sound ceases and does not exist, the echo will not arise. Likewise, if the object of knowledge does not exist, cognition also will not arise.]

43. How can, on the one hand, *saṃsāra* exist for one who knows [the Self, at the same time as], on the other hand, cognition exists without an [intermediary] instrument [of knowledge]? Since [the Self], furthermore (*vā*), in every respect is non-distinguished (*aviśiṣṭatva*), [eternal and one,] how can [one assume] bondage (*bandha*) and liberation (*mokṣa*) [for the Self]?

44. Moreover, [the Self] cannot be free from suffering (*duḥkha*) even in [the state of] liberation when one maintains that there is only the Self, because that [suffering] cannot be different from the Self, just as fire (*vibhāvasu*) [cannot be different] from the heat (*uṣṇa*) [of the fire.]

58 The term *bīja* in MHK 8.42 seems to have a connotation identical to that of the term *vāsanā* (residue/impression) in, e.g., TJ 8.24. It is therefore not related to the Yogācāra concept of "seeds" (*bīja*) residing in the store-house consciousness (*ālayavijñāna*). The VTV-MHK does not give any information as to whether Bhavya follows the Sautrāntika theory of *bīja* or not. On the Sautrāntika theory of *bīja*, see Jaini 1959. Cf. May 1959, p. 273, n. 1002 (*vijñānabīja*).

45. How can a latent (*līna*) and an unoriginated (*anutpanna*) cognition (*buddhi*) [produce] knowledge without an [intermediary] instrument [of knowledge]? It would, of course, be just as inconsistent as the woodpecker (*pūrṇaka*) being able to peck without a beak (*paraśu*). [Objection: Just as even if fire burns, it is indicated that the person burns by means of fire, likewise even when cognition knows, it is said that the person knows but not the cognition. Answer: That is not correct:]

46. When it is said: "He burns by means of fire", it is the fire that burns, not the one who achieves it, just as when it is said: "One knows by means of the mind", it is the cognition that knows, not [that] Self (*pumān*) of yours. [In the statement "fire burns" either fire itself burns or else Devadatta does. As to that, the so-called burning exists in fire, not in the one who makes something burn, i.e. the agent of the burning. Likewise, when it is said that the mind here knows, the mind itself knows, not the Self. Objection: Just as a potter is called a potter even at the time when he is not making pots, and fire is called "burner" (*dāhaka*) even at the time it is not burning wood, just so the Self too has the nature of cognition, even though it is not related to any instrument.]

47. That [Self which, even though it does not depend on any instrument, has the nature of cognition] could not be established in analogy with a pot-maker (*kulāla*), since he has not [always the function of being a pot-maker] as his intrinsic nature (*svabhāva*). The establishment [of the Self] in analogy with something that burns is not acceptable [either], since without something to be burned (*dāhya*), fire (*agni*) does not exist. [When the Self is active or proceeds by means of instruments, then it is correct that it has the intrinsic nature of cognition, but apart from that, the intrinsic nature of cognition is just a designation in relation to the intrinsic nature of non-cognition (*ajñāna*). Cognition is, however, not established by merely stating it in regard to non-cognition.[59]]

59 According to Bhavya, space is established on a conventional level in relation to a substance, just as unorigination (*ajāti*) is established in relation to origination (*jāti*). Cognition (*jñāna*) as the intrinsic nature of the Self cannot, therefore, be ultimately established, since, like space and unorigination, it is only possible to conceive of cognition in relation to non-cognition (*ajñāna*). Something which is dependent on something else for its existence cannot ultimately be self-existent or intrinsic. On *svabhāva*, see n. 62 below; (**IV**), pp. 104-108; MHK 3.29cd;

48. Furthermore, you cannot in any way [maintain] that the [Self which is by intrinsic nature] non-knowing can become a knowing agent (*kartṛ*) and enjoyer (*bhoktṛ*). Furthermore, what is the use of imagining [the Self] as being devoid of conceptual construction (*avikalpa*), like the sky, merely on the basis of the scriptures (*āgama*), [which are no means of (valid) knowledge (*pramāṇa*)? Objection: Even though the Self has the nature of non-cognition, it will have the nature of cognition when the instruments are present. Answer: Nevertheless, prior to the first existence of cognition, because the instruments had not arisen, the Self had the nature of non-cognition. It could therefore not be an agent or an experiencer.][60]

49. Furthermore, [if you say that the Self] does not [have] the intrinsic nature of either cognition or non-cognition, [then] this [Self] would be without intrinsic nature. But the Self could not be without intrinsic nature, [since then] it would be [as non-existent] as a son of a barren woman (*bandhyātanaya*). [Moreover, you have stated that because the Self pervades all bodies, it is the single Self of all:]

[Refutation of an Individual (Mortal) Self (*antarātman*) and an (Immortal) Self which Rests in the Supreme (*parameṣṭhātman*)]

50. [That Self of a person] which is not affected by suffering and pleasure, when [one or another individual Self] torments or pleases it — that cannot, as far as he is concerned (*tasya*), logically be his Self, in the same way as the sky cannot belong to [an accidental person by the name] Devaśarman.

51. If [you] maintain that meditative cognition (*dhyānajñāna*), etc., lead to liberation of the individual [mortal] Self (*antarātman*),[61] then [this] must [imply] an effort (*prayatna*) to negate the Self, [since in reality there is no deviation from a certain intrinsic nature]: How would the mortal (*martya*) [Self] become immortal (*amṛta*) [without being impermanent, etc.]?[62]

MMK 15.1, 2, 8; 7.30; GK 4.9, 29.

60 On *āgama* and *yukti* in the works of Bhavya, see Iida 1966.

61 On Bhavya's rare usage of the term *antarātman*, see (**IV**), p. 115, n. 97.

62 Cf. MMK 15.1-2, 8; the *Triśaraṇasaptati* 12-13 (see Sørensen 1986a, pp. 21-22, 65-66, n. 12-13); GK 3.21-22, 4.7-8, 29. For a discussion of Bhavya's

52. [If it is said that the individual Self and the supreme Self are both different and non-different, this should be examined in the following way:] If the individual [mortal] Self (*antarātman*) is different from the Self [which rests in the supreme] (*parameṣṭhātman*), your assertion: "All is the 'Person' (*puruṣa*)",[63] is rendered invalid, because the individual [mortal] Self, is different from the Self [which rests in the supreme. And:]

53. If the individual [mortal] Self is non-different from the Self [which rests in the supreme], [then] your assertation is [once again] rendered invalid, since the [supreme] Self does not at all experience pleasure and pain, etc. It (i.e. the mortal individual Self) could [therefore] not be [identical with] the supreme [Self.][64]

[Refutation of the One Self as having a Manifold Nature]

54. If it [i.e. the Self] is subtle (*sūkṣma*), this [Self] cannot [at the same time] be large (*mahat*). If it is large its subtleness does not exist, and it is not one [either]. How could the formless Self have the property of form [without the occurence of the mental constructions (*vikalpa*), "subtle" and "great", "one" and "many", etc.? Objection: Those who do not see Reality see it in many forms: Some say that it is all-pervasive (*sarvatraga*), some say that it is just the extent of the body (*deha*), others again think that it just has the nature of an atom (*paramāṇu*). Like the elephant's intrinsic nature (*svabhāva*), it is just one (*eka*), but like the major and minor limbs (*aṅga/pratyaṅga*) of the elephant (*hastin*), it is also many. Answer:]

55. On the basis of the example of the elephant, it is not logical that one [thing] has a manifold nature, since [the part, i.e.] the trunk (*kara*) is not considered to be [the whole, i.e.] the elephant (*karin*). Furthermore, oneness does not [apply] to the trunk, etc. [The trunk of the elephant is just the trunk. The foot is just the foot, and the ear is just the

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notion of intrinsic nature (*svabhāva*), see (**IV**), pp. 104-108.

63 Cf. MHK 8.4 ab.

64 Cf. the *Brahmasūtra* I.2.8 (translated with Śaṅkara's commentary): *saṃbhogaprāptir iti cen na vaiśeṣyāt* "If it is said: [Because the individual Self and the supreme Self are identical], there is arising of experience [of pleasure and pain also for the supreme Self], it is not so because of difference [with respect to their respective nature]."

ear. The elephant itself does not exist. Therefore, there is no single nature and the trunk, etc.][65]

56. If the Self has the colour of the sun, etc. (*sūryādivarṇa*) [as you maintain],[66] how could it [also] be without colour? [Objection: Like the *palāśa*-tree, one thing pervades all, and as the *palāśa*-tree exists in its own parts, such as the root, the trunk, the branches, the twigs, etc., that has also a manifold nature. Answer:] On the basis of the example of the *palāśa*[-tree], a manifold nature of the Self is not [to be] accepted:

57. Since a *palāśa*[-tree] is not one [in as much as] it always changes its nature [into the states of youth, middle-age and its end], and moreover, since the roots, etc. (*mūlādi*), are not one [in as much as] they are differentiated by causal conditions (*pratyaya*) [such as fire, wind, an axe, etc., [the example of the *palāśa*-tree is not able to establish the meaning which is the purpose of the example, i.e., a non-changing and non-differentiated Self.]

58. [Concepts like] "most excellent" (*jyāyastā*) and "supreme" (*paratva*) are meaningful [only] in relation to [something] other than that [which is said to be so]. How can the existence of [such] a notion be accepted when there is oneness [between the Self and all entities?[67] Furthermore, how could it be right that the Self is a substance and also all-pervasive?]

[Refutation of the Self as a Substance (*dravya*) and a Support (*ādhāratā*)]

59. If the Self were a substance (*dravya*),[68] it could not be all-pervasive (*sarvatraga*) because of its substantiality (*dravyatva*), as is the case with a pot, nor could it be eternal. How could [then] the whole world be

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65 I.e. none of the single parts are identical with the whole — neither alone nor taken together.

66 See MHK 8.2 (*sūryavarcasa*), 8.3 (*rukmavarṇa*). Cf., however, AK IX.301: *tathāgatāditya*.

67 This is a criticism of MHK 8.7.

68 For a discussion of "substance" (*dravya*) designating the ultimate reality in Vedānta and Madhyamaka, see (**IV**), pp. 127-130.

full of it? [With regard to your statement that all that has arisen, is arising and will arise is the "Person" (*puruṣa*),[69] we reply:]

60. To have the status of being a support (*ādhāratā*) is possible [only in relation] to a substance, but the Self does not relate to a substance. Therefore, since [the Self] does not have the status of being a support, because it is unoriginated, it is like a skyflower. [Furthermore, since the Self is not established as a substance:]

61. How can all elements (*bhūta*) be exactly [the same] as the Self to the one who experiences [the Self]?[70] It is unacceptable that what is without Self (*anātman*) has the status of Self, just as the [intrinsic] nature (*bhāvatā*) of a non-entity (*abhāva*), [such as a skyflower, is not possible.]

62. Therefore, [since the supreme Self is not established], the non-difference between the ignorant [and the learned], etc.,[71] is without support and illustration. [From the assumption] of the oneness of the Self, a lot of errors occur:

63. The Self of Maitra may be perceived by means of the sense-organs (*karaṇa*) of Caitra, just as the Self of Caitra [may be perceived by means of the sense-organs of Maitra], because [his] nature (*mūrtitva*) is not different from Caitra's, or because there is no difference as to place (*deśa*). [Such a perception does not exist. The Self of Maitra and the Self of Caitra are, therefore, not one.]

64. [If they were one,] the enjoyer of happiness and suffering may then be liberated when that [Self of another] is liberated, or alternatively, if that [Self] is bound, that [liberated Self must also] be in bondage, or if [one] suffers, that [liberated Self] should [also] be in suffering.[72] [Objection: Although I have determined the support of the elements, etc., and the oneness without distinction of fools, etc., what harm is

69 MHK/TJ 8.4.

70 Cf. MHK 8.9.

71 MHK 8.9.

72 A similar objection is found in MHK/TJ 8.11.

done? For I show as an example the "pot-space" simile, which is accepted by both sides.[73] Answer:]

[Refutation of the Oneness and Existence of Space (*ākāśa*) and Self]

65. On the basis of the "pot-space" simile (*ghaṭākāśadṛṣṭānta*),[74] [the oneness between the ignorant and the learned, etc.,] is not possible. That [oneness] does not exist for everyone, since the oneness (*ekatva*) and existence (*bhāvatā*) of space is not established:

66. [In the view of the Sautrāntikas, we accept on the conventional level (*saṃvṛtyā*) that] that object which is empty of substance is, as is known (*hi*), the relative (*sāṃvṛta*) space (*ākāśa*), [since it is the mere absence of a resistant substance (*sapratighadravyābhāva-mātra*)]. There is movement (*gati*) for those who move; there is room (*avakāśa*) for those demanding room.[75] [Space exists, therefore, only as a designation. And since space was given as an example of a permanent (*nitya*), all-pervasive (*sarvatraga*) and singular (*eka*) Self, it is in fact dissimilar to that. Therefore, the Vedāntavādins have not established the Self.][76]

67. Space therefore is not an unblocking (*anāvṛti*) [substance] and it is not an [active] provider (*dātṛ*) of room.[77] When this reason is given by the opponent [and incidentally by the Vaibhāṣikas] regarding its

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73 In TJ 8.64, the Vedāntavādin maintains that the "pot-space" simile is accepted even by the Mādhyamikas. The *Prasannapadā ad* XVIII.9 quotes an early Mahāyānasūtra, the *Āryasatyadvayāvatāra Sūtra*, which, apparently, already knows this simile. See (**II**), p. 24, n. 16. This is historically significant. For a discussion of the "pot-space" simile in VTV, GK and the *Paramārthasāra* (PaS), see (**IV**), pp. 108-127.

74 See MHK 8.10, 11, 13.

75 For an edition and translation of TJ 8.66, see (**IV**), pp. 119-121. On "space" as the mere absence of a substance, cf. Nāgārjuna's *Ratnāvalī* 1.99ab; Āryadeva's *Śataka* 9.3; Lang 1986, p. 89, n. 5.

76 In TJ 8.66, the Vedāntavādins object to Bhavya's denial of the existence of space by quoting an interesting *sūtra*-passage. For an edition, translation and a historical discussion of this passage, see (**IV**), pp. 119-121.

77 According to Bhavya, space is conventionally the absence of substance, and as such is not unblocked. An all-pervading (i.e. an unblocked) Self could therefore not be likened to space. Furthermore, since space is not an active provider of room, because it *is* room, the Self as an agent cannot be likened to space either.

[i.e. space's] existence, it should not be accepted as a valid reason (*hetu*),[78] [since space is not an existing substance (*dravyasat*).][79]

68. [As to the statement that the Self is a permanent entity, all-pervasive, and the support of all entities, like space:] Again, (p) space cannot be regarded as an entity (*bhāva*), (h) since it does not stand in relation to a cause. (d) It is, therefore, not one [but inexisting], just as [the unreal] son of a barren woman [is not one.][80]

69. [Even though] clay (*mṛd*) in the shape of pots, etc., is one [and the same thing] since it always remains clay (*mṛjjātīya*), in [each individual] pot, etc., there is always a different and new [portion of clay]. Therefore the Self is not one.[81] [You have said that, because one has not awakened to absorption into the Self and has not known the Self, one's experiences are like the enjoyments in a dream.[82] In that case, will one be conceited because one knows or because one does not know?]

70. When one knows, [like one who has a visual organ through which he gets his knowledge conforming to reality (*yathārtha*)], one cannot regard it as a state of imagination of the knower because there is no error. And again, when one does not know, [like one who is blind from birth], one cannot regard it as a state of imagination of the non-knower because there is no error [here also.[83] As to your statement

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78 On the usage of a simile (*dṛṣṭānta*) as a logical reason (*hetu*), see GK 4.20; *Nyāyasūtra* 1.1.34-37, 5.1.11.

79 For an edition and translation of TJ 8.67, see (**IV**), p. 122.

80 For an edition and translation of TJ 8.68, see (**IV**), p. 123.

81 This is a criticism of MHK 8.12.

82 MHK 8.14.

83 The notion of dependent origination (*pratītyasamutpāda*), the middle way (*madhyamā pratipat*) or emptiness (*śūnyatā*), which underlies Bhavya's argumentation in VTV, see (**IV**), pp. 101-108, is here instrumental in critizising the Vedāntavādin's claim that the non-knower of the Self is conceited. According to Bhavya, everything is to be understood complementarily, i.e. in relation to its opposite: Knowledge (*jñāna*) presupposes non-knowledge (*ajñāna*), space (*ākāśa*), substance (*dravya*), origination (*jāti*), non-origination (*ajāti*), etc., and vice versa. Ignorance therefore cannot have a characteristic of its own (*svalakṣaṇa*), since it does not exist in or by itself (*niḥsvabhāva*). Consequently the ignorance of the non-knower of the Self cannot be characterized

that though the "Person" exists in the body, He is not attached, and though He enjoys objects, He is not stained by them,[84] we answer:]

[Refutation of the Self as the Agent (*kartṛ*) and the Enjoyer (*bhoktṛ*)]

71. Because [the Self] does not change (*avikāritva*) and is not attached (*asaṅgatva*),[85] like space (*vyoman*), it is not logical that the Self is the agent (*kartṛ*), and it is not logical that it is the enjoyer (*bhoktṛ*) either. [Something which always remains the same, not engaged in its own activity and not attached to objects, could not be an agent or an enjoyer.][86]

72. [The characteristic mark of an agent, when he is an agent, is that he is stained by the results (*phala*) of beneficial (*kuśala*) and non-beneficial (*akuśala*) actions. Therefore:] If the agent, which is the Self, is not defiled [by the result of action (*karma*)], how can the agent

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as erroneous or imaginative. Ultimately, knowledge and non-knowledge, etc., are purely abstractions, designations (*nāma*) or metaphors (*upacāra*). Bhavya seems furthermore to maintain that one cannot be a part of the Self and yet be ignorant of it, as the Vedāntavādins maintain. If one does not know the Self, it could not exist. Either one knows the Self, or one does not.

See also MHK 8.47 (p. 79 with n. 59, above).

84 MHK/TJ 8.15.

85 This is a criticism of MHK 8.15ab.

86 A fundamental (*pradhāna*), independent agent does not exist apart from causes and conditions, according to Bhavya. It is only if something has the property of change that it is true to say that it is an agent (*kartṛ*) or experiencer (*bhoktṛ*). In TJ 8.30, Bhavya refers to the science of grammar (*śabdaśāstra*), according to which an action must have an independent agent. On *svatantraḥ kartā* (independent agent), see the *Aṣṭādhyāyī* (1.4.54) of Pāṇini.

In ch. 25 of Bhavya's *Prajñāpradīpa,* it is said, however, that the *nirmāṇakāya* acts without disturbing the non-activity of the *dharma-* or *tathāgatakāya.* Bhavya's position in PP regarding agenthood seems, therefore, to contradict that of VTV. The *Mahāyānottaratantra* (1-2 cent.) takes a similar stand as that of PP: *mahākaruṇayā kṛtsnaṃ lokam ālokya lokavit / dharmakāyād aviralaṃ nirmāṇaiś citrarūpibhiḥ //* (II 53) *jātakāny upapattiṃ ca tuṣiteṣu cyutiṃ tataḥ /* (II 54 ab) *kṣetreṣv apariśuddheṣu darśayatyā bhavasthiteḥ //* (II 56cd) "Having surveyed the entire world with His Great Compassion the Knower of the World (*Buddha*) without locomoting from his Absolute Medium (*Dharmakāya*) by way of His Transformation [Medium] (*Nirmāṇa*[*kāya*]) in protean garbs [He] displays origination in *Vita* [of any individual] in impure Realms [such as our World] as long as the World is durating." (Sørensen 1986b, pp. 172-173).

[produce] the result (*phala*) wished for? [If there is no later enjoyment (*anubhoga*) of the results, all the actions of the agent will be pointless. Therefore, because the agent will not possess the quality of enjoying the results, agenthood is very difficult to establish.] The example of the king (*rāja*) is [therefore] not logical, because the king (*nṛpati*) is evil.[87] [As to the statement of yours that the Self is one (*eka*), all-pervasive (*sarvatraga*) and eternal (*nitya*):][88]

[Refutation of the Self as One (*eka*), All-pervasive (*sarvatraga*), Permanent (*nitya*), Inexpressible (*avācya*) and Inconceivable (*nirvikalpa*)]

73. It is not logical that [the Self, which is] without a second (*advitīya*), is one, since it is independent of anything external (*bāhya*). If it is one from its connection to oneness, [then] the relation (*yoga*) is only to itself; there is no other [relation. Since the Self exists as everything internal and external, in relation to what will it be one? And if the Self is said to be one by being related to number one, then how will the Self relate to itself since there does not exist anything different from the Self? This is impossible, just like it is impossible that a finger itself can touch the tip of that very same finger. If you say that the Self is imagined to have many ways of manifesting itself as subject (*viṣayin*) and object (*viṣaya*), and that by means of excluding that manifoldness, the Self should be said to be just one, we say:]

74. If, although conceptualized [to be] many, [the Self] is one due to the exclusion (*apoha*) of that [manifoldness], oneness would not exist in reality (*tattvataḥ*), since the conception (*kalpanā*) [of oneness, etc.,] is relative (*sāṃvṛtī*):

75. If this [Self] existed in reality with the nature of permanency, oneness, etc., [then] the function of words and cognitions of "the one", etc. (*ekādiśabdadhīvṛtti*), [would be] infallible (*niratyayā*), if [its] referent (*artha*)[89] existed. [But since there is nothing but the Self, the

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87 This is a criticism of MHK/TJ 8.15.
In TJ 8.72, Bhavya states furthermore that, because the king would have the fear of falling into hell, etc., it is taught that he should perform actions in accordance with *dharma*. But if he were not stained by sin, etc., this would not be taught.

88 See, e.g., MHK/TJ 8.16.

89 In the words of Lindtner (1982b, p. 271, n. 240): "*artha* ('object' or 'meaning')

Self and the cognition of which it is an object are not different. Therefore, this method has a fault:]

76. Since one conceptualizes [the Self] to be one, etc., how can this Self be devoid of conceptual construction. [This is impossible, since there does not exist any difference between the cognition and the Self]. It is, however (*ca*), undeniable that words function on the basis of a referent (*artha*), which is the object of conceptual construction (*vikalpa-viṣaya*). [Where conceptual constructions apply, there speech also applies:]

77. How can [you] therefore [maintain that the Self] is neither an object of cognition (*dhī*) nor an object of speech (*gira*)? In accordance with the previous argument (*nīti*), it is false (*vitatha*) that [such a Self] is inexpressible (*avācya*) [and] without conceptual construction (*nir-vikalpa*).[90]

[Refutation of Liberation (*mukti*) or Enlightenment (*bodhi*) as a State of Self-identity of Non-origination (*ajātisamatā*) Resulting from the Cognition of the Self]

78. If liberation (*mukti*) comes from seeing (*darśana*)[91] [that Self] by

reveal, as well as *upalabdhi* ('exist' and 'perceive'), *satya* ('reality' or 'truth'), etc., the fact that Indians in a certain sense do not clearly distinguish between facts and ideas, between ideas and words." The reason why Bhavya in MHK 8.76 does not distinguish between the fact that the Self has a conceptual construction (*vikalpa*) and that we have a *vikalpa* of the Self is, however, due to the fact that he maintains that for the Vedāntavādins, there does not exist any difference between the Self (*ātman*) and the cognition (*jñāna*).

90 MHK/TJ 8.73-77 seems to be Bhavya's critique of MHK/TJ 8.17.

91 As mentioned in n. 46 above, Bhavya expresses the cognition of the enlightened in terms of a cognition which "moves without moving". In MHK 3.280ab, Bhavya uses a similar logical device to describe the Bodhisattvas' cognition of the Buddha: *vyomavad ye mahātmānaḥ īkṣante tam anīkṣanāt* / "Like space, those who are illustrious see him without seeing" (ed. and tr. by Malcolm D. Eckel).

Cf. MHK 5.106: *sakalajñeyayāthātmyam ākāśasamacetasā* / *jñānena nirvikalpena buddhāḥ paśyanty adarśanāt* // "The Buddhas see by means of non-seeing the reality of all knowable objects with a knowledge which is without mental construction and with a thought which is like space." The *Dharmasaṃgīti Sūtra* states also: *adarśanaṃ bhagavany sarvadharmāṇāṃ darśanaṃ samyagdarśanam* "O Lord, not to see is to see all *dharmas*: this is true seeing"

means of cognition (*buddhi*), how can oneness exist? [There cannot be oneness] because they [i.e. the cognition and the Self] are different. Furthermore, this [liberation] would also be false in analogy with the previous [argument],[92] because it [i.e. the Self] would be grasped [as an object], like the cognition of multiplicity (*nānātvadhī*).[93]

79. If there is a cognition (*jñāna*) which knows the self-identity of non-origination (*ajātisamatā*),[94] [then], because there is no difference [between the cognition and the state of self-identity of non-origination], how could seeing exist? Liberation would [then] result from "non-seeing", otherwise there would not be liberation (*mukti*) for anyone.

80. If enlightenment (*bodhi*) results from the arising of that [seeing], how could non-origination be self-identical? If it (i.e. seeing) does not arise because it is not an existing entity, it would be the same as a conceptual construction of that [self-identity of non-origination.]

81. Non-origination (*ajāti*) is a phenomenon (*dharma*) which resembles origination (*jāti*), but it exists [only] as the non-existence [of origination]. It is [therefore] not at all (*nāpi na*)[95] logical that [this phenomenon of non-origination] is identical with the Self or abiding in it (*tatsthatā*).[96]

(quoted from Eckel 1987, p. 115, n. 15). See also Gokhale 1963.

Expressions like "to see without seeing" or "to move without moving" I take as metaphorical, referring to a cognition which is of a non-grasping nature. See the interesting information on *a-dassana* ("not seeing" and "not being seen"!) in *A Critical Pāli Dictionary* (CPD), p. 118.

92 See MHK 8.24.

93 Cf. GK 3.13, 4.91.

94 On *ajātisamatā,* see GK 3.2b, 3.38d. Cf. GK 4.93d (*ajaṃ sāmyam*), 4.95a (*aje sāmye*), 4.100b (*ajaṃ sāmyam*) (see Lindtner 1985a, pp. 275-276). The *Āryasatyadvayāvatārasūtra* quoted in the *Madhyamakavṛtti* (La Vallée Poussin ed., p. 374) states: *paramārthataḥ sarvadharmānutpādasamatayā paramārthataḥ sarvadharmātyantājātisamatayā paramārthataḥ samāḥ sarvadharmāḥ/.../* (quoted from Bhattacharya 1943, p. 49). This passage should have been mentioned by Lindtner 1985a. It proves, however, that Lindtner was right in taking *ajāti* and *samatā* in GK 3.38 as a compound. On *anutpāda-samatā,* see Conze 1973, p. 32 (*°samatā, °sama, °jñāna*), and MMK 18.12 (*saṃbuddhānām anutpāde /.../*).

95 The expression *nāpi na* ("not at all") is of rare occurrence.

82. Difference (*bheda*) is not accepted to exist in that which is unborn (*aja*), in which there is a potentiality (*samarthana*),[97] since in reality (*tattvataḥ*) unbornness (*ajatva*) is not accepted either for the born (*jāta*) or the unborn (*ajāta*).

83. If [you say that] that [Self] is not differentiated (*abheda*), [then the Self is not different] from a skyflower (*khapuṣpa*), which is to hold an unreal position (*asatpakṣa*). If [you alternately say that] there is differentiation (*bheda*) in the absolute (*pariniṣpatte*), [then] non-duality (*advaita*)[98] cannot be established.

[Conclusion]

84. Therefore, neither existence (*bhāva*) nor non-existence (*abhāva*),[99] and neither difference (*pṛthak*) nor non-difference are [applicable to] the Self (*pumān*),[100] [which is furthermore] neither eternal (*nitya*) nor non-eternal, and it is not an object of speech or cognition (*buddhidhvanigocara*).

85. [If you say: Do not also the Buddhists maintain that which transcends the sphere of speech and cognition to be ultimately real?" We

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96 MHK 8.81cd (*naivātmasamatā tasya yuktā nāpi na tatsthatā //*) seems to be Bhavya's answer to GK 3.38cd (*ātmasaṃsthaṃ tadā jñānam /.../*) (see Lindtner 1985a, p. 276). Unorigination (*ājati*) is then the absence of origination (*jāti*), just as space (*ākāśa*) is the absence of a resistant substance (*sapratigha-dravyābhāvamātra*, MHK/TJ 8.66). The Self could therefore not be likened to either *ajāti* or *ākāśa*, which consequently do not possess intrinsic nature (*sva-bhāva*).

97 Cf. GK 4.19: *aśaktir aparijñānaṃ kramakopo 'tha vā punaḥ / evaṃ hi sarvathā buddhair ajātiḥ paridīpitā //* "As there is absence of capability, or complete ignorance, or, again, incompatibility of orders, the Buddhas elucidated [the theory of] absolute non-origination (*ajāti*)." (ed. and tr. by Bhattacharya 1940, p. 121). See also Bhattacharya *ibid.*, pp. 121-123. Cf. also Lindtner's (1984b, pp. 152-153, n. 9) discussion of the objection stated in *Pramāṇa-varttika* III.4a (*aśaktaṃ sarvam iti ced /.../*), where, according to Lindtner, Dharmakīrti is compelled to admit that *śakti* is only real from a relative perspective (*saṃvṛtyā*). We are consequently here dealing with a tradition which is far from considering the absolute as "dynamic" — it holds just the contrary.

98 On *advaita*, see Vetter 1979, pp. 31-34.

99 Cf. MHK 3.287; TJ 3.111; *Ratnāvalī* 1.72.

100 Cf. GK 2.34; MMK X.16.

answer: That is true. Nevertheless this is the reasoning (*yukti*):][101] Since in every respect no object of knowledge can be established,[102] there is logically no domain of operation for cognition (*buddhi*). When the realm of cognition [therefore] has ceased, the domain of speech could not exist [either.[103] Conventionally, the object of knowledge, which is the object of the six forms of cognition (*vijñāna*), is imagined (*parikalpita*), but in reality (*tattvataḥ*) what is imagined or conceptually constructed is completely unestablished. Therefore, since cognition does not arise in regard to that non-existing object, that is not an object of cognition, and because the object of cognition has ceased, speech also does not function, since its basis does not exist.]

[The Vedāntadarśana — A Completely Heterogeneous (*atyantātulyajātīya*) System (*siddhānta*)]

86. Being convinced that this infallible system of the Tathāgata is a good one (*śubha*), here [in the Vedānta system] the heterodox sectarians (*tīrthika*), being desirous (*spṛhā*) of [that doctrine], have therefore [even] made it their own,[104] [saying: "This is our system". But that is eclecticism, endowed with the fault which consists in the contradiction of former and latter parts, and it is therefore to be classified as a mental construction (*vikalpa*).[105] Therefore:]

87. Who would [be so stupid as to] have faith (*śraddhā*) in this [Vedānta system]. Here the former and latter [parts] are completely incompatible (*atyantātulyajātīya*), just as [when] a jewel (*maniratna*) [is not distinguished from a piece of] metal (*ayas*).[106] [If you Vedāntavādins say that contradictions also occur for the Mādhyamikas who say that there is something which possesses a Self (*sātmatā*) and something which does not possess a Self (*anātmatā*), and that there is emptiness (*śūnyatā*) and external emptiness (*bāhya-*

101 TJ 8.77.

102 MHK 3.266 (3. 266ab=8.85ab) states: *jñeyasya sarvathāsiddher nirvikalpāpi yatra dhīḥ / notpadyate tad atulyaṃ tattvaṃ tattvavido viduḥ //* "No object of cognition is established in any way, so reality is that of which not even a non-conceptual cognition arises. (Translated by Malcolm D. Eckel.) See pp. 71-72, n. 46 above.

103 MHK/TJ 3.285-286 states that Reality could not be reached by logic (cf. MHK/TJ 5.104; *Laṅkāvatārasūtra* 2.122) or by conceptual or non-conceptual cognition.

104 On Bhavya's attitude towards the Vedāntadarśana, see (**IV**), pp. 101-104.

105 For an edition and translation of TJ 8.86, see (**IV**), pp. 102-103.

106 Cf. Mātṛceṭa's *Varṇārhavarṇastotra* 7.19, 20ab. See (**IV**), p. 103, n. 36.

śūnyatā), origination (*utpāda*) and non-origination (*anutpāda*), existence (*bhāva*) and non-existence (*abhāva*),[107] then we answer:]

88. Due to the manifoldness (*vaicitrya*) of the [Buddhist] teaching (*deśanā*), let this principle (*naya*) [of Self and non-Self etc., which is in accordance with relative (*saṃvṛti*) and absolute truth (*paramārthasatya*)] be like this here, for the sake of attracting some and [for the sake of] turning the rest away from grasping (*grāha*). [In order to divert those who grasp and advocate non-existence, and whose minds are impaired by the view (*dṛṣṭi*) which negates (*apavāda*) causality (*hetuphala*), the existence of the Self is taught. And in order to stop attachment to, or grasping at a Self (*ātmagraha*) by the adherents of a Self (*ātmavādin*), the non-existence of the Self is taught. To those endowed with receptivity (*kṣānti*) for the vast and profound doctrine (*dharma*), it is ultimately taught that neither the Self nor the non-Self exists. Therefore, there is no contradiction (*virodha*). If you ask: How is that? We answer:][108]

[Unoriginatedness (*ajātatva*) and Lack of Intrinsic Nature (*niḥsvabhāvatā*) as the "Intrinsic Nature" (*svabhāva*) or "Self" (*ātman*) of All Entities (*bhāva*)]

89. It is, as is known (*hi*),[109] the intrinsic nature (*svabhāva*) of entities (*bhāva*) not to be originated (*ajātatā*), [since existent and non-existent entities have not originated (*utpanna*) from themselves (*svataḥ*), from another (*parataḥ*), from both (*dvābhyām*), or from no cause (*ahetutaḥ*)]. That [nature] is also said to be the "Self" (*ātman*) of these [entities], because it is contingent (*akṛtrimatva*) and because it does not disappear (*anapāyitva*).

90. That [nature] is one (*eka*) by virtue of its single nature (*ekarūpatva*), [and] because it is undifferentiated (*abheda*) even when there is differentiation of entities. It is all-pervasive (*sarvaga*), because [it possesses the property of grasping the own-characteristic of no-characteristic (*alakṣaṇasvalakṣaṇa*)] of all *dharmas*(*sarvadharma*). Furthermore, it is also eternal (*nitya*) because it does not disappear

107 For a tr. and ed. of TJ 8.87, see (**IV**), p. 106.

108 For an edition and translation of TJ 8.88, see (**IV**), pp. 106-107. On references to the pedagogical attitude in various Buddhist texts, see the *Prajñāpradīpa* 18.5d, 6 (Eckel 1980, pp. 217-220); (**IV**), pp. 106-108.

109 On Skt. *hi*, see Lindtner 1982b, p. 26, n. 79.

(*avināśa*). [That nature is also the Self, because it is unoriginated intrinsic nature.]

91. That [nature] is unoriginated (*ajāta*), since it is not originated (*ajāta-tva*). Precisely for that reason, it is not subject to old age and death (*ajarāmara*). It is imperishable (*acyuta*) because it is free from extinction. It is considered supreme (*para*) because of excellence (*prakarṣa*) [with regard to its nature.]

92. It is not form (*rūpa*), sound (*śabda*), smell (*gandha*), etc. It is not earth (*bhūmi*), fire (*agni*), water (*jala*) [or] air (*anila*). It is not space (*ākāśa*), the moon (*śaśī*), the sun (*sūrya*), etc. It does not have the defining characteristic (*lakṣaṇa*) of mind (*manas*) [which is to cogitate] or of cognition (*jñāna*)[110] [which is to know entities.]

93. That [nature] is everything, because it is the intrinsic nature [of all entities], but it is not every particular [entity], since it is without destruction (*avināśa*). Because defilements (*kleśa*), etc., do not arise there [in that unoriginatedness or Self], that is pure (*śuddha*). It is [also] completely equanimous (*śānta*), [because it has completely transcended all actions (*kriyā*).]

94. It is expressible by virtue of the imposition of conceptual constructions (*kalpanāsamāropa*), but it is inexpressible (*avācya*) in reality (*tattvataḥ*), and furthermore because it is in every respect inexpressible (*avācyatva*), it is said to be unmanifest (*nirañjana*).[111]

95. Obviously, if such a Self [or intrinsic nature described above] is accepted even by you, [then] that [Self or intrinsic nature, which is the general characteristic (*sāmānyalakṣaṇa*) of non-origination], is infallible (*nirdoṣa*) and completely proper (*upapattika*) because of extensive conceptual correspondences with regard to name, etc.

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110 Cf. the characteristics of a person (*skyes bu/puruṣa*) in the *Ratnāvalī* (1.80) and the description of *nirvāṇa* given in the *Suhṛllekha* 105.

111 On *nirañjana*, cf. MHK 3.274cd; *Ālokamālā* 53, 194 (see Lindtner 1985b, pp. 138-139, 186-187).

(*nāmādibahusādharmya*): [You say "supreme Self" (*paramātman*) and we say "non-origination" (*ajātitva*). Therefore:]

96. Those who are afraid, due to the fear (*bhīta*) of the absence of a Self (*nairātmya*), remain exactly there [in that very absence, because there is no support apart from that], just as one who is afraid [of space, remains exactly there in that space], because [there is no other place than] space. Where else could he remain?[112]

97. Welcome! Quench your thirst (*tṛpti*)![113] Here [in this preaching (*pravacana*)] no one is hindered from anything. The Buddhas, the friends of the world (*lokabandhuna*),[114] [offer] this very exquisite nectar of reality (*tattvāmṛta*).

98. Abandon this false clinging (*asadgrāha*) to there being a Self (*ātmatva*), an agent (*kartṛtva*), an enjoyer (*bhoktṛtva*), etc. It is groundless (*nirāspada*), [and] it prevents one from from seeing the real (*bhūtadṛk*).

99. [Objection: If our Self (*ātman*) and your non-Self (*anātman*) are similar, then our systems (*siddhānta*) would be equal. Answer:] In reality (*tattvataḥ*), one has to accept that entities are unoriginated, because they do not arise in their own right. [When] they are said to be without intrinsic nature (*niḥsvabhāvatā*), it is because they do not arise by virtue of [their] own nature.

100. Lack of intrinsic nature and lack of Self, that is not [the same as] Self, because that would be contradictory. If lack of Self would be the same as Self, [then] the absence of a cow (*go*) would be the same as [the presence] of a cow.

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112 Cf. MHK 3.278 (*apratiṣṭha*), 3.294; TJ 1.21 (*apratiṣṭhita*), TJ 1.16 (*apratiṣṭhitanirvāṇa*). On *apratiṣṭhitanirvāṇa*, see Stcherbatsky 1978, p. 195, n. 3, p. 215, n. 4, pp. 29-30 (Technical terms). On "fear of emptiness", see *Ratnāvalī* ch. 1, etc.

113 *svāgataṃ* ! *kriyatāṃ tṛptir* ! = "Welcome!" "Cheers!"

114 *lokabandhu,* cf. MHK 3. 315.

101. How is it possible that [a really existing] agent and enjoyer is without such an intrinsic nature. It is not completely accidental that the status of agent and enjoyer [of a Self] here is considered [on line with the status of agent and enjoyer] of a son of a barren woman.

102. How can [a Self] of such a nature originate?, and how can [all the worlds and beings] dissolve into it?[115] It is impossible to imagine any thing arising from or being dissolved into a skyflower.

103. As long as a cognition occurs which has as its object the absence of intrinsic nature, so long will we think of the existence of "one", etc., by the imposition of conceptual construction of the mind. [The intrinsic nature of oneness, etc., does not, however, exist in reality.][116]

104. When conceptual and [finally] non-conceptual cognition[117] [which apprehends non-Self (*anātman*) without conceiving it as either having or not having an intrinsic nature] cease, [then] the peaceful, [completely inexpressible] cessation of diversity [occurs] in that which is not an object of the mind.[118] [That nature in which all entities are completely unestablished (*apariniṣpanna*) and which is beyond speech and cognition is, therefore, Reality.[119] The view of a Self which is conceptually constructed by you is, however, not Reality.]

[Thus ends] the eighth chapter [of the *Madhyamakahṛdayakārikā* entitled:]
The Determination of Reality according to Vedānta (*vedāntatattvaviniścaya*).

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115 Cf. MHK/TJ 3.288; MHK/TJ 8.5; *Madhyamakavṛtti Prasannapadā* by Candrakīrti (pp. 533.9, 194.14, 195.2, La Vallée Poussin's ed.)

116 Cf. MHK 8.74.

117 Cf. MHK 3.265: *nirvikalpārthaviṣayā nirvikalpāpi dhīr mṛṣā / anātmādi svabhāvatvāt tadyathā savikalpadhīḥ //* "A cognition that has 'no concept' as an object is false, even though it is non-conceptual, because it is [a cognition of] no-self and so forth, like a conceptual cognition" (tr. by Malcolm D. Eckel).

118 Cf. MHK 3.284d: *'yaṃ prapañcopaśamaḥ śivaḥ /* "This is the peaceful cessation of conceptual diversity", a clear echo of Nāgārjuna's MMK 25.24, etc.

119 Cf. Bhavya's description of reality (*tattva*) in MHK/TJ 1.1-3 (See Gokhale/ Bahulkar 1985, pp. 82-83).

IV. Space and Substance. A Theme in Madhyamaka - Vedānta Polemics

Bhavya as a "Svātantrika-Sautrāntika-Mādhyamika"

The immense importance of Bhavya's[1] scholarship within the history of Mahāyāna Buddhist thought is indisputable. Bhavya (A.D. 500-570)[2] was successful in influencing not only his contemporaries, but also later philosophers in the Mahāyāna tradition. Within the Madhyamaka tradition, his *svātantrika* approach was followed and developed by such authors as Jñānagarbha, Śāntarakṣita and Kamalaśīla.[3] Nāgārjuna and Buddhapālita, on the other hand, used *prāsaṅgika* arguments to show that the opponent's position, with its implicit or explicit assumptions, has consequences unacceptable to the opponent himself. This was criticized by Bhavya, who maintained that these *prāsaṅgika* arguments should be supplemented by independent propositions (*svatantra*), e.g. in the form of formal syllogisms (*prayogavākya*), a characteristic feature of Bhavya's own approach. This was in order to refute potential counter-arguments by opponents from various Buddhist and non-Buddhist schools. Bhavya's usage of a threefold syllogism[4] suggests, *inter alia*, the influence of Dignāga (A.D. 480-540),[5] especially the latter's *Pramāṇasamuccaya* (PS), to which Bhavya frequently alludes in his *Tarkajvālā* (TJ) and *Madhyamakaratnapradīpa* (MRP). Dignāga first reduced the five-fold syllogism of the *Nyāyasūtra* to a three-fold form and then incorporated and established the usage of syllogisms within the Buddhist tradition.[6]

Bhavya's influence on the Madhyamaka tradition is also shown by the opposition which he provoked. Candrakīrti's *prāsaṅgika* sub-school of Madhyamaka, which still dominates Tibetan Madhyamaka Buddhism

1 On the various names given to this *ācārya*, see (II), p. 21, n. 2

2 See Kajiyama 1963, pp. 37-38; 1968/1969, pp. 193-203.

3 See Ruegg 1981a, pp. 67-71, 87-100.

4 Thesis (*pratijñā*): there is fire on the mountain, reason (*hetu*): because of smoke, example (*dṛṣṭānta*): as in a kitchen. See pp. 112-113, n. 82 below, and MHK/ TJ 8.68 (pp. 122-123 below).

5 See Frauwallner 1961, pp. 134-137. Cf. Hattori 1968, p. 4 with n. 21.

6 See Lindtner 1986a, p. 78, n. 24. The usage of a five-fold syllogism at the very end of the *Prajñāpradīpa* (PP), ch. 27, an independent essay on logic and *pramāṇa*, probably reflects the opponent's language, since Bhavya's reasons for not accepting the *pañcavāyana*-doctrine are explicitly given in PP (*loc. cit.* 183b4-184b1); see Lindtner 1986a, p. 81, n. 33. It may also reflect another, later period of his scholarship in comparison to MHK/TJ. On Nāgārjuna's refutation of syllogisms, see Lindtner 1982b, p. 89.

through the dGe-lugs-pa branch of the Tibetan tradition, was actually formed in reaction to Bhavya's works.

The classification of Bhavya as a "*svātantrika*" is apparently a later sectarian formalisation made by the Tibetan tradition. It stems from the basic distinction of the Indian Svātantrika-Mādhyamikas into the sub-schools of the mDo sde [spyod] pa'i dbu ma [raṅ rgyud pa] (Sautrāntika-[Svātantrika-] Madhyamaka) and the rNal 'byor spyod pa'i dbu ma [raṅ rgyud pa] (Yogācāra- [Svātantrika-] Madhyamaka). As early as the 9th century the Tibetan scholar Ye-śes-sde, a student of Śāntarakṣita, sets out this preliminary classification in his famous *lTa-ba'i khyad-par,* without, however, mentioning the terms *prāsaṅgika* and *svātantrika,*[7] which we now know first came into usage during the Second Dissemination (*phyi-dar,* from ca A.D. 1000) of Tibetan Buddhism. The term *svātantrika* (*raṅ-rgyud-pa*), applied to Bhavya, probably derives from passages in Candrakīrti's commentary on the *Madhyamakāvatāra* or from Jñāna-garbha's *Satyadvayavibhāga.*[8]

The vast indigenous Tibetan *grub-mtha'* (*siddhānta*) literature deals to a large extent with the systematic presentation and ramification of the Madhyamaka school, a theme studied by Mimaki.[9] The division of various Indian Madhyamaka masters into distinct sub-schools differs considerably, especially among the later dGe-lugs-pa doxographers.

We can observe the pivotal importance of Bhavya throughout the entire Tibetan doxographical tradition. From the very outset, Bhavya was exclusively classified as a Sautrāntika[-Mādhyamika].[10] For instance, in the *gŹuṅ-lugs legs-par bśad-pa*[11] falsely ascribed to Sa-skya Paṇḍita Kun-dga' rgyal-mtshan (A.D. 1182-1251), Bhavya is characterized in the following terms:

> Distinguishing [Madhyamaka] from a conventional level (saṃvṛti) /. . ./ [Bhavya is designated as a] Mādhyamika who advocates the absence of a contradiction whatsoever [in accepting] the definition of empirical reality (*vyava-hāra*).

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7 See Ruegg 1980, 1981b, 1982.

8 Jñānagarbha's *Satyadvayavibhaṅga* or perhaps rather ˚*vibhāga* ("The Distinction between the Two Truths"), vv. 25-35. See Eckel 1987, pp. 92-99.

9 See Mimaki 1980, pp. 27 sqq., 139 sqq.

10 See Mimaki *ibid.* pp. 27 sqq. On the relationship between the Sautrāntikas and the Mādhyamikas, see also La Vallée Poussin 1971, vol. 1, p. 8, n. 3.

11 See *Sa-skya bka'- 'bum,* Vol. 5, Tokyo 1961, *fol.*146b2-150a1: *kun rdzob kyi sgo nas dbye ba /. . ./ tha sñad rnam gźag gaṅ daṅ yaṅ mi 'gal bar smra ba'i dBu ma pa / . . ./.* On the status of this work as a forgery, see for instance Mimaki 1982, p. 33, n. 65; Jackson 1985; and Jackson 1987, pp. 48-49.

In fact, in all the Tibetan doxographical works Bhavya is classed as a Sautrāntika-[Svatāntrika-Mādhyamika]. The reason for such a classification is most likely the fact that conventionally (*saṃvṛtitaḥ*) he agrees with the Sautrāntikas at least on major "ontological" issues. This is evident from TJ 8.66,[12] where space (*ākāśa*) is regarded as merely the absence of a resistant substance (*sapratighadravyābhāvamātra*). The *Prajñāpradīpa* (PP), commenting upon the *Mūlamadhyamakakārikā* (MMK) 1.6d, also affirms on a conventional level a Sautrāntika position: Entities which cannot be described as existent (*bhāva*) or non-existent (*abhāva*), do indeed originate from their assembled causes and conditions (*hetupratyaya*).[13] It must be conceded, though, that the exact meaning of the term "*Sautrāntika*" is not at all clear in most cases.

Bhavya the Doxographer

In the *Madhyamakahṛdayakārikā* (MHK) and its auto-commentary the *Tarkajvālā* (TJ),[14] Bhavya shows his thorough knowledge of Hīnayāna (or Śrāvakayāna), Yogācāra, Sāṃkhya, Vaiśeṣika, Vedānta and Mīmāṃsā (chs. 4-9). This is therefore the earliest Sanskrit doxographical work that has come down to us,[15] preceding the *Ṣaḍdarśanasamuccaya* (ṢDS) of

12 See p. 119 below.

13 See Ames 1986 ch. 1, pt. 2, pp. 21-22; p. 59, n. 90. See also La Vallée Poussin 1933, p. 67.

14 For purely practical purposes, I will in the following refer to the verses as MHK and the prose commentary as TJ. For a detailed discussion of these titles, see (**II**), pp. 25-26.

15 The *Brahmajālasutta* (BJS) of the *Dīghanikāya,* and the *Prajñāpāramitāpiṇḍārthasaṃgraha* (PPPAS) of Dignāga (see Hattori 1968, p. 3 with n. 17, p. 7 with n. 40), enumerate various philosophical views from which the Buddhists are to keep away, since their doctrines and speculations are an impediment to those seeking true liberation. BJS and PPPAS are, however, not to be classified as doxographical treatises in the sense of a systematic presentation of different fixed and consistent systems. In this perspective, BJS and PPPAS constitute *vorstufen* to the doxographical genre, which, as far as the still extant texts are concerned, was initiated by Bhavya. It is, however, interesting to note that Dignāga's PPPAS and the *Madhyamakaratnapradīpa* (MRP) of Bhavya both refer to BJS. This means that in the time of Dignāga and Bhavya, BJS was considered an important handbook of philosophy. Furthermore, Āryadeva's (?) *Skhalitapramathanayuktihetusiddhi* (SPYHS), of which the last verses are based upon BJS, seems to have influenced some verses of Bhavya's MRP and Nāgārjuna's *Mūlamadhyamakakārikā.*

The relationship between the above mentioned texts will be discussed by the present author in a forthcoming study on the beginnings of Indian doxography. This article will also include a critical edition and an annotated English translation

the Jaina scholar Haribhadrasūri (8th cent.), which, according to Halbfass, is the earliest Sanskrit doxography.[16] The critique found in the *uttarapakṣa* sections of MHK/TJ constitutes, as it were, a strengthening of the principles and methods expounded by Bhavya in great length in his crucial *Tattvajñānaiṣanā* chapter of MHK/TJ, where he explicitly states his own philosophy. Therefore, when it comes to identifying a Madhyamaka approach to other schools, his work has unique value. As a doxographer, Bhavya actually initiated the genre of comprehensive histories of philosophy in Buddhism, such as the *Tattvasaṃgraha* (8th cent.) by Śāntarakṣita. Such texts are also found within the traditions of Jainism and Vedānta, e.g. the already mentioned *Ṣaḍdarśanasamuccaya* (8th cent.)[17] by Haribhadrasūri, the *Sarvasiddhāntasaṃgraha* (SSS) (8th cent.?), ascribed to Śaṅkara[18] and the *Sarvadarśanasaṃgraha* (SDS, 14th cent.) by Mādhava, based upon the SSS.

The position which Bhavya holds in Tibet with regard to doxographical knowledge is as dominant as the position which Candrakīrti holds in the interpretation of Nāgārjuna. MHK/TJ is the earliest and most substantial work translated into Tibetan which seriously and in greater detail presents and critically examines various heterodox schools.

The main narrative structure of MHK/TJ differs from ṢDS, SSS and SDS in that it first outlines Bhavya's own philosophy (chs. 1-3) and then, in the following chapters (4-9),[19] gives a presentation of various heterodox systems in a *pūrvapakṣa* submitted to a critical examination in a collateral *uttarapakṣa*. The ṢDS, SSS and SDS, on the contrary, give the author's own system at the very end of the treatise, having outlined the various systems without an *uttarapakṣa* attached to each chapter. The structure of MHK/TJ and the above mentioned doxographies reveal clearly, however, the apologetic intent behind the historical interest of these authors.

Bhavya's major inspiration for the composition of a doxography may have been Dignāga's PS, which deals with Nyāya, Vaiśeṣika, Sāṃkhya and Mīmāṃsā within the *pramāṇa*-tradition. One reason why Dignāga did not include Vedānta in his PS, or in the lost works known to us from the *Pramāṇasamuccayavṛtti*, [where he refuted adversaries from the Nyāya, Vaiśeṣika and Sāṃkhya traditions among others],[20] was perhaps the fact

of SPHYS by Per K. Sørensen.

16 See Halbfass 1979, p. 196.

17 For an edition and commentary of ṢDS, see ref. in Halbfass 1979, pp. 196-197, n. 7; Suali 1905.

18 The SSS (see e.g. Raṅgācārya *et al.* 1909 for an edition and translation) is not by Śaṅkara, the author of the BS-*bhāṣya* (see Hacker 1968/1969, p. 147). A new critical edition of SSS is in preparation by Lindtner.

19 On the titles of the eleven chapters of MHK/TJ, see Gokhale/Bahulkar 1985, p. 76.

that the Vedānta systems at that time did not include an independent theory of the "means of [valid] cognition" (*pramāṇa*).[21] This does not seem to be a possible reason for the ṢDS of the eighth century to omit Vedānta philosophy, since although early Vedānta philosophers did not pay much attention to epistemological and logical problems, at least Śaṅkara deals with *pramāṇa,* even if he does not deal with it systematically in his works.[22] Bhavya then supplements Dignāga by treating various schools now within the *vāda*-tradition.[23]

The didactic and historical interest of Bhavya is implicitly put in doubt by Halbfass, who, from an analysis of the usage of the terms *dṛṣṭi* (Pāli *diṭṭhi*) and *darśana,* contrasts the Buddhist doxographical tradition with that of Jainism and Vedānta. The latter's usage of the term *darśana* reveals, according to him, a rather neutral and non-committal stance, with no normative or idealizing implications.[24] But the narrative structure of ṢDS, SSS and SDS does not support that conclusion, since the author's own system stands at the very end of the treatise, implying its superiority. Halbfass also maintains that, in contrast to the Buddhist texts, the Jaina and Vedānta works are characterized by a "perspective inclusivism" (in the Jaina works even towards Vedānta). Jaina doxographers arrange the systems in a systematic order and framework, in order to arrive at a more comprehensive understanding of Jaina philosophy itself, in terms of its co-ordination and comprehension of all the other philosophical systems or viewpoints.[25] Bhavya identified a Madhyamaka approach to heterodox systems and by so doing not only saved the existence of the school, but also clearly defined its philosophical fundamentals. As far as the Jaina relationship to Vedānta is concerned, we may have to reconsider their attitude in the light of MHK/TJ 8.86.[26] The inclusiveness found in Jaina and Vedānta treatises, which constitutes, according to Halbfass, a salient difference from the Buddhist tendency not just to refute other systems but even mere "views" (*dṛṣṭi*), seems inaccurate. Perceiving various systems as expressions of partial truths is not unique for those traditions, since it is found in Bhavya's *Madhyamakaratnapradīpa* (MRP). In the second chapter, Bhavya arranges different doctrinal systems under incorrect relative truth (*mithyāsaṃvṛtisatya*) and

20 *Nyāyaparīkṣā, Vaiśeṣikaparīkṣā, Sāṃkhyaparīkṣā,* etc. See Hattori 1968, pp. 3- 4, 9.

21 Mayeda 1968/1969, p. 221.

22 Mayeda *ibid.,* pp. 221-222.

23 I.e. the tradition of debate, which concerned itself with dialectics, eristic arguments and sophistry.

24 Halbfass 1979, p. 199.

25 Halbfass 1979, p. 199, and p. 201, n. 23.

26 See pp. 102-103 below.

correct relative truth (*tathyasaṃvṛtisatya*).[27] The Vedāntavādins would be classified under the former, whereas the Hīnayānists and Yogācāras come under the latter. This is certainly "inclusivism" if anything is! Needless to say, Bhavya's Madhyamaka system reflects for him the absolute truth (*paramārthasatya*).

Bhavya's Attitude towards the Vedāntadarśana

In the *Vedāntatattvaviniścaya* (VTV) chapter of MHK/TJ, Bhavya is obviously biased due to his own philosophical affiliation, though he assures us of his non-dogmatic attitude in trying to incorporate the Vedāntadarśana[28] notion of a "Self" (*ātman*) into the framework of his theory of "intrinsic nature" (*svabhāva*). MHK 8.18 states:

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27 Lindtner 1984c, pp. 169-171. On *tathyasaṃvṛtisatya*, see MRP 1. 3-4, translated by Lindtner 1981b, pp. 169-170. On the classification of various truths (*satya*), see *Madhyamakārthasaṃgraha* (MAS), translated by Lindtner (1981b, p. 200, n. 14) and Śastri (1931).

28 Bhavya defines *Vedānta* and *Vedāntavādin* in TJ 8.1: (Peking. 282b7) || *rig pa'i mthar phyin pa ni rig byed mtha' ba ste* | *chags pa med par ṅes par rig pa'o* || *de smra ba'i ṅaṅ tshul ga la yod pa 'am* | *tshig de gaṅ la yod* (P. 282b8) *pa ni rig byed kyi mthar smra ba'o* || " '*Vedānta*' means the end of [all] knowledge, which certainly should be known as [a knowledge with] non-attachment (*asaṅga*). One who discusses it or maintains it as his own theory is a '*Vedāntavādin*'."

The term "*Vedānta*" is then not defined in reference to the *Upaniṣads*, i.e. the final textual portion of the *Vedas*. Nakamura (1983, pp. 90-100) notes that with the process of transmission and separation into different schools (*śākhā*) the appendices to a *saṃhitā* came to vary. This means that we observe instances where "*vedānta*" was explained by referring to, e.g., the *Āraṇyaka*, i.e. whatever constituted the appendix to the *saṃhitā* at any particular period of a school was then regarded as "*vedānta*". With the firm establishment of the tradition in the post-Śaṅkara period, "*vedānta*" came to denote the general position of the Vedānta-school based upon the so called *prasthāṇatraya*: The *Upaniṣads*, *Bhagavadgītā* (BhG) and *Brahmasūtra* (BS).

On *asaṅga*, see GK 4.72, 79 (*niḥ°*), 96, 97 (°*tā*).

On the term *darśana*, see Halbfass 1979, 1981. Bhavya's usage of *darśana* (TJ 8.1, MHK 4.7), as a designation of a philosophical system, is to be noticed as an early occurrence of such a connotation. The title of MHK ch. 3 is perhaps Bhavya's term for "philosophy": *Tattvajñānaiṣanā* ("The Search for Knowledge of Reality"), cf. Greek *philosophia*.

The Buddhists, more precisely: the Mahāyānists are designated with the rare and interesting term *Śūnyasaṃskāravādinaḥ* (MHK/TJ 8.1), cf. SSS 4.15.

> As far as this [teaching in the *pūrvapakṣa*[29] and the meaning which has been stated previously in the present work (*prakaraṇa*)[30]] is concerned, it is to be critically investigated by persons who do not take up a dogmatic position (*pakṣa*). [Because a person whose] mind is concealed by attachment to a position (*pakṣarāgāvṛta-mati*) does not even understand the truth (*satya*).[31]

Bhavya, advocating the middle way (*madhyamā pratipat*) which avoids the extremes of nihilism (*ucchedavāda*) and eternalism (*śāśvatavāda*),[32] disagrees of course with the Vedāntavādins, who according to his summary are attached to an extreme (*anta*). According to TJ 8.18, the one who should investigate is rather one who has examined whether his own and others' positions (*pakṣa*) are logical (*yukti*) or not, and who is free from attachment (*anurāga*) and anger (*krodha*). This is because a mind which is stained by attachment to a position will not believe even faultless words (*nirdoṣapāda*) since it is attached to its own position (*svapakṣarāga*).[33] The main reason, however, for Bhavya to introduce the notion of a "Self" (*ātman*) into the concept of "intrinsic nature" (*svabhāva*) is the fact that he maintains that the Vedāntavādins have actually adopted or stolen their notion from Mahāyāna Buddhism. MHK 8.86 states:

> Being convinced that this infallible system of the Tathāgata is a good one, here [in the Vedānta system], the heterodox sectarians, being desirous of [that doctrine], have therefore [even] made it their own.[34]

TJ 8.86:

> On very rare occasions, a Tathāgata has arisen in the world, not only to teach the system of his sacred words (*pravacana*), which is without falsehood (*avitatha*), but

29 Gloss on "*atra*" in TJ 8.18.

30 Gloss on "*apīdam*" in TJ 8.18, which also glosses *'di ltar* not found in the Skt. manuscript.

31 *atrāpīdaṃ parīkṣante pakṣapātānapekṣinaḥ /*
pakṣarāgāvṛtamatiḥ satyaṃ yathāpi nekṣate //
For a critical edition of the Sanskrit verses of VTV, see (II), pp. 28-48.

32 See *maṅgala śloka ad* MMK.

33 In *Catuḥśataka* (CŚ) 8.10, Āryadeva states that *nirvāṇa* is not attained if one has attachment to one's own position (*svapakṣa*). See Lang 1986, p. 81 with n. 10. Cf. also CŚ 12.1, Lang *ibid.*, pp. 110-111 with n. 1, p. 111.

34 *tāthāgatīm avitathāṃ matvā nītim imāṃ śubhām /*
tasmāj jātaspṛhais tīrthyaiḥ kṛtaṃ tatra mamāpi tat //

> also to display his Final Extinction (*parinirvāṇa*). When that happens the heterodox sectarians (*tīrthika*) generate desire (*spṛhā*) for that doctrine of his, whereafter they mix it into their own system (*siddhānta*) and even make it their own, saying: 'This is our system!'. But that is a mixture of doctrinal systems, endowed with the fault which consists in the contradiction of former and latter parts and is, therefore, to be classified as a mental construction (*vikalpa*).[35]

This explains Bhavya's reply in the *Śrāvakatattvaniścayāvatāra* chapter of MHK. Here the Hīnayānists maintain that Mahāyāna does not represent the teaching of the Buddha, since it is not included in the doctrinal scriptures (*sūtrāntādi*), and since it teaches heterodox paths to liberation, like the Vedāntadarśana. Bhavya answers in MHK 4.56ab:

> *Vedānte ca hi yat sūktaṃ tat sarvaṃ buddha-*
> *bhāṣitam /*[36]

Gokhale, Nakamura and others takes this to mean that Bhavya had a favourable attitude towards the Vedāntadarśana, but in the light of MHK/TJ 8.86 the intention is quite the reverse:

> Whatever is well said in the Vedānta has [already] been said by the Buddha" [— so it must have been stolen by them!]

35 (P. 302b5) | *brgya la res 'ga' de bźin gśegs pa 'jig rten du byuṅ bar gyur ciṅ* | *des brdzun pa ma yin pa'i gsuṅ rab kyi lugs kyaṅ rab tu bstan nas yoṅs su mya ṅan las 'das pa* (P. 302b6) *yaṅ bstan pa na de'i lugs de la mu stegs pa rnams 'dod pa skyes par gyur nas raṅ gi grub pa'i mtha'i naṅ du bsreg śiṅ lugs 'di ni kho bo cag gi yin źes bdag gir yaṅ byed do* | | *de ni sṅon daṅ phyi mar yaṅ* (P. 302b7) *'gal ba'i skyon daṅ bcas pa'i grub pa'i mtha'i 'dres pas rnam par rtog pa yin par mtshon par bya ba yin te* |

36 Quoted by Gokhale 1958, p. 179; Hartmann 1987, p. 229. Already Mātṛceṭa seems to say much the same. Bhavya is clearly reflecting Mātṛceṭa: The *Varṇārhavarṇastotra* (VAV) 7.19 states: *ito bāhyeṣu yat sūktaṃ ghuṇākṣaravad īk[ṣy]ate / tat tatrātulyajātīyaṃ jātarūpam ivāyasi //* "Was bei denen, die außerhalb [dieser Lehre stehen], an Wohlgesprochenem — gleichsam wie ein von einem Holzwurm [hervorgebrachter] Buchstabe — gefunden wird, das ist dort von so ungleicher Natur wie Gold zwischen Eisen" (see Hartmann 1987, p. 228).

VAV 7.20ab: *kaḥ śraddhāsyati tat tasmin pūrvāparaparāhatam /* (Hartmann 1987, p. 229) has clearly inspired Bhavya in MHK 8.87ab: *kaḥ śraddhāsyati tāṃ tatra pūrvāparavirodhinīm /*.

All that is well said in Vedāntadarśana is actually nothing but Buddhism which the Vedāntavādins have stolen or borrowed! Śāntarakṣita, quoting the *Gauḍapādīyakārikā* (GK 2.31f, 35) exclaims in his *Madhyamakālaṃkāravṛtti*:

> What they state has already been said by the Tathāgata![37]

This also strengthens our assertion that the Vedānta tradition from the time of the *Brahmasūtra* (BS) to that of GK was strongly influenced by Buddhism. Consequently, Bhavya felt obliged to explain the "stolen goods" thoroughly for the Vedāntavādins. Having done that, he says in MHK 8.95, with respect to the notions of a "Self" or an "intrinsic nature":

> Obviously, if such a Self [or intrinsic nature described above] is accepted even by you, [then] that [Self or intrinsic nature, which is the general characteristic of non-origination] is infallible and completely proper, because of extensive conceptual correspondences between name, etc.[38]

Bhavya explains in TJ 8.95 that, if the Vedāntavādins also maintain that the Self is the general characteristic (*sāmānyalakṣaṇa*) of non-origination, then the dispute concerns a mere name. The Vedāntavādins say "supreme Self" (*paramātman*) and Bhavya says "non-origination" (*ajātitva*), so there is no contradiction. Therefore, Bhavya invites his opponents to satisfy themselves with the supreme nectar of reality (*tattvāmṛta*) offered by the friends of the world, the Buddhas.[39] Consequently, as far as Bhavya himself is concerned the apologetical purpose is not admitted. Instead he wants us to accept his didactic purpose.

Bhavya on "Intrinsic Nature" (*svabhāva*)

The Mādhyamikas were in general notoriously reluctant to attribute intrinsic nature (*svabhāva*)[40] to anything, including emptiness itself.[41]

37 *de dag gis gaṅ brjod pa de ni bde bar gśegs pas gsuṅs pa*
Op. cit. Lindtner 1982b, p. 280.

38 *īdṛśo yady abhipreta ātmā hi bhavatām api /*
nāmādibahusādharmyān nirdoṣaḥ sopapattikaḥ //

39 MHK 8.97.

40 For references to technical terms like *svabhāva, bhāva,* etc., see May 1959, pp.

Bhavya accepts, however, that from a relative perspective (*saṃvṛtitaḥ*) entities (*bhāva*) do originate, exist and have an intrinsic nature. Earth (*pṛthivī*), for example, has solidity (*khara*) as its intrinsic nature.[42]

No entity exists, however, *a priori:* Entities (*bhāva*) have not originated (*utpanna*) from themselves (*svataḥ*), from another (*parataḥ*), from both (*dvābhyām*) or from no cause (*ahetutaḥ*).[43] "Intrinsic nature" would here connote "*ens*", "existence" or "being", i.e., that which gives something its status as an independent entity, or its independent existence.[44]

In an absolute perspective (*paramārthataḥ*), entities do not originate or exist since they are interdependently originated (*pratītyasamutpānna*): That which arises (*samutpāda*) "depends on" (*pratītya*) other factors for its arising. Consequently, according to Bhavya, "intrinsic nature", here connotating the "*essentia*" or "nature" (*prakṛti*)[45] of all entities, is ultimately an absence of intrinsic nature (*niḥsvabhāva*), since nothing can be different (*anya*) in itself.[46] Ultimately earth has, therefore, no intrinsic nature,[47] since it is "made up" (*kṛta*) and since it has causes (*hetu*).[48] Bhavya states that this is a total negation (*prasajyapratiṣedha*), not a negation for affirmation (*paryudāsapratiṣedha*), i.e. it affirms neither another intrinsic nature nor an intrinsic nature which is itself empty of intrinsic nature.[49] Differently expressed, the statement that earth does not have solidity as its intrinsic nature does not imply that it has something else as its intrinsic nature. Furthermore, even emptiness (*śūnyatā*) itself is without intrinsic nature. All entities are therefore ultimately non-existent, being empty by intrinsic nature (*svabhāvena śūnya*). The middle way (*madhyamā pratipat*) consequently implies both dependent origination (*pratītyasamutpāda*) and emptiness (*śūnyatā*). According to Nāgārjuna, it is because things arise dependently that they are without intrinsic nature,

493-531 (index).

41 *Op. cit.* Eckel 1980, p. 23. See TJ 3.26. Cf. the *Prasannapadā ad* MMK 13.7 by Candrakīrti, quoted by Eckel 1980, p. 23.

42 MHK/TJ 3.21c.

43 TJ 8.89; MMK 1.1.

44 See de Jong 1972, pp. 2-3; Steinkellner 1973. For further references, see May 1959, p. 124, n. 328.

45 Nāgārjuna glosses "*svabhāva*" with "*prakṛti*" in MMK 15.8. Cf. GK 4.9, 29.

46 TJ 3.122.

47 MHK 3.26; TJ 3.27.

48 MHK/TJ 3.26, see Lindtner 1986a, pp. 62-63.

49 Bhavya is to our present knowledge the first philosopher to introduce these two kinds of negations into the Madhyamaka tradition (cf., however, Lindtner 1982b, p. 14, n. 27). The *locus classicus* is found in the *Prajñāpradīpa* ch. 25; see Eckel 1980, pp. 342-343. See also Eckel 1987, p. 126, n. 46; Matilal 1971, pp. 162-165; Kajiyama 1966, pp. 38-39; 1968/1969, p. 203; 1973.

and because they are empty of intrinsic nature that they are able to enter into dependent relations. The middle way is then beyond existence and non-existence (*bhāvābhāva*). These two extremes must be avoided,[50] since non-existence (*abhāva*)[51] would be non-existence of existence (*bhāva*), i.e. non-existence would be derived from something else (*parāśrayāt*) and therefore conditioned (*saṃskṛta*).[52] "If intrinsic nature depended on anything else for its origin, it would not be 'intrinsic' (*sva-*) and would no longer define a unique, independent entity."[53] Bhavya explains in MHK 8.88 his position in reply to the following objection from the Vedāntavādins:

> If you ask whether great contradictions do not also occur for the Mādhyamikas who say that there is something which possesses a Self (*sātmatā*) and [that there is something which does] not [possess] a Self (*anātmatā*) and that there is emptiness (*śūnyatā*) and external emptiness (*bāhyaśūnyatā*), origination (*utpāda*) and non-origination (*anutpāda*), existence (*bhāva*) and non existence (*abhāva*), we answer:[54]

> Due to the manifoldness of the [Buddhist] teaching let this principle [of Self and non-Self, etc.,] be like this here, for the sake of attracting some and [for the sake of] turning the rest away from grasping.[55]

TJ 8.88 explains:

> The Blessed One (*bhagavan*) has taught the very existence (*astitva*) of the Self (*ātman*) in order to divert [i.e. to remonstrate] those who grasp non-existence and advocate non-existence, [and] whose minds are impaired by the view (*dṛṣṭi*) which negates (*apavāda*) causality (*hetuphala*). He attracts those and in order to stop

50 See the *Bhāvābhāvaparīkṣā*-chapter of MMK (esp. 15.7, 10).

51 The *locus classicus* of "*abhāva*" is found in the *Ratnāvalī* 1.72. Cf. TJ 3.111.

52 MHK/TJ 3.109-116.

53 Eckel 1980, p. 136.

54 TJ 8.87: (P. 303a3) | *gal te yaṅ dbu mar smra ba rnams la* (P. 303a4) *yaṅ bdag daṅ bcas pa*[1] *ñid daṅ* | *bdag med pa ñid daṅ* | *stoṅ pa ñid daṅ* | *phyi stoṅ pa ñid daṅ* | *skye ba daṅ* | *skye ba med pa daṅ* | *dṅos po daṅ* | *dṅos po med par smras bas 'gal ba chen po 'byuṅ bar 'gyur ba ma* (P. 303a5) *yin nam że na* |
Notes: 1. *bdag daṅ bcas pa*: *bcas pa* P.

55 MHK 8.88: *deśanāyās tu vaicitryād ihaivaṃ syād ayaṃ nayaḥ* / *ākarṣaṇārtham ekeṣāṃ śeṣagrāhanivṛttaye* //

> attachment to the grasping of a Self (*ātmagraha*) among the adherents of a Self (*ātmavādin*), he teaches: "The Self does not exist" (*ātmā nāsti*). Conventionally (*saṃvṛti-taḥ*), he teaches the abandonment of the Self, and to those who are endowed with receptivity (*kṣānti*) for the vast and profound doctrine (*dharma*), he teaches that in ultimate reality (*paramārthataḥ*) there is neither Self (*ātman*) nor non-Self (*anātman*). Thus the very teachings in the many preachings (*pravacana*) of the Blessed One are taught in accordance with relative (*saṃvṛti*) and absolute (*paramārtha*) [truth (*satya*)], so there is no contradiction (*virodha*).[56]

Similar "pedagogical devices" are found throughout Buddhist literature. In the *Saṃyutta Nikāya,* brahmins who are annihilationists are taught that a Self does exist, whereas brahmins who are eternalists are taught its non-existence.[57] In the *Ātmadharmaparīkṣā* ("The Critical Examination of Self and Phenomena"), which Buddhapālita in his *Mūlamadhyamakavṛtti* sees as an expression of the Buddha's pedagogy,[58] Nāgārjuna states:[59]

> They used the designation 'Self'. They also taught 'no Self'. The Buddhas also taught 'neither Self nor no-Self'.
>
> Everything may be true or not true, or true as well as not true, [or] neither true nor not true. This is the gradual teaching of the Buddha.[60]

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56 (P. 303a5) | *rgyu daṅ 'bras bu la skur* (P. 303a6) *ba 'debs pa'i lta bas sems ñams par byas pa med par smra ba* | *yod pa ma yin par 'dzin pa rnams bzlog par bya ba'i phyir* | *bdag yod pa ñid du bcom ldan 'das kyis bstan te* | *de dag 'dren* (P. 303a7) *par mdzad pa daṅ* | *bdag tu smra ba rnams bdag tu 'dzin pa la mṅon par źen ciṅ 'jig pa rnams bzlog par bya ba'i phyir bdag med do źes ston par mdzad pa yin te* | *kun rdzob tu de bdag*[1] *tu 'dzin pa spaṅ* (P. 303a8) *par bstan pa yin no* | | *don dam par ni bdag kyaṅ ma yin bdag med pa yaṅ ma yin no źes zab ciṅ rgya che ba'i chos la bzod pa daṅ ldan pa rnams la bstan pa yin te* | *de ltar na bcom ldan 'das kyis gsuṅ* (P. 303b1) *rab rnam pa du mar bstan pa ñid ni kun rdzob daṅ don dam pa'i rjes su 'braṅs nas bstan pa yin te* | *'gal*[2] *ba med do* |

Notes: 1. *bdag* (*ego*): *dag* P. 2. *yin te* | *'gal*: *ste 'gal* D.

57 SN, pt. IV, pp. 281-282 (tr.), pp. 400-401 (ed.). This passage may, however, be a later addition. Cf. Schmithausen 1973, p. 177, n. 52.

58 Lindtner 1981b, p. 208.

59 MMK 18.6, 8.

60 *ātmety api prajñapitam anātmety api deśitam /*
buddhair nātmā na cānātmā kaś cid ity api deśitam //
(MMK 18.6, tr. by Eckel 1980, pp. 218-219.)
sarvaṃ tathyaṃ na vā tathyaṃ tathyaṃ cātathyam eva ca /

Bhavya concludes in MHK 8.84:

> Therefore, neither existence nor non-existence, and neither difference nor non-difference are [applicable to] the Self, [which is furthermore] neither eternal nor non-eternal, and it is not an object of speech or cognition.[61]

The concept of "intrinsic nature", defined in MMK by Nāgārjuna as one (*eka*), eternal (*nitya*) and independent (*anapāyitva*), is considered axiomatic and is the main issue of the prolonged Buddhist criticism of Brahmanical philosophies.[62] Whereas Nāgārjuna in his MMK and *Śūnyatāsaptati* directed his critique of *svabhāva* towards Buddhist Abhidharma, Bhavya for his part took up this principal discussion of *svabhāva* in connection with Vedānta philosophy.

The "Pot-space" Simile (*ghaṭākāśadṛṣṭānta*)

On the basis of the above reasoning, we are now in a position to analyse the Madhyamaka - Vedānta polemics, as presented in the "pot-space" simile of VTV. This simile provides a clearly defined framework for a study of the polemics regarding the concepts of "intrinsic nature" (*svabhāva*) and

naivātathyaṃ naiva tathyam etad buddhānuśāsanam //
(MMK 18.8, see Lindtner 1981b, p. 208 with n. 100.)

Bhavya states in his *Prajñāpradīpa,* commenting upon MMK 18.5: "There are sentient beings whose minds are stained by the false view of denying (*apavāda*) cause and effect. They mistakenly think that the present world and the world to come do not exist, good and bad actions do not bear fruit, and sentient beings are born spontaneously. They become obsessed with bad actions, and they hover on the brink of bad states of rebirth (*gati*). Buddhas have pity on them. Because of their vow to seek the welfare of others, they see that if these beings depend only on themselves, they would never escape rebirth, and [the Buddhas] use conventional designations to say, 'there is a self'." (Quoted and translated by Eckel 1987, p. 37.)

See also *Catuḥśataka* 8.15, 20; 12.12 (Lang 1986, pp. 83, 85 with n. 20, pp. 114-115 with n. 12, p. 115); *Bodhicittavivaraṇa* 98-99 and *Yuktiṣaṣṭikā* 30, 33 (see Lindtner 1982b, pp. 212-213, 110-111); GK 4.42.

61 *nāto bhāvo na cābhāvo na pṛthag nāpṛthak pumān /*
na nityo nāpy anityaś ca na buddhidhvanigocaraḥ //

62 On the definition of *svabhāva,* see MHK 3.29cd; MMK 15.1, 2, 8; 7.30. Claus Oetke has recently (1988) published a book entitled: *"Ich" und das Ich. Analytische Untersuchungen zur Buddhistisch-Brahmanischen Ātmankontroverse.* This does not, however, include an analysis of MHK/TJ.

"Self" (*ātman/ puruṣa*). Why discuss this simile rather than anything else?

Even though the doxographical genre as a rule neglects historical developments and presents a fixed and final system (*siddhānta*), the advantage of using VTV is that we may trace early stages of the Vedānta philosophical tradition through a description and critique from an external source. By so doing, it provides us, furthermore, with a *corpus comparationis* to the still extant texts of early systematic Vedānta philosophy up to the time of Bhavya: The *Brahmasūtra* (BS), the *Vākyapadīya* (VP), the *Gauḍapādīyakārikā* (GK),[63] and the various fragments found for example in Śaṅkara's commentaries (*bhāṣya*) on BS and the *Bṛhadāraṇyaka Upaniṣad*.[64] As far as the "pot-space" simile is concerned, it is most likely that Bhavya in VTV draws on GK.[65] Gauḍapāda is, as far as we know, the one who introduced this simile into the Vedānta tradition, perhaps under Buddhist influence.[66] Bhavya's criticism of the **ajātisamatāvāda* ("the doctrine of the self-identity of non-origination") of GK,[67] found in VTV,[68] further strengthens this assumption.[69] However, this does not

63 On the dates of these texts, see Walleser 1910, p. 18; Bhattacharya 1943, pp. lxxii-lxxxviii (GK); Frauwallner 1961, pp. 134-135 (VP); Nakamura 1983, pp. 435-436 (BS). Frauwallner (1953, p. 287), followed by Rüping (1977, p. 2) and Danielson (1980, pp. 1-2) dates the *Paramārthasāra* (PaS) of Ādiśeṣa before A.D. 550 on the basis of the *Yuktidīpikā,* which quotes PaS 83 *ad* the commentary on *Sāṃkhyakārikā* 2. According to the present author, this does not provide evidence enough for arriving at such an early dating of PaS (cf. Wezler's [1974] analysis of the *Yuktidīpikā*). As far as the *Yogavasiṣṭha* is concerned, Glasenapp's investigations show that it is not a pre-Śaṅkara Vedānta text.

64 See Hiriyanna 1924, 1925, 1928; Nakamura 1983, pp. 369-390.

Walleser (1910) actually initiated the study of pre-Śaṅkara Vedānta philosophy in modern scholarship. He was then followed by Nakamura, Hiriyanna, Gokhale, Vetter, and others.

65 Walleser (1910, p. 18), followed by Bhattacharya (1943, pp. 50-53), was the first to establish the relationship between VTV and GK: MHK 8.10 resembled GK 3.3; MHK 8.11, 12 resembled GK 3.6cd. However, Walleser (*ibid.* p. 18) and Bhattacharya (*ibid.* p. 52) maintained incorrectly that MHK 8.13 was a *verbatim* quotation of GK 3.5 (cf. PaS 36). This inaccuracy was due to the fact that these scholars could not benefit from having access to the Sanskrit Ms of VTV. On the possibility of Gauḍapāda borrowing from Bhavya, see Lindtner 1985a.

66 On *ghaṭākāśadṛṣṭānta,* see the *Prasannapadā ad* XVIII.9 (B 374.14 sqq., Vaidya 1960, p. 31, pp. 105-106). Here, an early Mahāyānasūtra, the *Āryasatyadvayāvatāra Sūtra,* is quoted, which apparently already knows this example. (For a translation, see de Jong 1949, p. 31.) Since Bhavya frequently refers to this *Sūtra* in his works, the "pot-space" simile was probably familiar to him even from Buddhist *Āgama.* Although it is not historically established, Gauḍapāda may also have benefitted from this Mahāyāna sūtra in his discussion of the "pot-space" simile.

67 See GK 3.2, 38; 4.80, 93, 95, 100.

mean that the Vedāntadarśana, presented by Bhavya, is in complete accordance with GK or even comes from the same tradition as GK. Therefore references are given to the above Vedānta treatises, without implying any historical relationship to VTV (except for GK) due to the ideological complexity, etc., of these texts.

One salient feature of the Vedāntavādins in trying to describe their supreme reality is their attempt — at least according to Bhavya's presentation — to synthesize religio-philosophical concepts of different historical and semantic settings into a consistent framework. MHK 8.17cd states:

> [Various words] are applied to it by those whose cognition is led astray by difference.[70]

TJ 8.17 states:[71]

> By him the term Brahman is 'used to describe it', as well as other terms like: Self (*ātman*), Person (*puruṣa*), Lord (*īśvara*), the All-pervasive (*sarvatraga*), the Eternal (*nitya*) and so forth. The reason [for such usage] is the practicality [of these terms]. The meaning of other such terms is to be understood just like the meaning of the Self.[72] Its nature being inexpressible, the Vedas have called it: 'self-born, actionless, immeasurable', 'the Person beyond darkness' [and further] 'I have known that great Seer, radiant like the sun and living beyond darkness. Having known Him, one surpasses death. There is no other way leading to the place of non-birth'.[73]

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68 See MHK 8.78-84.

69 See (II), p. 24, n. 16; Lindtner 1985a.

70 *giras tatra prayujyante bhedāpahṛtabuddhibhiḥ /*

71 The translation of TJ 8.1-17 (my numbering) follows Gokhale (1958) except for some changes noted in the *apparatus*. In order to make the rendering of Tibetan terms into Sanskrit in conformity with my edition and translation of TJ 8.18-104, based upon Peking *bsTan-'gyur* (P) *fol.*: *Dza* 287b4-306a2, *sDe-dge bsTan-'gyur* (D) No. 3855, *fol.*: *Dza* 255a4-271a2, I have occasionally deviated from Gokhale in this respect. The Tibetan edition of TJ 8.1-17 is, apart from some minor corrections, in agreement with Nakamura's (1958).

72 I do not see how Gokhale (1958, p. 177, l. 32) arrives at the translation "according to the context". I have chosen here to deviate from him and translate *ji ltar bdag gi don* with "just like the meaning of the [term] Self".

73 (P. 287a3) | *des de la tshaṅs pa'o* | | *źes tshig sbyor bar byed de* |*'di lta ste* | *bdag daṅ* | *skyes bu daṅ* | *dbaṅ phyug daṅ* | *kun la khyab pa daṅ* | *rtag pa źes bya ba la sogs pa'i bar ro* | | *ci'i phyir źe na* | *kun* (P. 287a4) *tu tha sñad du bya ba'i phyir te* | *gźan dag gi*[1] *don ji ltar*[2] *bdag gi don ji bźin*[3]

The passage above, as well as other textual passages of VTV, gives an anthropomorphic description of *puruṣa* ("Person"), originating probably from the *Puruṣasūkta* of the *Ṛgveda* (10.90). *Puruṣa* is conceived as an embodied being (*dehin*) in which the individual parts of his body (*deha*) correspond to the various phenomenal elements of the relative existence.[74] In VTV, this idea is combined with a purely philosophical notion of *puruṣa,* identical to that of *ātman.* Thus, on a macrocosmic level, the Absolute and the relative existence is comprehended within a "Person" regarded as an embodied being. This explains why the Vedāntavādins, according to Bhavya, view them as holding "whatever is past, present and future, it is all regarded as the Person" /. . ./ "and He is the agent".[75] This is in reply to a hypothetical question as to how *puruṣa* could be an agent (*kartṛ*) if He is beyond the three spheres of existence (*traidhātuka*).[76] The microcosmic counterpart consists of a human embodied being, who comprises a Self[77] and a psychophysical constitution (*dehādi*). These two aspects of "embodied being": the Absolute/Self and the relative existence/psychophysical constitution, are illustrated in the "pot-space" simile as "space" (*ākāśa*) and "pot" (*ghaṭa*) respectively. The following objection is raised in TJ 8.9:

> Now, if someone were to raise the question: 'This Person (*puruṣa*), who is [said to be] omni-present (*sarva-vyāpin*), and from whom, although He is alone, the bodies of all kinds of living beings (*gati*), such as gods and men are [said to be] born,— how is it that He does not become a nature which is non-eternal (*anitya*) and not

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du rtogs par 'gyur źes bya bar ro | | 'di'i ṅo bo ni brjod par bya ba ma yin pa ñid yin te | rig byed las raṅ byuṅ byed pa med pa boṅ tshad (P. 287a5) *med pa ste | mun pa las gźan pa'i skyes bu ni | skyes bu draṅ sroṅ chen po ñi ma'i mdog | mun pa las gźan gyur pa de rig*[4] *na | | 'chi ba med par 'gyur te bdag gis rtogs | | skye med gnas 'gro ba* (P. 287a6) *la lam gźan med | |*

Notes: 1. *gi*: *gis* D. 2. *ltar*: *lta* P. 3. *bdag gi don ji* (*de*?) *bźin*: *ba bźin* P. 4. *rig*: *rigs* P.

Cf. *Śvetāśvatara Upaniṣad* 3.8 (which is also found in TJ 8.2):
vedāham etaṃ puruṣaṃ mahāntam ādityavarṇaṃ tamasaḥ parastāt /
tam eva viditvātimṛtyum eti nānyaḥ panthā vidyate 'yanāya //
Quoted by Gokhale 1958, p. 168, n. 9.

74 See TJ 8.4.

75 *bhūtaṃ bhavad bhaviṣyac ca sarvaṃ puruṣa iṣyate /*
/. . ./ sa ca karmakṛt // (MHK 8.4).

76 TJ 8.3.

77 The proofs for the existence of a Self (*ātman*): Remembrance (*smṛti*), recognition (*pratyabhijñāna*), knowledge (*jñāna*), etc., found in MHK/TJ, chs. 3 and 8, are similar to those stated in the *Nyāyasūtra*.

all-pervasive (*asarvatraga*), like all bodied beings?[78]
The following is said as a rejoinder:[79]

MHK 8.10:

When a pot is being produced or destroyed, the space [in it] does not have the same nature [of being produced or destroyed]. When bodies, etc., are born or die, they cannot be considered [to have the same nature] as the Self.[80]

The parallelism (*dṛṣṭānta*) between Self and space, pot and bodies, etc., illustrates two distinct realities with their respective intrinsic natures, according to the Vedāntavādin. The perceivable and obvious division of space into different pots causes, however, another Vedāntavādin[81] to raise the following objection as to the oneness (*ekatva*) of the Self (MHK 8.11):

Objection: the one [Self] is many, like space in pots. [Reply: space] is one, because it is not differentiated through the breaking of pots, since it is considered the same for all.[82]

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78 Cf. TJ 3.290: "If [the dharmabody] is free from conceptual diversity, non-conceptual and pervasive, how do we know that it is the Tathāgata's body and not the body of someone else." (Translated by Malcolm D. Eckel.)

79 (P. 285a7) | *gal te 'ga*[1] *źig 'di skad du* | |[2] *gaṅ skyes bu ni thams cad du khyab pa* | |[3] *gcig ñid yin la de las lha daṅ mi la sogs pa 'gro ba rnam pa sna tshogs kyi lus rnams* (P. 285a5) *'byuṅ bar 'gyur ba yin na* | *ji ltar lus can bźin du mi rtag pa daṅ* | *thams cad du ma khyab pa'i ṅo bor mi 'gyur źe na* | *de la lan gdab par bya ba'i phyir smras pa*|

Notes: 1. *'ga'* (*ego*): *'ba'* P. D. 2. | |: | D. 3. | |: no single or double *śad* (*daṇḍa*) in D.

I have here deviated from Gokhale's translation (1958, p. 173): "/.../ — how is it that he, like any (other) bodied being, is neither evanescent (*anitya*), nor non-pervasive (*asarvatraga*)?".

80 *ghaṭotpattau vināśe vā nākāśasya tadātmatā* /
tadātmatātmano 'pīṣṭā na dehādyudayavyaye //

81 This technique of playing off one school against another school before conducting one's own criticism (i.e. Bhavya's) is also found e.g. in GK and SSS. It is however possible that the objection in MHK 8.11ab is put forth by Bhavya himself, since a similar objection to that stated in the commentary to MHK 8.11 is found in MHK 8.64, in which Bhavya criticizes the oneness of the Self.

82 *ghaṭākāśavad ekasya nānātvaṃ ced abhedataḥ* /
ghaṭabhedena caikatvaṃ sāmyaṃ sarvasya yan matam //

The Vedāntavādin's reply takes the form of an actual syllogism (*prayoga-vākya*): The subject (*dharmin*) "of space" (*ākāśasya*), the inferred property

TJ 8.11 adds:

> The ether within a pot, which is being broken and that in another pot, which is already broken, is not different from each other.[83]

Bhavya states in MHK 8.64 the consequences of a singular (*eka*) Self/space:

> The enjoyer of happiness and suffering may then be liberated when that [Self of another] is liberated, or alternatively, if that [Self] is bound, that [liberated Self must also] be in bondage, or if [one] suffers, that [liberated Self] should [also] be in suffering.[84]

The Vedāntavādin replies in TJ 8.64:[85]

> Although I have determined the support of the elements (*bhūta*), etc., and the oneness (*ekatva*) without distinction between fools (*bāla*) [and the learned /.../], etc.,[86] what harm is done? For I show as an example the "pot-space" [simile] which is accepted by both sides.[87]

By referring to the "pot-space" simile, the Vedāntavādins here defend themselves from the absurd consequences of the notion of a singular Self. If we look at the passage in the *pūrvapakṣa* where the equality (*tulyatā*) of

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(*sādhyadharma*) "oneness" (*ekatva*), and the inferring property (*sādhanadharma*) "because it is not differentiated" (*abhedataḥ*), with the subsidiary cause "through the breaking of pots" (*ghaṭabhedena*). See MHK/TJ 8.68 (p. 123 below).

83 (P. 285b5) | *gcig chag par gyur pa'i nam mkha' daṅ*[1] *bum pa gźan chag*[2] *pa'i nam mkha' khyad par med pa de bźin du bum pa thams cad kyi nam mkha' yaṅ yin la* |
Notes: 1. no single or double *śad* (*daṇḍa*) in P: | D. 2. *chag*: *chags* P.

84 *sukhaduḥkhopabhoktā ca tanmuktau cāpi mucyatām /*
tadbandhe cāpi bandho 'sya tadduḥkhe vāstu duḥkhitaḥ //

85 (P. 298b7) | *gal te 'byuṅ*[1] *la sogs pa'i rten ñid daṅ* | *byis pa la sogs pa'i khyad par med pa gcig pa ñid du bdag gis btags su ziṅ kyaṅ gnod pa ni ci yaṅ med de* | *ji ltar bdag gis phyogs gñi ga la* (P. 298b8) *grags pa'i bum pa'i nam mkha' dpe*[2] *bstan pa yin*[3] *no źe na* |
Notes: 1. *'byuṅ*: *'byuṅ ba* D. 2. *dpe*: *dper* D. 3. *yin*: *bźin* P.

86 See MHK 8.9cd.

87 (Vedānta:) MHK 8.11, cf. GK 3.3; MHK 8.13, cf. GK 3.4-5, PaS 36, 51; MHK 8.12, cf. GK 3.6; MHK 8.13, 39, cf. GK 3.5, 7, PaS 36, 51. (Buddhist:) *Āryasatyadvayāvatāra Sūtra*, see n. 66 above.

the ignorant (*bāla*) and the learned (*paṇḍita*), the outcaste (*caṇḍāla*) and the brahmin (*vipra*) is stated, the argument of TJ 8.64 becomes clearer. MHK/TJ 8.9 states that the equality between the ignorant and the learned, etc., is only real for one who has *experienced* the Self (*puruṣa*). Viewed in this context, the simile is to be read out, according to the Vedāntadarśana, whilst taking the status of the perceiver into consideration.[88] The question as to the oneness and multiplicity of space is, therefore, an epistemological issue.

Bhavya's fundamental criticism of the oneness of the Self is linked to the very notion of intrinsic nature. The Self, in the strict sense of the word, cannot be arranged under, or subordinate to, the device of different epistemological theories since, according to the Vedāntavādins, the Self has the intrinsic nature of cognition (*jñāna*).[89] The Self and the cognition of the Self are therefore not different. The distinction between an individual [mortal] Self (*antarātman*) and a supreme [immortal] Self (*paramātman*) is thus not an epistemological difference, but a difference as to the ontological status of the very Self, according to Bhavya. This would, therefore, conflict with the very concept of "intrinsic nature". If the supreme reality has an intrinsic nature, it cannot have inherent opposite natures such as manifoldness (*nānātva*) and oneness (*ekatva*), bondage (*bandha*) and liberation (*mokṣa*), suffering (*duḥkha*) and happiness (*sukha*). This leads Bhavya to conclude that the supreme reality of the Vedāntavādins is without intrinsic nature and could not, therefore, be a "Self" by definition. The assertion that space has the nature of oneness is, accordingly, not established (*siddha*).[90] Bhavya is, however, well aware that his opponent classifies Self in two ways. MHK 8.23 states:[91]

> The adherent of Vedānta (*Vedāntavādin*) postulates that this Self (*ātman*) appears in two forms: the Self which is bound up with the so-called body (*deha*) and the liberated (*mukta*) Self which rests in the supreme (*parameṣṭhātman*).[92]

88 MHK/TJ 8.9cd.

89 MHK/TJ 8.40, etc.

90 MHK 8.65.

91 *rig byed smra bas bdag de ni | | rnam pa gñis su 'dod byed de |*
| lus źes bya ba bciṅs bdag daṅ | | mchog na gnas pa grol pa'i bdag |
Omitted in the Skt. Ms., but found in the Tibetan version of MHK in the *Peking bsTan-'gyur* (PK) [vol. 96] (No. 5255) *fol. Dza*: 31b3-31b4; P. *fol. Dza*: 289a4; the Tibetan version of MHK in the *sDe-dge bsTan-'gyur* (DK) (No. 3855), *fol. Dza*: 28b3; D. *fol. Dza*: 256a7-256b1.

92 In MHK 8.24, Bhavya seems to have coined (*metri causa*?) the term *pareṣṭhātman* (*mchog na gnas pa grol pa'i bdag*) (P. *fol. Dza*: 289a4-289a5; D.

In order to combine the notion of space/Self having an intrinsic nature with the notion of a "twofold" space/Self,[93] the Vedāntavādins introduce an additional element to the simile. MHK 8.13 states:

> Just as when space in a pot, which is one, becomes covered by such [things] as dust and smoke, it is certainly not the case [that this takes place] likewise for all [pots], so [when] the Self [of a person, being one], possesses pleasure, etc., it is not the case [that the Self of all other persons also comes to possess pleasure, etc.].[94]

TJ 8.13 adds:

> Nor does the absence of any such covering in the case of one pot, cause the absence of the same in the case of all other pots.[95]

This is an answer to a Buddhist objection found in TJ 8.13, repeated by Bhavya in MHK/TJ 8.64, as to the oneness of the Self. The space in a pot covered by dust, smoke, etc. (*rajodhūmādi*), is here likened to the Self which "possesses" pleasure, etc. (*sukhādi*), i.e. an "individual" (*antara*), "mortal" (*martya*) and "bound" (*bandha*) Self. The transformation of the "mortal",[96] "individual" Self (*antarātman*),[97] forming a part of the threefold existence, defined in TJ 8.2 as: "the cumulative result of the process of cause and effect",[98] to the immortal (*amṛta*), supreme Self (*paramātman*),[99] located beyond this relative existence, implies according

fol. Dza: 256b1), which is short for *parameṣṭhātman* found, e.g., in the *Upaniṣads*.

93 I.e. the Self being both one (*eka*) and many (*nānā*), etc., without undergoing any deviation, which would make the Self a non-Self (*anātman*) or something without intrinsic nature (*niḥsvabhāva*).

94 *ghaṭākāśe yathaikasmin rajodhūmādibhir vṛte /*
tadvattā na hi sarveṣāṃ sukhāder na tathātmanaḥ //
Cf. GK 3.5; PaS 36.

95 (P. 286a3) | *gcig bsgribspa daṅ bral bar gyur pas thams cad bsgribs pa daṅ bral ba ma yin pa* (P. 286a4) *de bźin du* |

96 TJ 8.3, 43.

97 MHK/TJ 8.50-53, 71, 98, 101. Bhavya use the term *antarātman* connotating an "individual [mortal] Self". This rare usage of the term *antarātman* is also found, e.g., in the *Manusmṛti* 6.73, 12.13, and in the *Catuḥśataka* 10.1 (see Lang 1986, p. 95 with n. 1). The *Upaniṣads* use it consistently for an "inner/internal Self".

98 (P. 283a4) | *rgyu daṅ 'bras bu'i cha bsags pa ñid kyi khams gsum du*[1] *srid pa'o* | |
Notes: 1. *du*: *na* P.

to the Vedāntavādins not an actual change in the status of the very Self. To the question, "How does pleasure (*sukha*) and pain (*duḥkha*) arise in these individual continua [i.e. streams of consciousness, *saṃtāna*)?"[100] MHK 8.14 therefore replies:

> It is because one is unawakened [to absorption into the immortal *puruṣa*] that someone who does not know the Self collects *karma* and experiences its result which is good or bad, just as one who dreams imagines himself to have [real] experiences.[101]

The Vedāntavādins seem here to regard the question as to the intrinsic nature of the Self as an epistemological issue, avoiding the principal objection that the Self actually changes status and thereby is without intrinsic nature (*niḥsvabhāva*). The Vedāntavādins could therefore legitimately agree with Bhavya in MHK 8.7 that the mortal (*martya*) cannot be regarded as having immortality (*amṛtatva*). However, one has to be awakened (*prabodha*)[102] to become absorbed into the state of the immortal (*amṛtatā*) "Person" (*puruṣa*) in order to realize the true nature of the Self. Bhavya, who does not accept this way of arguing, states in TJ 8.51:

> Because it will not change from the nature of mortality. Therefore, how would it become immortal, since there is no deviation from intrinsic nature.[103]

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99 MHK/TJ 8.50-53.

100 (P. 286a5) | *yaṅ ji ltar 'di dag so so'i rgyud la bde ba daṅ* | *sdug bsṅal 'byuṅ bar 'gyur ba yin źe na* | (TJ 8.13).

101 *aprabodhād anātmajñaḥ svapne bhogābhimānavat* /
cinoti karma bhuṅkte ca tatphalaṃ yac chubhāśubham //

102 MHK 3.291 states in connection with TJ 3.290 (see n. 78 below): "It (i.e. the *dharmakāya*) does not belong to someone who does not have this understanding (*bodha*)". (Translated by Malcolm D. Eckel.)

103 (P. 296b1) | *'chi ba'i ṅo bo las 'gyur pa med pa yin pa'i phyir ji ltar 'chi ba med pa ñid du 'gyur te* | *raṅ gi ṅo bo las ñams pa med pa'i* (P. 296b2) *phyir ro* | |

Cf. MMK 15.1-2, 8; *Triśaraṇasaptati* (TŚS) 12-13 (Sørensen 1986a, pp. 21-22 with n. 12, 13, pp. 65-66); GK 3.21-22, 4.7-8, 29.

Because of the Buddhist influence on GK, especially ch. 4 (see Vetter 1978), it is difficult to attribute the following statement from GK 3.22 to either side of our contracting parties: *svabhāvenāmṛto yasya bhāvo gacchati martyatām* / *kṛtakenāmṛtas tasya kathaṃ sthāsyati niścalaḥ* // "How can he, according to whom a thing which is naturally immortal becomes mortal, maintain that an immortal thing, when it becomes artificial, will remain changeless?" (Bhattacharya 1943, p. 61).

The Self having the properties, according to Bhavya, of simultaneously being one and many, mortal and immortal, etc., would contradict the very notion of intrinsic nature discussed above. The existence (*astitva*) of the Self and its being the cause of the world (*jagatkāraṇatā*) are therefore negated.[104] The Self is as non-existent as the son of a barren woman (*vandhyātanaya*),[105] a skyflower (*khapuṣpa*)[106] or a hare's horn (*śaśa-śṛṅga*).[107]

The intrinsic nature of an entity (*bhāva*) is, according to Bhavya, unoriginatedness (*ajātatā*) and that is, strictly speaking, the "Self" (*ātman*) of all entities.[108] The intrinsic nature or Self of entities is, therefore, emptiness (*śūnyatā*) or absence of intrinsic nature (*niḥsvabhāvatā*). This is the one (*eka*), all-pervasive (*sarvatraga*) and permanent (*nitya*) "nature" of entities.[109] Absence of intrinsic nature is then equal to absence of Self (*nairātmya*) and that, in Bhavya's opinion, is not to be regarded as Self (*ātman*), which would be a logical contradiction (*virodha*).[110]

Before we continue with our analysis of the "pot-space" simile of VTV, we should for the historical reasons given above look into the *Gauḍapādīyakārikā* and its presentation of this simile. The "pot-space" simile in GK begins with an illustration of origination (*jāti*):

> The Self, which can be compared to space, has arisen in the form of individual selves, which can be compared to the space in pots, and in the form of conglomerations, which can be compared to pots, etc. This [famous idea] is an example of origination.[111]

These "individual selves" (*jīva*) are then said to be "merged" into the Self (*ātman*), just as when pots (*ghaṭa*) are destroyed and the "space in pots" (*ghaṭākāśa*) is "merged" into Space (*ākāśa*).[112] The distinction in GK between *ātman* and *jīva*, Space and "space in pots", does not, as was the case in VTV, account for any ontological difference between the two. GK 3.6 explicitly states that there is no difference in Space (*ākāśasya na*

104 MHK/TJ 8.19.

105 MHK/TJ 8.49.

106 MHK/TJ 8.50.

107 TJ 8.67.

108 MHK 8.89.

109 MHK 8.90.

110 MHK 8.100.

111 *ātmā hy ākāśavaj jīvair ghaṭākāśair ivoditaḥ /*
ghaṭādivac ca saṅghātair jātāv etan nidarśanam // (GK 3.3).
On the historical background of this passage, see Vetter 1978, pp. 117-118. Cf. MHK/TJ 8.10; PaS 51.

112 GK 3.4. Cf. MHK/TJ 8.10, 11.

bheda).[113] The "space in pots" / "individual selves" are neither a transformation (*vikāra*),[114] nor a part of Space/Self.[115] *Ātman/ jīva* are one (*eka*) because of non-differentiation (*abheda*).[116] GK, like VTV, solves the problem of intrinsic nature, discussed above, by the device of a relative (*saṃvṛti*) and an absolute (*paramārtha*) theory of knowledge. The latter describes relativity as a dream (*svapna*), projected by the illusion (*māyā*) of the Self.[117] Origination (*jāti*) is therefore only true from a conventional level. Ultimately, according to GK 3.2, there is "self-identity of non-origination" (*ajātisamatā*). Similar to MHK 8.13, GK 3.5 averts the dilemma of a possible deviation from intrinsic nature on the part of the Self by comparing the "bound" or "differentiated" Self, being "related" to pleasure, etc. (*sukhādi*), to a single "pot-space" which is connected to dust, smoke, etc. (*rajodhūmādi*).[118] GK (3.8) uses also the analogy of the sky (*gagana*) appearing to the ignorant (*bāla*) as if covered with impurities, just as the Self appears with impurities to the non-enlightened (*abuddha*).[119] The reason why the Self (*ātman/ jīva*) becomes as if it were "mortal", "bound", "plural", "differentiated", etc., is because it is connected (*yuta*) with, or in the state of attachment (*saṅga*)[120] to, the object. This causes the mind (*citta*), consciousness (*vijñāna*) or knowledge (*jñāna*) to be vibrant (*spandita*), and this in turn brings forth the appearance of duality between subject and object, perceiver and perceptible (*grāhya/grāhaka*).[121] *Citta*,[122] *vijñāna* and *jñāna*[123] are ultimately

113 Cf. MHK 8.11: */. . ./ abhedataḥ / ghaṭabhedena caikatvaṃ sāmyaṃ sarvasya yan matam //* MHK 8.12: */. . ./ mṛdbhedo nāsti kaś cana /.*

114 The concepts of *parināma* and *vivarta* were not consistently used and distinguished until post-Śaṅkara times. On the historical usage of these terms, see Hacker 1953.

115 GK 3.7.

116 GK 3.13.

117 Cf. MHK/TJ 8.14.

118 Cf. MHK/TJ 8.64; MHK 8.65; PaS 36.

119 Cf. TJ 8.39; PaS 35. The example of space covered by impurity may have been taken from the *Madhyāntavibhāga*, to which there are several allusions in GK.

120 See the definition of "*Vedānta*" and "*Vedāntavādin*" (p. 101, n. 28 above). Bhavya, however, maintains that the Vedāntavādins are attached to a position (*pakṣa*) or an extreme (*anta*).

121 See GK 4.47-48, 72. Cf. the *Yogasūtra* (YS), from which MHK/TJ seems to draw some information regarding "supernormal powers" (*siddhi*) (see MHK 8.8; Gokhale 1958, p. 172, n. 27). YS states that [the Self] takes the same form as the activity [of the mind (*citta*)] (YS1.4). This does not, however, occur in the state of *yoga*, defined in YS 1.2 as "the suppression of the activity of the mind (*yogaś cittavṛttinirodhaḥ*), i.e. when the Perceiver (*draṣṭṛ*) or the Self rests in itself (YS 1.3).

122 See e.g. GK 4.72.

123 See e.g. GK 4.96.

non-attached due to the absence of objects to be cognized (*jñeya*).[124]
Resuming the discussion of the "pot-space" simile of VTV, Bhavya proceeds with his critical examination (*parīkṣā*) through an analysis of the very concept of "space" (*ākāśa*), since this was the correlate of the Self (*ātman*) in the "pot-space" simile (*ghaṭākāśadṛṣṭānta*). Bhavya states in TJ 8.65 that the example of space which was brought forward is completely unestablished,[125] because: "

> That object which is empty of substance, is relative space. There is movement for those who move; there is room for those demanding room.[126]

TJ 8.66 states:

> In the view of the Sautrāntikas, we accept on the conventional level (*saṃvṛtyā*) that space is the mere absence of a resistant substance (*sapratigha-dravyābhāvamātra*).[127] Because that [space] is neither a substance (*dravya*) nor permanent (*nitya*), entities (*bhāva*) that are mobile move and perform actions of going and coming, etc., in it, and in that same space those who desire room (*avakāśa*) acquire room. Therefore, that is designated "space" (*ākāśa*).[128]

Bhavya states further in TJ 8.66 that since space is dependent on the non-existence of substance (*dravya*), it has no definite status (*niyama*). Space does not exist and continue as a substance and a support (*ādhāra*)[129] with intrinsic nature (*svabhāva*), since it, strictly speaking, has the nature of a non-existent Self. To this the Vedāntavādins object:

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124 See e.g. GK 3.32, 4.1.

125 (P. 299a1) | *nam mkha'i dpe bstan pa de ni śin tu ma grub pa yin no* |

126 MHK 8.66: *mukto dravyasya yo bhāvas tad ākāśaṃ hi sāṃvṛtam / gatir gatimatāṃ tatra so 'vakāśo 'vakāśināṃ //*

127 Cf. the *Abhidharmakośabhāṣya* 2.55d.

128 (P. 299a2) | *mdo sde pa'i lta ba'i rjes su 'braṅs nas thogs pa daṅ bcas pa'i rdzas kyi dṅos po med pa* (P. 299a3) *tsam nam mkha'o źes bdag gcig kun rdzob tu khas blaṅs pa yin pas gaṅ gi phyir de ni rdzas kyaṅ ma yin* | *rtag pa yaṅ ma yin pas de'i phyir 'gro ba daṅ ldan pa rnams de la 'gro ba daṅ 'oṅ ba la sogs pa'i*[1] *bya ba* (P. 299a4) *yaṅ 'jug par byed la*| *de ñid la skabs 'dod pa rnams kyis kyaṅ skabs thob par 'gyur pas*[2] *des na nam mkha' źes brjod pa yin te* |
Notes: 1. *pa'i*: *pha'i* P. 2. *pas*: *bas* D.

129 Cf. MHK/TJ 8.60.

> If in that way space (*ākāśa*) is totally non-existent,[130] why has your teacher, the Buddha, taught that [space] is the support of wind (*vāyu*)? Does not the following passage occur? 'Oh Gautama, on what is earth (*pṛthivī*) supported? Oh Brahmin, earth is supported on water (*ap*). On what is water supported? It is supported on wind (*vāyu*). On what is wind supported? Wind is supported on space (*ākāśa*)'. [Reply:] From the same *sūtra*, having ascertained definitely (*avadhārya*), it is taught: 'Oh Gautama, on what is space (*ākāśa*) supported? Oh Brahmin, now you are going too far! It is difficult to be able to understand the limit of the question, [since] if space is formless (*arūpya*), invisible (**anidarśana*) and non-obstructing (*apratigha*), on what is it [then] supported?'.[131]

This apparently unknown *sūtra*-passage seems to recur frequently in the polemics between Buddhist and Vedāntic philosophers. It is quoted in the *Sphuṭārthāvyākhyā* of Yaśomitra, alluded to in the *Brahmasūtrabhāṣya* of Śaṅkara, the *Ratnagotravibhāga,* and in the *Vākyapadīya* of Bhartṛhari.[132] VP 3.7.151 (III.407) states:

130 The *Upaniṣads* as well as VP, BS, GK, PaS, BS-bhāṣya by Śaṅkara, etc., regard space (*ākāśa*) as a positive entity.

131 (P. 299a8) | *gal te 'di ltar nam mkha' śin tu med pa źig yin na* | *ci'i phyir khyod kyi ston pa saṅs rgyas gyis*[1] *de rluṅ gi brten*[2] *yin par*[3] *bstan*[4] | (P. 299b1) *ji*[5] *ltar*[6] *źe na* | *gau ta ma sa ci la brten te* |[7] *gnas źes gsol pa*[8] *daṅ* | *bram ze sa ni chu la brten te gnas so* | | *chu ci la brten chu ni rluṅ la brten to*[9] | | *rluṅ ci la brten rluṅ ni nam mkha' la brten to* | |[10] *źes 'byun* (P. 299b2) *ba ma yin nam źe na* | *mdo de ñid las ṅes par byas nas bstan pa yin te* | *gau ta ma nam mkha' ci la brten źes gsol pa daṅ* | *bram ze śin tu 'da' bar byed de dris pa'i mtha' rtogs par nus par dka'o* | (P. 299b3) *nam mkha' ni gzugs med pa* | *bstan du med pa* | *thogs pa med ba*[11] *yin na de ci źig la brten par 'gyur* |

Notes: 1. *gyis*: *kyis* P. 2. *brten*: *rten* D. 3. *par*: *bar* D. 4. *bstan*: *brten* D. 5. *ji*: *ci* P. 6. *ltar*: *lta* D. 7. | : no single or double *śad* (*daṇḍa*) in D. 8. *pa*: *ba* P. 9. *brten to*: *to* P. 10. | | : no single or double *śad* (*daṇḍa*) in D. 11. *ba*: *pa* D.

132 Yaśomitra's *Sphuṭārthāvyākhyā ad* AK 1.5 states: *pṛthivī bho gautama kutra pratiṣṭhitā / pṛthivī brāhmaṇa abmaṇḍale pratiṣṭhitā / abmaṇḍalaṃ bho gautama kutra pratiṣṭhitam / vāyau pratiṣṭhitam / vāyur bho gautama kutra pratiṣṭhitaḥ / ākāśe pratiṣṭhitaḥ / ākāśaṃ bho gautama kutra pratiṣṭhitam / atisarasi mahābrāhmaṇa atisarasi mahābrāhmaṇa / ākāśaṃ brāhmaṇa apratiṣṭhitam anālambanam iti vistaraḥ /*

Cf. Śaṅkara's *Brahmasūtrabhāṣya ad* 2.2.24: *pṛthivī bhagavaḥ kiṃ saṃniśrayā ity asya praśnasya prativacanaṃ bhavati vāyur ākāśasaṃ niśrayaḥ iti / tadākāśasyāvastutvena samañjasaṃ syāt / tasmād anya*

> Because it establishes differentiation as to place, space — having the capacity of a "support" — is, according to some, regarded as the primordial [support] of all conjunctions [like earth, etc.].[133]

Bhavya concludes in TJ 8.66:

> Therefore there is not any substance (*dravya*) called space (*ākāśa*), and since space was given as an example of a Self (*ātman*) which is said to be permanent (*nitya*), all-pervasive (*sarvatraga*) and single (*eka*), it is in fact dissimilar to that, and thus it is not established for the other (i.e. for the Vedāntavādin).[134]

Bhavya continues in MHK 8.67:

> Space therefore is not an unblocking [substance] and it is not an [active] provider of room. When this reason is given by the opponent regarding its [i.e. space's] existence, it should not be accepted as a valid reason.[135]

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yuktam ākāśasyāvastutvam / Cf. also the *Ratnagotravibhāga* I. 55 and prose (Ed. Johnston, p. 44, 10, and n. 6, p. 44).

On references to *a-nidassana* ("which cannot be characterized"/"invisible") in relation to *vijñāna, ākāśa* and *nirvāṇa,* see *A Critical Pāli Dictionary* (CPD) I, p. 173. See also Norman 1987, pp. 23-25.

133 *ākāśam eva keṣāṃ cid deśabhedaprakalpanāt /*
ādhāraśaktiḥ prathamā sarvasaṃyogināṃ matā //

134 (P. 299b5) | *des na nam mkha' źes bya ba ba'i rdzas ni cuṅ źig kyaṅ yod pa ma yin no*[1] *gaṅ gi phyir 'di ni rtag pa*[2] *daṅ*[3] *thams cad la khyab pa daṅ* | [4] *gcig pu ñid do źes bya ba'i bdag gi dper bstan pa daṅ chos mthun pa ñid du* (P. 299b6) *'gyur ba ma yin pas 'di ltar gźan la ma grub pa ñid yin no* | |

Notes: 1. No single or double *śad* (*daṇḍa*) in P: | | D. 2. *pa*: *ba* P. 3. No single or double *śad* (*daṇḍa*) in P: | D. 4. | : no single or double *śad* (*daṇḍa*) in D.

135 *nāto 'nāvṛtir ākāśaṃ nāvakāśasya dātṛ ca /*
taddhetūktau tadastitve hetos tu syād asiddhatā //

On the usage of a simile (*dṛṣṭānta*) as a logical reason (*hetu*), see GK 4.20; *Nyāyasūtra* (NS) 1.1.34-37, 5.1.11.

TJ 8.67 states:

> The Vaibhāṣikas maintain that space (*ākāśa*) has the characteristic of non-obstruction (*anāvṛti*) and has the result that it provides room (*avakāśa*),[136] but that does not exist for me because space is not a substance possessing existence (*dravyasat*).[137] Objection: Space indeed exists, because it has the characteristic of non-obstruction (*anāvṛti*) and because it has the result of making room (*avakāśa*). /. . ./ [Answer:] These reasons mentioned here are purely unestablished for others. We maintain that space (*ākāśa*) is just devoid of the nature of a substance (*dravya*).[138] Moreover, as to the statement [of the opponent] that the Self (*ātman*) is a permanent (*nitya*) entity (bhāva) and is all pervasive (*sarvatraga*) and is the support (*ādhāra*) of all entities (*bhāva*) like space,[139] as to that, in order to adduce a disproof differently from that, the *ācārya*[140] [i.e. Bhavya] says the following:[141]

MHK 8.68 states:

> Again, space cannot be regarded as an entity, since it does not stand in relation to a cause. It is, therefore, not

136 Cf. AK 1.5d: *tatrākāśam anāvṛtiḥ /*

137 See, e.g., AK 5.25-27.

138 Cf. TJ 8.66.

139 TJ 8.66.

140 Bhavya refers here to himself as *ācārya*. See (II), p. 21, n. 1.

141 (P. 299b7) | *nam mkha' ni sgrib pa med pa'i mtshan ñid can yin la* | *skabs sbyin par byed pa źes bya ba ni de'i 'bras bu can yin no źes bye brag tu smra bas 'dod* |[1] *ṅa la de yaṅ yod pa ma yin te* | *nam mkha' ni rdzas yod* (P. 299b8) *pa daṅ ldan pa ma yin pa'i phyir ro* | | *gal te yaṅ nam mkha' ni yod de* | *sgrib pa med pa'i mtshan*[2] *ñid can yin pa'i phyir ram* | *skabs sbyin par byed pa'i 'bras bu can yin pa'i phyir ro* | | . . . (P. 300a2) | | *de skad smras pa'i gtan tshigs 'di dag ni gźan la ma grub pa ñid yin te* | *nam mkha' ni rdzas*[3] *kyi dṅos po daṅ bral ba tsam ñid yin par kho bos khas blaṅs pa'i phyir ro* | | *gźan* (P. 300a3) *yaṅ dṅos po rtag pa thams cad la khyab pa'i bdag dṅos po thams cad kyi rten du gyur pa nam mkha' daṅ 'dra ba yin no źes smras pa de la* | *de las gźan du rtog ge'i gnod pa ñe bar dgod*[4] *pa'i sgo nas slob dpon* (P. 300a4) *gyis smras pa* |

Notes: 1. | : no single or double *śad* (*daṇḍa*) in D. 2. *mtshan*: *mchan* D. 3. No single or double *śad* (*daṇḍa*) in P: | D. 4. *dgod*: *dgos* P.

> one, [but inexisting], just as [the unreal] son of a barren woman [is not one].[142]

TJ 8.68 explains:

> The subject (*dharmin*) is 'space', the property [which is to be proved] (*sādhyadharma*) of [the subject in the thesis] is 'that is not an entity'. The logical reason (*hetu*) is 'because it is not originated (*anupapannāt*)[143] from a cause (*hetu*)'. A synonymous way of expressing this is that it originates having been produced from causes and conditions (*hetupratyaya*). Space has not originated from a productive cause (*janakahetu*). How can that which has no cause (*hetu*) be an entity (*bhāva*)? [It is, therefore, unreal] like the son of a barren woman (*vandhyātanaya*).[144]

In order to cope with the grand edifice of Buddhist dogma handed down and codified in the Abhidharma, and to substantiate his criticism of the Vedāntadarśana, Bhavya refers to the views of the Sautrāntikas [145] and the Vaibhāṣikas.[146]

In TJ 8.67, the Vedāntavādin's view on space is linked to that of the Vaibhāṣikas, who considered space to be an unconditioned (*asaṃskṛta*) *dharma*[147] in contrast to empirical entities (*bhāva*) which are only

142 *nāpi hetvanupādānān ākāśaṃ bhāva iṣyate /*
vandhyātanayavan nāpi tad ekam ata eva hi //

143 *ñe bar ma byuṅ ba'i* phyir suggests *anupapannāt* and not *anupādānāt* (≈ *ñe ba ma blaṅ ba'i phyir*) as in MHK 8.68.

144 (P.300a4) | | *nam mkha' źes bya ba ni chos can no* | | *de ni*[1] *dṅos po ma yin te źes* (P. 300a5) *bya ba ni de'i chos so* | | *rgyu las ñe bar ma byuṅ ba'i phyir źes bya ba ni gtan tshigs so* | | *'byuṅ bar 'gyur bas na dṅos po ste* | |[2] *rgyu daṅ rkyen las bskyed nas 'byuṅ ba źes bya ba'i tha tshig go* | |[3] *nam mkha' ni skyed* (P.300a6) *par byed pa'i rgyu 'ga' las kyaṅ byuṅ ba ma yin pas* | *rgyu daṅ ldan pa ma yin pa 'di dṅos por lta ga la 'gyur te* | *mo gśam gyi bu bźin no* | |

Notes: 1. *de ni*: *de* D. 2. | | : | D. 3. | | : | P.

145 TJ 8.66.

146 TJ 8.67.

147 See AK 1.5a-c. Bhavya refers to the major text (*grantha*) of the Vaibhāṣikas in TJ 3.128. From the enumeration of *asaṃskṛta dharmas* found in MHK 3.129cd: *asaṃskṛtā nirodhau dvāv ākāśaṃ tathatā tathā //*, it is clear that Bhavya does not rely upon the Sarvāstivāda teaching as reported in the AK by Vasubandhu. Cf. the **Karatalaratna* on *ākāśa*, etc. (See La Vallée Poussin 1933, pp. 105-

nominally existent (*prajñaptisat*). Space is, however, considered as a substance possessing existence (*dravyasat*) and intrinsic nature (*svabhāva*).[148] Space (*ākāśa*), as an existing substance (*dravyasat*), is therefore considered by the Vaibhāṣikas to be unblocked (*anāvṛta*) and an [active] provider (*dātṛ*) of room (*avakāśa*).[149]

Even if the existence of a relationship between the Vaibhāṣikas and the Vedāntavādins may be severely questioned from a historical or philosophical point of view, Bhavya seems to motivate his comparison and criticism of space/Self by taking recourse to his main point of comparison: The notion that space as well as the Self exists by virtue of intrinsic nature (*svabhāva*).

In order to further clarify Bhavya's criterion of judgement, we may look into the rather complex picture of space given in both the unsystematic and systematic texts of early Vedānta philosophy. The Vedic Upaniṣads contain propositions concerning space as an element (*bhūta*), as well as an ultimate principle from which everything arises.[150] From Āryadeva's (?) *T'i p'o p'u sa shih lang chia ching chung wai tao hsiao sheng nieh pan lun* ("Treatise on the Explanation of *Nirvāṇa* by Heterodox and Hīnayāna Teachers in the *Laṅkāvatārasūtra*") there even seems to have existed an "*ākāśa*-school":

> On demande: Quels sont les hérétiques qui soutiennent que l'espace (*diç* /.../) s'appelle le *nirvāṇa*? On répond: Les maîtres de la deuxième école hérétique, celle de l'espace, qui disent: Au commencement (*ādau* /.../) naquit l'espace; de l'espace naquit l'homme cosmique; de cet homme naquirent le ciel et la terre.[151] Quand le ciel et la terre se dissolvent et rentrent dans le lieu de cet (espace), cela s'appelle le *nirvāṇa*. C'est pour cela que les maîtres de l'école de l'espace disent que l'espace est éternel et qu'il s'appelle le *nirvāṇa*.[152]

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116).

148 See, e.g., AK 5.25, 6.4. The intentionality of consciousness (*vijñāna*) expressed for example in AK 5.25 (*sati viṣaye vijñānaṃ pravartate nāsati* / "consciousness occurs [only] if the object exists, not if it does not exist"), along with the notion of the intentional object's *a priori* existence, may explain the Vaibhāṣika position.

149 TJ 8.67. See AK 1.5d: *tatrākāśam anāvṛtiḥ*.

150 On space (*ākāśa*) as an element (*bhūta*), see the *Chāndogya Upaniṣad* (Chānd.Up.) 1.9.1; *Taittirīya Upaniṣad* (Taitt.Up.) 2.1.1.

151 See the *Ṛgveda* 10.90 (*puruṣasūkta*), quoted by Tucci 1926, p. 21, n. 1.

152 Tucci 1926, pp. 20-21. See also Nakamura 1983, p. 168 with n. 17, p. 178; Lang

Furthermore, we find passages in, e.g., the *Chāndogya Upaniṣad* identifying space with the Self (*ātman*).[153] The very same Upaniṣad states explicitly, however, that the ultimate principle is that which is within space.[154] This would be in agreement with the *Bṛhadāraṇyaka Upaniṣad,* e.g., which contains passages against a confusion of space and Brahman as well as propositions as to the symbolical function of space.[155] As far as the systematical treatises of early Vedānta philosophy are concerned, i.e. BS, VP, GK and PaS, space, being a positive entity, is used consistently as a symbolic representation of their respective supreme reality.[156]

Even though these textual passages express opposing doctrines, Bhavya would have been able to synthesize these by means of his yardstick of comparison: Space as an entity possessing existence. This approach of Bhavya is also instrumental in denying the Vedānta notion of a Self in VTV by referring to the *Vaiśeṣikatattvaviniścaya* (ch. 7) and the *Sāṃkhya-tattvāvatāra* (ch. 6) of MHK/TJ.[157] The synthesis and criticism of these Brahmanical systems, including the Vedāntadarśana of VTV, is restricted to the same kind of methodology. The fundamental differences between Vaiśeṣika, Sāṃkhya and Vedānta philosophy are no obstacle to Bhavya's criticism, since his focus is only on the idea of the Self as something which possesses existence and intrinsic nature. By referring to the Vaibhāṣikas and the Sautrāntikas, Bhavya demonstrates his firm ideological affiliation with Buddhist tradition (*āgama*) when, as a true Buddhist, he applies his reason (*yukti*)[158] to Vedānta philosophy. Whereas the overall Madhyamaka critique of the Vaibhāṣika doctrine is used by Bhavya to reject the notion of space and Self held by the Vedāntadarśana, the reference to the Sautrāntika system is meant to consolidate his own view of space.

As we have seen, Bhavya agrees conventionally (*saṃvṛtitaḥ*) with the Sautrāntika view on space as the mere absence of a resistant substance (*sapratighadravyābhāvamātra*).[159] The Sautrāntikas refuted the doctrine of unconditioned (*asaṃskṛta*) *dharmas* postulated by the Vaibhāṣikas:

1986, p. 10 with n. 17, p. 15 with n. 30.

153 Chānd.Up 3.14.2: *ākāśātman.*

154 Chānd.Up 8.1.1. Cf. 8.14.1: *te yad antarā.* See also passages where *ātman* (*Bṛhadāraṇyaka Upaniṣad,* Bṛh.Up., 4.4.22) and *puruṣa* (Bṛh.Up. 2.1.17; Chānd.Up. 3.12.7-9; Taitt.Up. 1.6.1) is said to be in the space (*ākāśe*) in the heart (*hṛdaye*).

155 Bṛh.Up. 2.1.5, 3.7.12, 3.8.11, 4.4.17-20.

156 BS 1.1.22 (*ākāśas talliṅgāt*), 1.3.14, 1.3.41, 2.2.24 (*ākāśe cāviśeṣāt*); VP 3.7.112 (III.368); GK 3.3, 6, 9,12; 4.1.

157 TJ 8.18; MHK/TJ 8.19.

158 On *āgama* and *yukti* in the works of Bhavya, see Iida 1966.

159 See TJ 8.66; AK 2.55d.

> Le Sautrāntika affirme que l'inconditionné, le triple inconditionné (1.5b), n'est pas reél.[160]

They considered these *dharmas*, therefore, as being without intrinsic nature (*niḥsvabhāva*):

> Le Sautrāntika s'autorise encore de l'Abhidharma où nous lisons: 'Quels sont les *dharmas avastuka*? — Les inconditionnés — Le terme *avastuka* signifie 'irréel', 'sans nature propre'.[161]

Space (*ākāśa*) is therefore, according to Bhavya and the Sautrāntikas, a purely analytical concept explaining the absence of something real (*dravya*), which ultimately (*paramārthataḥ*) does not exist either. Without implying any historical connections between Bhavya's summary of Vedānta and the VP, a proposition diametrically opposite to that of Bhavya and the Sautrāntikas is found in VP 3.7.112 (III.368):

> Just as the non-real absence of space manifests itself as form, in the same way, the non-real absence of form [manifests itself as] the support of space.[162]

Bhavya's view on space is not unique in the Madhyamaka tradition. Nāgārjuna states for instance in the *Ratnāvalī* 1.99ab:

> Space is a mere designation because it is a mere absence of form.[163]

Āryadeva writes in his *Śataka* 9.3 on the same line of reasoning as Bhavya:

> Là où il n'y a pas de matière (*rūpa*), rien ne s'oppose à la naissance de *dharmas* matériels: l'absence de matière reçoit le nom *d'ākāśa,* parce que les choses y brillent fortement (*bhṛśam asyāntaḥ kāśante bhāvāḥ*). Le Vaibhāṣikas supposent dans l'Abhidharmaśāstra que *l'ākāśa* est une réalité (*vastu*), ne voyant pas que

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160 AK-*bhāṣya ad* 2.55d, *op. cit.* La Vallée Poussin 1971, Vol. 1, p. 278.

161 AK-*bhāṣya ad* 2.55d, *op. cit.* La Vallée Poussin *ibid.*, p. 286.

162 *yathaivākāśanāstitvam asan mūrtinirūpitam /*
tathaiva mūrtināstitvam asad ākāśaniśrayam //

163 *rūpasyābhāvamātratvād ākāśaṃ nāmamātrakam /*

> l'Ecriture se borne à donner un nom à une irréalité, à un pur néant (*avastusato kiṃcanasya*).[164]

The fact that such Mādhyamika masters as Nāgārjuna, Āryadeva and Bhavya criticize the very concept of "space" as a designation for something which is said to possess existence and intrinsic nature does not, however, prevent them from using space as a symbolic representation of their own fundamental reality (*tattva*),[165] since that was regarded as empty (*śūnya*), without intrinsic nature (*niḥsvabhāva*), etc. Nāgārjuna therefore states in his *Acintyastava* 37-39:

> [That which] has transcended the duality of being and non-being without, however, having transcended anything at all; that which is not knowledge or knowable, not existent nor non-existent, not one nor many, not both nor neither; [that which is] without foundation, unmanifest, inconceivable, incomparable; that which arises not, disappears not, is not to be annihilated and is not permanent, that is [Reality] which is like space [and] not within the range of words [or] knowledge (*akṣarajñāna*).[166]

The Self (*ātman*) as a Substance (*dravya*)

MHK 8.59 states:

> If the Self were a substance, it would not be all-pervasive due to substantiality — as with a pot — nor could it be eternal. How could [then] the whole world be full of it?[167]

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164 *Op. cit.* La Vallée Poussin *ibid.*, p. 8, n. 3. For further references on the refutation of space (*ākāśa*), see Lang 1986, p. 89, n. 5.

165 See also Nāgārjuna's *Bodhicittavivaraṇa* (vv. 46, 47, 51) and Bhavya's MHK 3.11, 28, 275, etc.

166 *bhāvābhāvadvayātītam anatītaṃ ca kutra cit / na ca jñānaṃ na ca jñeyaṃ na cāsti na ca nāsti yat // yan na caikaṃ na cānekaṃ nobhayaṃ na ca nobhayam / anālayam athāvyaktam acintyam anidarśanam // yan nodeti na ca vyeti nocchedi na ca śāśvatam / tad ākāśapratīkāśaṃ nākṣarajñāna-gocaram //* (Ed. and tr. by Lindtner 1982b, pp. 153-154).

167 *dravyaṃ yadi bhaved ātmā dravyatvāt sarvago na saḥ /*
ghaṭavan nāpi nityaḥ syāt tena pūrṇaṃ kuto jagat //
See the fourth derivation of "*puruṣa*" (TJ 8.2) : "He fills up" (Gokhale 1958 p. 168 with n. 10). Cf. *Īśa Upaniṣad* (Ī.Up.) 6; BhG. 6.29-30; MHK 8.4ab;

In the light of the preceding critique stated by Bhavya in connection with the "pot-space" simile, the hypothetical assertion that the Self is a substance simply means that the Self is an object existing by virtue of intrinsic nature. We cannot, however, exclude the possibility that Bhavya actually refers to some early Vedānta text or school which considered the Self to be a substance.

The following fragments[168] ascribed to Bhartṛprapañca and the passage from VP given below are the only passages of pre-Śaṅkara Vedānta philosophy known to the present author which explicitly declare the Self (*ātman*) to be a substance (*vastu/dravya*):

> On this some say: The Self is a substance that by itself has oneness and multiplicity, just as a cow is one as the substance cow, but its features, the dewlap, etc., are different from [one cow to] another.[169]
>
> Just as there exists oneness and multiplicity in gross [substances], so we can infer that there exists oneness and multiplicity in indivisible formless substances.[170]

The difference between Bhartṛprapañca's position and that of the Vedāntadarśana as presented in VTV is that whereas the former considers oneness as well as multiplicity as the intrinsic nature of the Self, the latter maintains the Self to be one by intrinsic nature; oneness and multiplicity is connected to different epistemological perspectives. Therefore, in reply to an objection from Bhavya that his opponent ascribes opposed characteristics to the Self, such as it being subtle (*sūkṣma*) and great (*maha*), one (*eka*) and many (*nānā*), with and without form (*rūpa*), the Vedāntavādin states in TJ 8.54:

Ṛgveda 10.90.2; Ś.Up. 3.15; Ī.Up. 1.5; BhG. 13.15, referred to by Gokhale 1958, p. 170, n. 16.

168 See Śaṅkara's *bhāṣya ad* Bṛh.Up. 2.3.6; 4.3.30. Sureśvara's *Vārttika* as well as Ānandajñāna's *Ṭīkā ad* Śaṅkara's *Bhāṣya ad* Bṛh.Up. give also numerous references to Bhartṛprapañca.

169 *atra ke cid vyācakṣate ātmavastunaḥ svata evaikatvaṃ nānātvaṃ ca / yathā gor godravyatayaikatvaṃ sāsnādīnāṃ dharmāṇāṃ parasparato bhedaḥ /*

170 *yathā sthūleṣv ekatvaṃ nānātvaṃ ca tathā niravayaveṣv amūrtavastuṣv ekatvaṃ nānātvaṃ cānumeyam /*

> Likewise also for the Self (*ātman*), those who do not see reality see it in many forms: Some say it is all pervasive (*sarvatraga*), some say that it is just the extent of the body (*deha*), while others again think it has just the nature of an atom (*paramāṇu*).[171] Like the elephant's intrinsic nature (*svabhāva*), it is just one (*eka*), but like the major and minor limbs (*aṅga/pratyaṅga*) of the elephant (*hastin*), it is also many.[172]

Bhavya replies in MHK 8.55:

> On the basis of the example of the elephant, multiformity of a single [nature] is not logical, since the trunk is not considered to be the elephant and [since] oneness does not [apply] to the trunk, etc.[173]

The usage of the concept of "substance" as a designation of ultimate reality is not exclusive to Brahmanical philosophy. Nāgārjuna and others also use this device, though in a completely different way. Using the same reasoning as that used in the case of space, substance could also be accurately used as a designation for the Mādhyamika's ultimate reality, since it too is without intrinsic nature (*niḥsvabhāva*).[174] The *Acintyastava* 45ab runs:

> It is also termed (*iti*) own-being, nature,
> truth, substance, the real [and the] true.[175]

171 Cf. CŚ 10.18: | *la lar kun tu soṅ bar mthoṅ* | *la lar skyes bu lus tsam źig* | | *la lar rdul tsam źig mthoṅ ste* | *śes rab can gyis med par mthoṅ* | "Some see that [self] as ubiquitous; some see it as the size of a person's body; and some see it as minute in size. Someone endowed with insight (*prajñā*) sees it as non-existent." See Lang 1986, pp. 100-101 with n. 18.

172 (P. 297a2) | | *de bźin du bdag la yaṅ de kho na ñid ma mthoṅ ba rnams kyis*[1] *rnam pa du ma źig tu lta bar byed de*[2] | *kha cig gis ni kun la khyab par ro* | | *gźan dag gis ni* (P. 297a3) *lus kyi tshad tsam du'o* | | *yaṅ gźan dag gis phra rab kyi ṅo bo tsam yin no sñam du sems te* | *glaṅ po'i raṅ gi ṅo bo bźin du gcig ñid kyaṅ yin la*[3] *yan lag daṅ ñiṅ lag bźin du du ma ñid kyaṅ yiṅ no źe na* |

Notes: 1. kyis: kyi P. 2. de: do P. 3. No single or double *śad* (*daṇḍa*) in P: | D.

173 *na yuktā hastidṛṣṭāntād ekasyānekarūpatā /*
karaḥ karī yato neṣṭaḥ karādīnāṃ na caikatā //

Cf. TJ 8.56; MHK 8.57 where the example of a *palāśa*-tree is discussed.

174 On relative substance (*dravya*), see *Acintyastava* (ACS) 49 (Lindtner 1982b, p. 157 with n. 49); *Ratnāvalī* 5.14 (here "material goods").

The following interesting passage from the *Vākyapadīya* 3.2.1 (III.111) seems almost to be modelled on the ACS.

> Regarding the concept of substance, its synonyms are [according to some schools]: Self, the Real, intrinsic nature, body and reality, and it has been declared eternal.[176]

In the *Prakīrṇakaprakāśa* by Helārāja,[177] it is said that the Advaitavādins call this ultimate substance (*pāramārthikadravya*)[178] "Self" (*ātman*), whereas some other school [probably some Ābhidhārmika] maintains that it is the "own-characteristic" (*svalakṣaṇa*) which is the ultimate substance. The Sattādvaitavādins equate substance with "existence" or "being" (*sattā*), which is claimed to be the intrinsic nature of things (*svo bhāvaḥ*), whereas some other school again [perhaps a Sāṃkhya school] holds that the body (*śarīra*) or primordial matter (*prakṛti*) is the ultimate substance. The Cārvākas say that the four elements, air (*vāyu*), fire (*tejas*), water (*ap*) and earth (*pṛthivī*) constitute that ultimate substance, which they term "Reality" (*tattva*).

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175 *svabhāvaḥ prakṛtis tattvaṃ dravyaṃ vastu sad ity api /* (quoted from Lindtner 1982, pp. 154-155). Cf. TŚS 12-13 (Sørensen 1986a, pp. 21-22 with n. 12-13, pp. 65-66).

176 *Ad* VP 3.2.1 (III.111).

177 *ātmā vastu svabhāvaś ca śarīraṃ tattvam ity api /*
dravyam ity asya paryāyās tac ca nityam iti smṛtam //

178 Bhartṛhari defines conventional substance (*sāṃvyayahārikadravya*) in VP 3.4.3 (III. 219).

Appendix

The Tibetan Text of the Vedāntatattvaviniścaya Chapter of Bhavya's Madhyamakahṛdayakārikā

Rig byed kyi mtha' rgyur smra ba'i de kho na ñid la 'jug pa dbu ma'i sñiṅ po'i tshig le'ur byas pa

Critically edited

by

Per K. Sørensen

Sigla

Ms The photocopies of VTV preserved in the Sanskrit Manuscript Collection of the China Library of Nationalities (Zhongguo Minzu Tushuguan), Beijing, China.

NK The Tibetan version of MHK in the *sNar-thaṅ bsTan-'gyur* (No. 3246) (fol. : *Dza* 27b5-31a4)

N The Tibetan version of TJ in the *sNar-thaṅ bsTan-'gyur* (No. 3246) (fol. : *Dza* 270b4-293a3)

PK The Tibetan version of MHK in the *Peking bsTan-'gyur* [Vol. 96]. (No. 5255) (fol. : *Dza* 30b7-34a8)

P The Tibetan version of TJ in the *Peking bsTan-'gyur* [Vol. 96]. (No. 5255) (fol. : *Dza* 282b6-306a2)

DK The Tibetan version of MHK in the *sDe-dge bsTan-'gyur* (No. 3855) (fol. : *Dza* 27b5-31a7)

D The Tibetan version of TJ in the *sDe-dge bsTan-'gyur* (No. 3855) (fol. : *Dza* 251a1-271a2)

CK The Tibetan version of MHK in the *Co-ne bsTan-'gyur* (fol. : *Dza* 27b5-31a7)

C The Tibetan version of TJ in the *Co-ne bsTan-'gyur* (fol. : *Dza* 251a1-271a2)

In the *sNar-thaṅ* recension, graphical contractions such as *namkha'* for *nam mkha',* *rigso* for *rig so,* *'gyuro* for *'gyur ro,* *bźino* for *bźin no,* etc., have all been tacitly normalized.

1. | rig byed mthar smra smras pa ni |
| 'dus byas stoṅ par smra ba yi |
| phyi rol pa la bdag rig dkon |
| bdag sdaṅ thar pa ga la yod |

2. | mun pa las gźan skyes bu ni |
| chen por gyur pa ñi ma'i 'od |
| dbaṅ phyug chen po bdag de ñid |
| mkhas pas śes na 'chi med 'gyur |

3. | byed po dbaṅ phyug gser mdog tu |
| gaṅ źig mthoṅ źiṅ lta ba de |
| sdig daṅ bsod ñams las 'das nas |
| mchog tu źi ba thob par 'gyur |

4. | byuṅ gyur byuṅ daṅ 'byuṅ ba dag
| thams cad skyes bu yin [PK 31a] 'dod de |
| de ni phyi naṅ riṅ ba daṅ |
| de ni ñe daṅ de las byed |

5. | srid pa sna tshogs de las skyes |
| dar gyi srin bu'i [NK 28a1] skud pa bźin |
| mkhas pa de yi char thim pa |
| yaṅ srid len par mi 'gyur ro |

1d sdaṅ: daṅ NK, PK
2a bu: bus D, C
2b pa: ba P
3a po: pa CK, C
3b źig: gis NK, PK, DK, CK; lta: blta NK, PK, DK, CK
4a 'byuṅ: byuṅ N, P
4d ñe: ñid CK; de: des PK
5b srin: srid PK
5c de yi: de'i NK, N, PK, P

6. | 'chi [DK 28a1] bcas rnams la bdud rtsi [CK 28a1] med |
| me la graṅ ba ji bźin no |
| des na bdud rtsi skyes bu ñid |
| ma rtogs bdud rtsi yod mi rigs |

7. | gaṅ las mchog gyur gźan med phyir |
| gaṅ las dam pa gźan med la |
| 'di las phra gyur gźan med pas |
| sna tshogs 'di dag rgyu gcig ñid |

8. | de ni phra daṅ rags daṅ ldan |
| yaṅ ldan gtso bo dbaṅ sgyur ba |
| rab phye 'dod pa'i mthar thug gaṅ |
| rnal 'byor ji ltar 'dod par 'gro |

9. | der ni 'byuṅ ba thams cad kyaṅ |
| bdag ñid du ni 'dus par mthoṅ |
| byis daṅ mkhas daṅ gdol pa daṅ |
| bram ze sogs rnams mñam pa ñid |

10. | bum pa 'byuṅ źiṅ 'jig pa ltar |
| [P 285b1] nam mkha' de yi bdag ñid min |
| lus can 'byuṅ źiṅ 'jig pa ltar |
| de bdag yin pas bdag mi 'dod |

6b graṅ ba: graṅs pa N
6c des na: des ni N, P
7b la: pa NK, PK
8b sgyur: bsgyur DK, CK
9c mkhas: mkhas pa N, P

11. | bum pa'i nam mkha' bźin du gcig
| du ma'o źe na bum pa dag
| chag na dbyer med gcig ñid du |
| thams cad mñam par [N 273b1] 'gyur bar 'dod |

12. | ji ltar bum sogs tha dad kyaṅ |
| sa la tha dad 'ga' yaṅ med |
| de bźin lus ni tha dad kyaṅ |
| bdag la tha dad 'ga' yaṅ med |

13. | ji ltar bum pa'i nam mkha' gcig
| rdul daṅ du bas [P 286a1] bsgribs pa na |
| thams cad de bźin ma yin ltar |
| bde sogs de bźin bdag la min |

14. | bdag ma śes śiṅ ma rtogs pas |
| rmi lam [D 254a1] loṅs spyod ṅa rgyal bźin |
| las [C 254a1] rnams sogs śiṅ dge ba daṅ |
| mi dge'i 'bras bu spyod pa yin |

15. | lus la gnas kyaṅ ma chags daṅ |
| spyod par byed kyaṅ mi gos te |
| 'dod bźin spyod kyaṅ rgyal po bźin |
| sdig pas gnod par mi 'gyur ro |

11c chag: chags NK, PK; dbyer: dbye NK, PK

11d mñam: ñams NK, PK

15b mi: ma C; gos: dgos N, P

16. | gcig pu [N 274b1] kun khyab rtag pa ste |
| tshaṅs mchog 'chi ba med pa'i gnas |
| rnal 'byor pa yis goms byas na |
| de ni yaṅ srid len mi 'gyur |

17. | de ni rtag par rtog med pa |
| ṅag gi spyod yul gaṅ ma gyur |
| blo ni dbye bas phrogs rnams kyis |
| de la tshig tu sbyor bar byed |

18. | phyogs su lhuṅ ba ma yin pas |
| [PK 31b1] 'dir ni 'di yaṅ 'di ltar dpyad |
| phyogs la chags pas bsgribs pa'i blos |
| ji ltar [DK 28b1] bden [NK 28b1] pa'aṅ rtogs mi 'gyur |

19. | bdag yod [CK 28b1] pa ni [D 255b1] bkag pas na |
| 'gro ba'i rgyu yaṅ de bźin te |
| des na de mthoṅ grol [C 255b1] ba ni |
| mi bden par ni rab brtags ñid |

20. | byol soṅ rnams la 'jig tshogs lta |
| lhan cig skyes yod źi ma gyur |
| kun ñon moṅs kun rtsa ba'i phyir |
| de ñid khyod kyis śin tu spel |

16a pu: po DK, CK
16c yis: yi N, P; goms (byas) *abhyāsa, rtogs, (s)gom pa, usually for -bhū meaning understand, perceive, cf. e.g. Yuktiṣaṣṭikā no. 1, Ms vetti, i.e. *rig (byas), *śes (byas); na: nas N, P
17b ṅag: gaṅ N, P, DK, D, CK, C
17c phrogs: phrog N, P
19a pa: pas NK, PK, DK, CK; pas: pa NK, PK, DK, CK
20a 'jig: 'jigs N: jigs PK, P; lta: blta NK, PK
20d kyis: kyi NK, PK

21. | 'jig tshogs lta la źen pa yi |
| bdag 'dzin bdag gir 'dzin pa dag
| gaṅ las 'khor ba 'byuṅ 'gyur ba |
| de ñid grol ba yin par smra |

22. | myos par gyur la myos 'gyur bźin |
| de lta ba yis źi 'gyur na |
| śin tu ma źu'i nad ldan la |
| kha zas zos pas phan par 'gyur |

23. | rig byed smra bas bdag de ni |
| [D 256b1] rnam pa [C 256b1] gñis su 'dod byed de |
| lus źes bya ba bciṅs bdag daṅ |
| mchog na gnas pa grol pa'i bdag

24. | mchog tu 'dzin pa bdag gi yul |
| bdag blo ji bźin don ma yin |
| bdag ni 'di źes mchog 'dzin phyir |
| lus [N 277a1] la bdag gi blo bźin no |

25. | yoṅs su brtags pas yod na yaṅ |
| khyod kyis bdag gis ci źig byed |
| gzugs daṅ sgra sogs yul rnams la |
| blo'o źe na de mi rigs |

21a la: ba N, P; yi: yin C
21b gir: gis NK, PK; dag: de N, P : daṅ C
21c ba: bar NK, PK, DK, CK; 'byuṅ 'gyur ba: 'byuṅ bar 'gyur N, P
21d yin par smra[s]; Ms uditā, i.e. "denoted", better ud+√i, "emerged", T *byuṅ bar 'gyur
22b yis: yi NK, PK; 'gyur: gyur NK, PK, DK, CK
23c źes: źe PK
23d na: ni CK
25a brtags: btags NK, PK, DK, CK; pas: pa NK, PK, DK, CK; na yaṅ: na'aṅ NK, PK
25b kyis: kyi NK, PK, DK, CK; gis: gi PK

26. | gzugs sogs yul la blo dag ni |
| byed po bdag ni med kyaṅ skye |
| rkyen la bltos pa'i skye yin phyir |
| me śel gyis ni me bźin no |

27. | gaṅ yaṅ yi ge'i bdag ñid sgra |
| de yi byed po bdag mi 'dod |
| mñan bya'i phyir daṅ sgra yin phyir |
| dper na brag ca ji bźin no |

28. | 'dis ni lus kyi bya ba gźan |
| 'oṅ ba daṅ ni 'gro ba daṅ |
| lag pa rkaṅ pa gyo ba ni |
| mtshan ñid lhag ma rnams kyaṅ bkag

29. | rnam par bcad nas kun śes las |
| kun śes dran pa ñid las dran |
| so sor rnam par rab śes las |
| śes rab ñams su myoṅ las tshor |

30. | xx xx xx xx xx xx xx |
| xx xx xx xx xx xx xx |
| xx xx xx xx xx xx xx |
| xx xx xx xx xx xx xx |

26b skye: ste PK
26c bltos: ltos DK, D, CK, C
26d śel: śes P; gyis: gyi NK, PK, DK, D, CK, C
27b mi: min DK, CK
27d ca: cha NK, N, PK, P
29d las: la D, C

31. | śes [D 258b1] sogs byed par smra że na |
| byed pa ñid [C 258b1] du sgrub pa 'am |
| de las gźan pa'i byed po ñid |
| gcod byed bźin du rigs ldan min |

32. | byed pa po la rkyen ldan gyis |
| gaṅ phyir byed pa la min pas |
| des na gtan tshigs ma grub pa'am |
| ma ṅes [PK 32a1] pa ñid yin par 'gyur |

33. | śes la sogs pa byed [DK 29a1] po ñid |
| byed po'i sgra'i brjod pa'i phyir |
| lhas byin gyis ni gcod do [P 292a1] źes |
| ji ltar [CK 29a1] byed por mthoṅ ba bźin |

34. | 'dus byas phuṅ po byed bral ñid |
| 'di la byed por [NK 29a1] brjod bya ste |
| byed pa yin phyir mar me yis |
| gsal bar byed pa yin pa bźin |

35. | yaṅ dag gtso gcig byed po min |
| gaṅ phyir gcig gis bum mi byed |
| des na mar me sogs byed po |
| gdags pa par ni mi 'dod do |

31d byed: byad C
32a la: ni N, P; gyis (ego): gyi N, P, D, C: źiṅ NK, PK, DK, CK
32c des: das C
33b sgra'i: sgra yis N, P, DK, D, CK, C
33c byin: sbyin NK, DK, CK
34a byed: bye NK, N, PK, P
34b por: par NK, PK
34c yis: yi NK, PK
35d pa par: ba bar P: pa bar N, D; Ms upacārika', T *ñe [bar] gdags par

36. | 'dod chags sogs kyi dbaṅ phyug sems |
| gzugs sogs yul la mṅon źen pa'i |
| thar pa mi mthun phyogs kyis phrogs |
| 'khor ba'i btson rar bciṅs pa yin |

37. | lag pa la sogs tshogs pa ni |
| sems bcas sems can źes bya ste |
| gtoṅ ba la sogs sems 'byuṅ ba |
| yod pa gtoṅ por la sogs brjod |

38. | rig pa skyes pas ma rig sogs |
| kun sbyor ldog par gyur pa'i phyir |
| chags sogs 'chiṅ ba las grol ba |
| grol ba źes ni brjod pa yin |

39. | nam mkha' 'dra ba'i bdag la ni |
| 'di dag thams cad brjod par dka' |
| gal te bdag la lhag chags na |
| nam mkha'i me tog bdag 'dod kyis |

40. | gal te bdag ni raṅ bzin gyis |
| śes pa'i ṅo bor 'dod na ni |
| byed pa la sogs bltos pa'i phyir |
| de ni gcig tu mi rigs so |

36b mṅon: mṅon par N
38a rig pa: rigs pa N, P; ma rig: mi rigs NK, PK
39d kyis: kyi D, C
40a gal te (ego), Ms yadi: gaṅ phyir NK, N, PK, P, DK, D, CK, C, reading *yasmāt, yataḥ; gyis: gyi NK, PK
40c bltos: ltos DK, D

41. | bdag sogs śes bya yod pas na |
| śes pa ldog par mi 'gyur te |
| don byas zin pa'i mar me yaṅ |
| raṅ gi rgyu las skye bar mthoṅ |

42. | ji srid yod la śes 'byuṅ ba |
| de srid sa bon sogs 'gyur te |
| ji srid sgra ni yod gyur pa |
| de srid sgra brñan 'byuṅ ba bźin |

43. | byed pa med par śes pa ni |
| 'khor ba ji ltar śes pa yin |
| kun tu khyad med yin pa'i phyir |
| gaṅ las ji ltar bciṅs daṅ grol |

44. | sdug bsṅal las kyaṅ thar min te |
| thar daṅ gcig tu smra ba'i phyir |
| bdag las de ni gźan min phyir |
| ji ltar me daṅ tsha ba bźin |

45. | ñams daṅ ma skyes [D 261b1] pa yi blo |
| byed pa med par ji ltar yin |
| gaṅ pos gcod par byed pa yaṅ |
| sta re med par ji ltar rigs |

41d rgyu: rgyud D, C

42a ji srid (ego): ci srid NK, N, PK, P, DK, D, CK, C; yod la (ego): yin la PK: yid la NK, N, P, DK, D, CK, C; Ms sato, T *yod la, T yid la, *mateḥ, a *lectio facilior* prompted by the adjacent śes and sa bon?

42c ji srid: ci srid NK, N, PK, D, C: ci srin P

43c khyad (ego): khyab NK, N, PK, P, DK, D, CK, C

45b par: pa N, P, D, C; yin: min NK, PK

45c gaṅ pos, "filler, filled", Ms pūrnaka, "woodpecker", T *śiṅ rgon

45d sta re, "ax", Ms paraśu, "beak", T *rva mchu, bya mchu

46. | me yis sreg ces [DK 29b1] smras [CK 29b1] pa na |
| me yis sreg kyi byed [PK 32b1] pas min |
| de bźin blo yis rig smras pas |
| śes pas rig gi skyes bus min |

47. | rdza mkhan bźin du de mi 'grub |
| de yi ṅo bo med pa'i phyir |
| sreg byed bźin du'aṅ 'grub [P 295b1] mi 'dod |
| bsreg bya med [NK 29b1] pas me med phyir |

48. | gal te mi śes byed po daṅ |
| za po khyod kyis śes ji ltar |
| mkha' 'dra rtog pa med pa yaṅ |
| luṅ 'ba' źig gis brtags ci bya |

49. | mi śes pa 'am śes dṅos min |
| 'di ni dṅos po med par 'gyur |
| dṅos med bdag du mi 'gyur te |
| 'di ni mo gśam bu bźin no |

50. | gaṅ la gnod daṅ phan pa las |
| gaṅ la gnod daṅ bde mi 'byuṅ |
| de de'i bdag tu mi rigs te |
| nam mkha' de ba śar ma'i bźin |

46a yis: yi NK, PK; sreg: bsreg DK, CK: bsregs NK, PK; ces: byed N, P
46b: sreg (ego): bsregs NK, N, PK, P, DK, D, CK, C
46c yis: yi N, P; rig: rigs D, C
46d pas: par D, C
47c sreg: sred DK, CK
48b ji: ci N, P, DK, D, CK, C
48d brtags: btags P, D, C
49a pa 'am: pa'am NK, PK, DK, D, CK, C
50b bde: bdi DK
50c de'i: yi NK, PK
50d ma'i: ma N, P, D, C

51. | ñi tshe'i bdag daṅ [N 284a1] grol bar ni |
| bsam gtan śes sogs kyis 'dod na |
| bdag med don la 'bad pa yis |
| śi ba mi 'chir ji ltar 'gyur |

52. | ñi tshe'i bdag ni bdag las gźan |
| źe na thams cad skyes bu yin |
| de ni ñi tshe gñis bdag daṅ |
| phyi źes dam bcas ñams pa yin |

53. | bdag las ñi tshe'i bdag de ni |
| gźan min źe na'aṅ dam bcas ñams |
| gaṅ yaṅ bdag gi bde sdug sogs |
| 'gro bas mi śes gtso bo min |

54. | gal te phra yin 'di che min |
| chen po yin na phra ba min |
| gcig kyaṅ ma yin gzugs kyi chos |
| ji ltar gzugs med bdag gi yin |

55. | gcig ñid du ma'i ṅo bo ru |
| glaṅ po'i dpe 'di mi rigs te |
| sna ni glaṅ du mi 'dod phyir |
| sna tshogs rnams kyaṅ gcig ñid min |

51a dan: gaṅ N, P, D, C
51c yis: yi NK, PK
51d 'chir: 'chi N, P, D, C
52c bdag: dag NK, PK, DK, CK
53b źe: źi NK, PK
53c gi: gis N, P

56. | gaṅ yaṅ bdag ni ñi sogs mdog
| yin na mdog bral ji ltar yin |
| bdag de du ma'i ṅo bo yi |
| dper na pa la śa mi 'dod |

57. | gcig pu pa la śa med de |
| kun tu 'gyur ba'i bdag ñid daṅ |
| ji ltar rtsa ba sogs du mar |
| rkyen la sogs pas 'byed pa'i phyir |

58. | gtso bo ñid daṅ dam pa ñid |
| de las gźan la bltos nas 'dod |
| gcig ñid yin na tshul 'di ñid |
| yod par ji ltar 'dod par bya |

59. | gal te bdag de rdzas [D 264a1] yin na |
| rdzas yin [C 264a1] phyir na kun khyab min |
| bum pa bźin du rtag mi 'gyur |
| des na 'gro [DK 30a1] ba rgyas ji ltar |

60. | rdzas ni rten du rigs 'gyur na |
| [PK 33a1] bdag ni rdzas su mi [CK 30a1] rigs te |
| nam mkha'i me tog ji lta bar |
| de bźin ma skyes phyir rdzas med |

56c yi: yis N
57c du: su N, P
58b bltos: ltos DK, D, CK, C
59d ji: ci N, P, D, C
60a 'gyur: gyur NK
60cd ji lta bar | de bźin, *yathā tathā, Ms yataḥ tataḥ, *gaṅ phyir de'i phyir

61. | thams cad byuṅ gyur byuṅ ba daṅ |
| 'byuṅ 'gyur bdag med ji ltar mthoṅ |
| bdag med bdag tu mi rigs te |
| ji ltar dṅos med ṅo bo bźin |

62. | byis sogs khyad par med ma yin |
| rten med pa daṅ dpe med phyir |
| bdag [NK 30a1] gcig yin na du ma yi |
| skyon rnams 'byuṅ bar 'gyur ma yin |

63. | tsai tra'i bdag de mai tra'i byed |
| mai tra'i bdag gi'aṅ de bźin te |
| tsai tra tha dad min dṅos phyir |
| yaṅ na [P 298b1] yul la dbye med phyir |

64. | bde daṅ sdug bsṅal spyod pa daṅ |
| de grol bas kyaṅ grol ba daṅ |
| de bciṅs kyaṅ bciṅs pa daṅ |
| de sdug pas kyaṅ sdug ñid 'gyur |

65. | bum pa'i nam mkha' dper bstan pa |
| [C 265a1] kun la de ni 'byuṅ ma yin |
| gaṅ phyir nam mkha' gcig ñid du |
| khyod kyis de ni ma grub ste |

62b rten: brten NK, DK, CK
63a tsai: tse NK, PK, DK, CK; mai: me NK, PK, DK, CK
63b mai: me NK, PK, DK, CK
63c tsai: tse NK, PK, DK, CK
65d kyis: kyi NK, PK, P, DK, D, CK, C

66. | rdzas kyi ṅo bos gaṅ stoṅ pa |
| de ni kun rdzob nam mkha' yin |
| de la 'gro ldan 'gro ba daṅ |
| de ni skabs 'dod skabs can no |

67. | des na nam mkha' sgrib med min |
| skabs sbyin pa yaṅ ma yin te |
| de yod gtan tshigs smras pa yis |
| gtan tshigs 'di yaṅ ma grub ñid |

68. | rgyu las ñe bar ma byuṅ ba |
| nam mkha' dṅos por mi 'dod do |
| de ni gcig kyaṅ ma yin te |
| mo gśam gyi ni bu bźin no |

69. | bum sogs gzugs kyi sa rnams ni |
| sa yi rigs su gcig na yaṅ |
| rdza sogs gźan daṅ [P 300b1] gźan yin ltar |
| des na bdag ni gcig ma yin |

70. | śes ñid phyin ci ma log pas |
| śes 'di ṅa rgyal mi rigs so |
| mi śes ñid na'aṅ log med pas |
| mi śes ṅa rgyal mi 'dod do |

66a kyi: kyis N, P
67a mkha': mkha'i NK, PK, DK, CK
68a las: la NK, PK
68b do: de CK
69c rdza: sa N, P, D, C
69d bdag: gźan NK: gźam PK; after v. 69 NK 30a4 here quotes v. 14ab, cf. supra, obviously prompted by the context of v. 70
70a log: logs N, P, C
70d do: pas P

71. | nam mkha' bźin du 'gyur med phyir |
| de bźin chags pa med pa'i phyir |
| bdag ni byed por mi rigs la |
| za ba po yaṅ mi rigs so |

72. | byed po bdag yin mi gos pa |
| byed po'i 'bras bu 'dod ji ltar |
| mi dbaṅ [DK 30b1] sdig daṅ bcas pa'i phyir |
| rgyal po'i dpe ni mi [CK 30b1] rigs so |

73. | [PK 33b1] phyi rol la ni ma bltos par |
| gcig ñid ṅo bo ñid mi rigs |
| gcig ñid daṅ ldan pas śe na |
| de ni de daṅ ldan ma yin |

74. | du ma ñid du brtags pa daṅ |
| bsal ba gcig ñid yin źe na |
| ji ltar brtags pa kun rdzob phyir |
| des na gcig de don dam min |

75. | rtag daṅ gcig sogs ṅo bo yis |
| [P 302a1] don dam de yod yin źe na |
| gcig sogs sgra daṅ blo 'jug pa |
| don yod na ni skyon med 'gyur |

72b ji: ci NK, DK, D, CK, C
73a bltos: ltos DK, D, CK, C
73b gcig ñid ṅo bo ñid: Ms ekatādvitīyasya, T *gcig ñid ṅo bo gñis
73c śe: źe NK, P, DK
74a brtags: btags N, P, D, C; daṅ: dag NK, PK, P, DK, D, CK, C
74b bsal: gsal NK, N, PK, P, DK, CK
74c brtags: btags N, P, D, C
74d de: ste DK, CK

76. | gcig la sogs par rnam rtog pa |
| 'de ni ji ltar mi rtog [NK 30b1] [N 289b1] ñid |
| rnam par rtog pa'i yul don la |
| tshig 'jug pa ni ma bkag go |

77. | 'di ltar blo yi yul min daṅ |
| ṅag gi spyod yul min ji ltar |
| brjod med rtog pa med pa yaṅ |
| sṅar bstan rigs pas brdzun pa ñid |

78. | xx xx xx xx xx xx xx |
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79. | xx xx xx xx xx xx xx |
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80. | xx xx xx xx xx xx xx |
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| xx xx xx xx xx xx xx |

76a rnam: rnam par N, P
76b ji: ci N, P, DK, D, CK, C; rtog: rtag NK, PK, DK, CK
76c rtog: rtogs NK
76d pa: par NK, PK, DK, CK
77b ji: ci NK, PK, DK, CK
77c rtog: rtogs N, P, D, C
77d rigs: rig NK, PK
78-84 lacking in all Tib. recensions

81. | xx xx xx xx xx xx xx |
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82. | xx xx xx xx xx xx xx |
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83. | xx xx xx xx xx xx xx |
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84. | xx xx xx xx xx xx xx |
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85. | śes bya ye nas ma grub pas |
| blo yi yul du mi rigs so |
| blo yi yul las log pas na |
| ṅag gi yul las log pa'aṅ yin |

85d gi: gis C

86. | de bźin gśegs pa'i mi brdzun [N 290a1] pa'i |
| lugs 'di dge bar śes nas ni |
| de phyir mu stegs 'dod skyes te |
| de la bdag gir byas pa yin |

87. | sṅon daṅ phyi mar 'gal ba yi |
| de yi lugs la su źig dad |
| śin tu rigs mi gcig pa'i phyir |
| lcags las nor bu rin chen bźin |

88. | 'di ltar 'di ni lugs 'di la |
| kha cig dag ni draṅ phyir daṅ |
| lhag ma 'dzin las bzlog pa'i phyir |
| sna tshogs dag tu bstan pa yin |

89. | dṅos po rnams ni ma skyes ñid |
| raṅ bźin bcos ma med pa'i phyir |
| 'di la ñams pa med pas na |
| bdag ces kyaṅ ni brjod pa yin |

90. | tha dad dṅos kyaṅ dbyer med phyir |
| ṅo bo gcig phyir gcig ñid yin |
| kun khyab chos rnams thams cad phyir |
| rtag pa'aṅ de yin mi ñams phyir |

87a yi: yin CK
87b dad: daṅ NK, N, P, D, C
88c las: la N, P
90a dbyer: dbye NK, PK
90d pa'aṅ: pa N, P

91. | ma skyes phyir na skye med ñid |
| de ñid phyir na rga śi med |
| 'pho ba med phyir 'di 'pho med |
| rab mthar thug phyir mchog ñid yin |

92. | gzugs daṅ sgra daṅ dri sogs min |
| sa daṅ me daṅ chu rluṅ min |
| nam mkha' zla ba ñi ma min |
| yid daṅ śes pa'i mtshan ñid min |

93. | thams cad 'di yin raṅ bźin [DK 31a1] phyir |
| ñams pa [CK 31a1] med phyir thams cad min |
| de la ñon moṅs skye med phyir |
| [PK 34a1] dag pa 'di yin źi ñid yin |

94. | de ni brtags pas sgro btags nas |
| brjod bya yaṅ dag brjod bya min |
| ye nas brjod bya ma yin phyir |
| 'di ni dri ma med ces bstan |

95. | gaṅ źig 'di ltar mṅon 'dod pa |
| khyod kyis bdag kyaṅ yin na ni |
| miṅ sogs chos maṅ 'dra ba la |
| skyon med rigs pa daṅ bcas yin |

91d ñid yin: yin ñid NK, PK, DK, CK
93d yin (ego): 'di NK, N, PK, P, DK, D, CK, C
94a brtags: btags N, P, D, C
95d rigs: rig NK, PK

96. | bdag med ñid kyis 'jigs pa rnams |
| 'jigs kyaṅ de ñid la gnas te |
| nam mkha' 'jigs par gyur pa dag
| gźan pa'i gnas 'ga' med pa bźin |

97. | saṅs rgyas 'jig rten gñen rnams kyi |
| de ñid bdud rtsi mchog 'di la |
| 'di [C 270a1] ni 'ga' yaṅ [NK 31a1] bkag med pas |
| [D 270a1] legs par 'oṅs so ñoms par gyis |

98. | yaṅ dag lta la sgrib [P 305a1] med pa'i |
| bdag ni byed po za po sogs |
| rten med brdzun pa'i 'dzin pa ni |
| des na spaṅ ba kho nar gyis |

99. | dṅos rnams raṅ bźin skye med phyir |
| de ñid du na skye med 'dod |
| ṅo bo ñid kyis skye med ñid |
| 'di yi ṅo bo ñid du bstan |

100. | dṅos med ñid ni bdag med pa |
| de ni bdag min 'gal ba ñid |
| bdag med bdag tu 'gyur źe na |
| ba glaṅ min pa'aṅ ba glaṅ 'gyur |

96d 'ga': 'ga' aṅ DK, CK
97a kyi: kyis N, P, D, C
99c kyis: kyi P
100a ni: na NK, PK
100d glaṅ (ego): laṅ NK, N, PK, P, DK, D, CK, C; glaṅ (ego): laṅ NK, N, PK, P, DK, D, CK, C

101. | dṅos po'i ṅo bo med 'di ni |
| ji ltar byed po za por rigs |
| gaṅ phyir mo gśam dag gi bu |
| byed po za por ma yin bźin |

102. | de ltar gyur las skye ji ltar |
| de la ñams par 'gyur ji ltar |
| mkha' la me tog med pa la |
| ji ltar skye 'jig brtags pa bźin |

103. | dṅos po med pa'i yul dag la |
| ji srid blo ni 'jug gyur pa |
| blo yis brtags pas sgro btags phyir |
| de srid gcig la sogs par 'dod |

104. | rtog bcas rtog pa med pa las |
| gaṅ tshe blo ni log gyur pa |
| de tshe blo ni yul med phyir |
| spros pa ñer źi źi ba ñid |

dbu ma'i sñiṅ po las
rig byed kyi mtha' rgyur smra ba'i de kho na ñid la
'jug pa ste le'u brgyad do | |

101b ji: 'di NK, PK, DK, CK
102a las: la NK, N, PK, P, DK, D, CK, C
102b la: las NK, PK, DK, D, CK, C; ji: ci D, C
102d brtags: btags NK, N, PK, P, DK, CK
103c brtags: btags NK, N, PK, P, DK, CK
104a las: la PK

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